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Citizen-peasants: modernity, international
relations and the problem of difference in
Tanzania

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Submitted for the degree of PhD in International Relations

September 2015

Statement

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:.....

Abstract

Darius A'Zami

Submitted for the degree of PhD International Relations

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A running difficulty in African Studies (and beyond) is the need to reconcile *modernity* with *difference*, arising in attempts to account for the impact of colonialism as well as unequal international relations without lapsing into erasure of the manifold realities of African difference. Identifying the peasant vis-à-vis modernity as a salient instance of the problem, this thesis proffers a historical sociology of post-colonial Tanzania, where Julius Nyerere insisted that 'If Marx were born in Tanzania he would have written the Arusha Declaration'. In saying so he was, in effect, pointing to the need, both programmatic and intellectual, to reconcile modernity and peasant-difference.

Drawing upon *international relations* and the framework of uneven & combined development in particular, modernity is theorised as a *process of fission* whilst the peasant is cast as a *protean subject* thereof; the promised reconciliation can be achieved by rendering each as interactive. Building on this framework the main body of the thesis proceeds, encountering and engaging with the peasant-modernity problem along the way, to show the historical process by which a 'citizen-peasant' social form emerged as *combined development*; an intellectual manoeuvre, moreover, that serves to conclude the reconciliation of 'Marx' with 'Arusha'.

Chapters 1 and 2 establish the terrain and Chapter 3 supplies the methodological framework. Thereafter Chapter 4 sets out an account of the unevenness confronting Tanzania in the 1960s, linking that to its international relations in general and with China in particular to establish a pattern of interaction that Chapter 5 builds upon, revealing the Arusha Declaration as the starting point of a historical process from which the citizen-peasant arose, which is the key to the thesis as a whole. Chapter 6 completes the argument, pointing to the entrenchment of that form beyond its origins in the era of Nyerere's 'African Socialism' taking the account up to the conclusion of the 20th century. Chapter 7 concludes, reflecting on the implications of the argument for the contemporary conjuncture.

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Chapter 1: Africa, Modernity and the Problem of Difference

‘If Marx were born in Tanzania he would have written the Arusha Declaration’

- Julius K. Nyerere, cited in (Mamdani 2012, p. 108).

‘Since the rise of the sugar empire and the resultant cotton kingdom, there has been consistent effort to rationalize Negro slavery by omitting Africa from world history...Therefore I am seeking...to remind readers in this crisis of civilization, of how critical a part Africa has played in human history, past and present, and how impossible it is to forget this and rightly explain the present plight of mankind’

- W.E.B Du Bois, *The World and Africa*, [1946] (2007, p. xxxi).

I. The World and Africa: Between Marx and Arusha

On the 5th February 1967 the charismatic president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, unveiled the Arusha Declaration to the nation. It was an ambitious programme of democratic socialism for the country’s modernisation and a seminal moment in its history, crucial to its sense of national identity (Nyerere 1968, pp. 231–250). It was also the signal moment in an era in which Tanzania became famous around the world for its experiment in *ujamaa*¹ or ‘African socialism’. A historical moment of real optimism, that decades later came to be seen by most as a failure, the Arusha Declaration retains a central place in analyses of Tanzanian society. Whilst there are a great variety of analyses available, there is a broad consensus that it was both foundational for national unity and stability as well as being a key source of economic failure (Bjerk 2010, Aminzade 2013a, Lofchie 2014).

Alongside its historical significance the Declaration has generated real intellectual interest. It is, argued C.L.R James, ‘one of the great documents of post-World War II’ (1977, p. 7). Moreover, it is the central plank in Nyerere’s renown in some quarters as a

¹ Swahili for ‘familyhood’.

‘philosopher-king’ (Shivji 2012, p. 103).² What is suggested here, in the first instance, is that grasping its full historical significance for Tanzania necessarily also entails grappling with the Arusha Declaration as an intellectual problem. That problem is alluded to by Nyerere himself in the epigraphic statement above, insisting that Marx would have written the Arusha Declaration. What this amounts to is, on the one hand, recognition of a tension between modernity and difference; on the other hand, it is also an insistence on reconciling the two both intellectually and as a matter of practical politics. Turning now to peruse the contents of the Declaration will serve to unpack this proposition.

Part One founds the Declaration in a series of abstract propositions. Beginning with the equality of all human beings, it proceeds to the political equality of all Tanzanian citizens before finishing by emphasising the importance of a ‘just return’ for labour and the common ownership of the major means of production and natural resources of the nation. At first glance, however, one might think that James was guilty of exaggeration in his high estimation of the Declaration. Seen through the lens of political philosophy, the above seems to be a familiar enough statement of 20th century socialism. At its core is an assertion of the primacy of politics (of equality) over economics, a logic that is inscribed in that sequence of propositions. Setting out from the political equality of all citizens it insists, on that basis, on ‘justice’ for labour and common ownership. In short, political equality must both condition and constrain the market. Accordingly, it is an evidently socialist reaction to the condition of modernity.³

There is a strong tendency in accounts of post-colonial Tanzania to address the era in precisely these terms, explicable in its broad contours as state socialism (Aminzade 2013a, Coulson 2013, Lofchie 2014). And, for the avoidance of doubt, it is simply beyond question that in this loose (but nevertheless instructive) sense Nyerere is speaking to and from that political tradition which Marx’s intellectual project bestrides. The difficulty is that as one presses on to the subsequent parts of the Declaration matters

² Nyerere was, perhaps, appreciative of that designation. As Issa Shivji reports, one of Nyerere’s last intellectual projects in his retirement from political life was translation into Swahili – Tanzania’s *lingua franca* – of Plato’s Republic (2012, p. 114).

³ This is expanded upon in subsequent chapters, but is in its essence a Marxist reaction to modernity, see for instance the collection of essays on questions of democracy and capitalism by Ellen Wood (1995). My point for now is neither recommendation nor criticism thereof, but rather simply that this Part of the Declaration is oriented in the direction of a political philosophy that is premised on a social theory of modernity.

become considerably more complex in thinking through the application of these socialist principles to Tanzania.

In Part Two Nyerere begins to shift his thinking away from foundational political philosophy toward 'the policy of socialism' (p.233-235). He refers to the absence of exploitation (the ambition to classlessness), control of key means of production by *peasants and workers*, which in turn supplies both a notion and definition of democracy and, finally, closes by noting that socialism is a 'belief' that must be engendered through the example of leadership. Necessarily there is a great deal of detailed commentary on this to follow in the general body of this thesis. The salient point for now is that Nyerere has, via policy discussion, offered up an important sociological premise: the broad and deep presence in Tanzania of peasants alongside workers. Indeed, in actual fact, the overwhelming preponderance of peasants vis-à-vis workers.

Whilst this is a basic point, it is not banal. Nor is it a tactical Leninist ploy, a means of taking a revolutionary step on the pathway toward a nonetheless commonly-conceived socialist modernity. Rather it is a *difference* which goes, fundamentally, to the nature of Nyerere's vision of socialism. Peasant difference combines with the imperative of political equality for all citizens to inform a series of arguments that constitute by far the most substantial element of the Arusha Declaration, Part 3 (1968, pp. 235-248). And, reserving points about their plausibility or otherwise to later Chapters, it would appear that introduction of this sociological premise of difference generates a set of increasingly counter-intuitive proposals by reference to the prevailing categories of the very political philosophy with which Nyerere began: socialism.

The first, and it must be said the least counter-intuitive, of these is that socialism must be developmental. Nyerere offers a pronounced vision of Tanzanian poverty, and insists that Tanzania is 'at war' in a fight to move to a 'state of prosperity'. He continues:

'We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution...' (p.235)

Obviously some sort of reference to socialism as a solution to backwardness (development) was common enough in this period. Yet, as he proceeds to sketch that revolution, more novel and intriguing material turns up.

In deliberately folksy language, which betokens the nation-building project that this was, Nyerere first urges that 'money' must not be the primary tool of development. 'A poor man', he writes, 'does not use Money as a Weapon'. Money, sourced internally, can only come from taxes which is simply not sustainable. '[K]nowing all the things which could be done with more milk does not alter the fact that the cow has no more milk!' (1968, p. 237). What he means is that this would depend overwhelmingly on surplus extraction from the peasant. Not only would it be politically inexpedient, it would ultimately be self-defeating since that surplus was so tenuous and limited.

Likewise, Nyerere thought that external finance – whether aid or loans – in the amounts that would be required would not only imperil Tanzanian independence but were also unrealistic since no country is able or willing to suffice all the 'needy countries in the world'. For good measure he adds that 'there is no world government which can tax the prosperous nations...nor if one did exist could it raise enough revenue to do all that is needed in the world' (Nyerere 1968, p. 239). In short, a peasant society such as Tanzania cannot (and should not) tax its way to development; and, in order to be independent, nor must it delude itself that the solution is external aid and loans.⁴

Additionally, that revolution must not, as Nyerere concedes had been done in the past, 'put too much emphasis on industries'. Neither the money nor technical ability for rapid and widespread industrialisation exist. Besides which, inviting external assistance would, he thought, also entail external capitalists that would interfere with Tanzanian socialism. For even if doing so gave 'us all the industries we need...it would also succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism unless we believe that without first building capitalism, we cannot build socialism' (Nyerere 1968, p. 242). In saying so Nyerere is adverting to a belief that historical development is, or can be, multi-linear; making it possible to skip capitalism and directly build socialism.

More important still is that Nyerere proceeds from this line to direct discussion of the peasant and agriculture as the basis of development. In order to avoid the

⁴ Given that Tanzania went on to be a massive recipient of foreign aid and loans, a phenomenon also intimately linked to the crisis it experienced in the 1980s, these claims have a real ring of both irony and tragedy to them (Edwards 2014). This issue will emerge in chapters 5 and 6.

substitution of urban exploitation for prospective capitalist exploitation,⁵ the peasant must be the principle agent of development and agriculture its focus. The means by which this would be achieved were an injunction toward hard work – labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive – and the overall effect would be developmental due to the perceived benefits of collectivisation. Each village would feature an admixture of private plots and collectivised fields, that would make the selective use of inputs such as fertiliser and limited machinery both effective and feasible.⁶

In this way Nyerere thought it would be possible for a peasant society to also be modern. It is an unfailingly socialist vision and contains an undeniable aspiration toward the condition of modernity. Nyerere talks of the use of ‘modern’ production methods in those collective villages, and frequently points to his anxious concern that Tanzania makes a space for itself in the modern world. In an abstract sense it is a vision of *modernity* as a condition of world history, that is simultaneously both an opportunity and a threat for all. For all that, however, it is also an insistence that *peasant difference* dictates a divergence from modernity in its ‘conventional’ form of capitalist industrialisation which is commonly conceived as antithetical to the peasant.

Thus the challenge is to determine whether the apparently contradictory nature of Nyerere’s formulation makes sense both in analytical terms and as a political project. Can Nyerere’s argument that Marx would have arrived at the same formulation be accepted? Or, rather, do the later failures of his political programme to achieve a durable socialism simply reflect the deep contradictions in Nyerere’s view? These are questions of considerable difficulty, and do not admit of a straightforward answer. In this sense this thesis navigates between *modernity* and the *problem of difference*, ultimately suggesting that the missing link is *international relations*.

Before considering how this thesis can constructively engage with Nyerere’s claim it is worth widening the intellectual lens. Doing so reveals the tense relation of modernity and difference as a more general intellectual problem. Far from flowing solely from the idiosyncratic choices of Nyerere, the ‘philosopher-king’, and the specificities of Tanzania, it is endemic.

⁵ Thus offering, long before it became a topic of mainstream concern (Bates 1983), a critique of urban bias.

⁶ A view contained within the Arusha Declaration, but expanded upon in much greater detail later in 1967 in a paper ‘Socialism and Rural Development’ calling for the establishment – through moral cajolement of the populace – of collective villages (Nyerere 1968, pp. 337–366).

Take, for instance, W.E.B Du Bois' treatment of the African continent and world history from which the other epigraph to this chapter is drawn. Writing in 1946-7 and provoked by the erasures intrinsic to the view of 'Africa' as ahistorical, Du Bois was engaged in an ambitious task: the restoration of Africa to its proper place in *world* history.⁷ Starting *The World and Africa* with the epigraphic lines above, his aim was avowedly universalist in nature. Not only had Africa had its own particular histories, he sought to show that they were also historical 'in the same sense' as anywhere else (2007, p. xxxiv). What he means by this is an attempt to intellectually reconcile the particularity (difference) of African history with a sense of its place in universal (modern) world history.⁸

A notion of modernity features in this passage from Du Bois in two ways. Firstly, in a critical sense, as the motive force for those erasures he wanted to tackle; sugar and cotton, the epitome of modern commodities, are seen as impelling the rationalisation of slavery and erasure of Africa from world history. Thus, in a line, Du Bois anticipates a key aspect of the critique that the subsequent post-colonial school would develop, that modernity is epistemologically corrupt inasmuch as it is in service of systematic brutality (Seth 2009).

Yet Du Bois does not stop there. For him modernity is not just the villain of the piece, its second role in his work is present in his allusion to his own motivation. In aspiring to unveil the critical part 'Africa' has played in 'human history' he directed his comments to both the 'past *and present*'. Whilst unhappy with the epistemological role universal categories such as modernity had played, rather than reject it outright he seeks to uncover the agency (or subjectivity) of Africans within it. As such he thought highly of Eric Williams' (1944) pioneering work because it emphasised the central significance of slavery to capitalist-modernity. The example of slavery as a feature of modernity, often rejected, treated as necessarily secondary or insignificant *because* it was so different from metropolitan modernity – wage labour etc. – illustrates the point well and resembles the erasures of the peasant which the Arusha Declaration seeks to grapple with. Thus Du Bois' project necessitated, at least so he thought, the recognition of difference as *intrinsic* to modernity rather than opposed to it.

This, he recognised, would be exceedingly difficult to convincingly demonstrate. 'I still labor [sic] under the difficulty' he wrote, 'of the persistent lack of interest in Africa

⁷ Thus taking direct aim, in his words, at 'the herd of writers of modern history who never heard of Africa or declare with Guernier "*Seule de tous les continents l'Afrique n'a pas d'histoire!*"' (2007, p. xxxii)

⁸ Du Bois was also concerned to make good the erasures of Africa from pre-modern world history too.

so long characteristic of modern history and sociology' since the need for 'detailed researches....is not yet clear to the thinking world' (Du Bois 2007, p. xxxi). The reason for that disinterest, at least in part, was that *modernity* had the appearance of being a property of the western, that is *non-African*, world. What he had in mind were those developments of the 19th century that are usually taken as being definitive of modernity: industrialisation, state bureaucracy and rationalisation as well as nationalism and socialism as related ideologies (Buzan and Lawson 2015). Thus Du Bois reflects, the history of the period 'between the American Civil War and World War I supports me only in part and in some cases appears violently to contradict me' (Du Bois 2007, p. xxxi). Given that this period not only featured those elements of modernity in European and North American societies but was also the apogee of colonialism in Africa, it can be little wonder that Du Bois writes of the appearance of violent contradiction.

The basic nature of that threat of contradiction is the abiding temptation to either interpret any incipient African modernity as simply an external imposition of colonialism or to insist on distinguishing 'Africa' from modernity. In either case, Du Bois would find himself in too weak an intellectual position to contend that Africa has nonetheless played a critical role 'in human history, past and present' (2007, p. xxxi). Thus an acute problem emerges, which is the apparent dilemma of choosing between a modernity conceived as external or African difference conceived as outwith the conceptual boundaries of modernity. If African history was to be established as world history, that dilemma's falsity would need to be established.

Thus what Du Bois is highlighting is a more directly *intellectual* form of the basic problem this thesis is concerned with, whereas the Arusha Declaration is more political in nature. Section II will reveal a tension between modernity and difference that has troubled African Studies long since Du Bois' work; and Chapter 2 shall observe that the problem extends further still, burdening a wide range of attempts to apply social theories of modernity to peasant societies. Thus the significance of the Arusha Declaration does not lie solely in discovering the pattern of Tanzanian history; simultaneously it entails confrontation of a general problem that maps onto the difficulty Nyerere puts his finger on: can Tanzania ('Africa') really be both modern and different, or must difference in some essential sense yield to, or converge on, modernity? Or, in his terms, would Marx *really* have written the Arusha Declaration?

The best reading of this line is that it necessarily connotes *some* conception of modernity by virtue of the reference to Marx.⁹ Simultaneously the reference to the Arusha Declaration imports a notion of fundamental difference: the conjunction of a premise of sociological difference (the peasant) yielding a necessarily differing form of modernity. The third logical element this line contains is the proposition that modernity and difference are nonetheless commensurable.¹⁰ Whilst Tanzanian conditions produce the Arusha Declaration rather than *Das Kapital*,¹¹ Marx would still have been able to write it. The clear implication being that he could do so without self-contradiction. It is this third element, the preferred term here being the proposition of *commensurability*, which is where the real difficulty (and controversy) lies.

The ambition of this thesis is not pursuit of the point in a specifically Marxian vein; instead it is interested in whether and how the general body of classical social theory might, ultimately, be cast as commensurable with difference. And it this is broad ambition that is increasingly adverted to. Take, for instance, Susan Buck-Morss' (2009) reading of Hegel *and* Haiti. The key, she argues, is to recognise the interactive connection of the two, and in that sense she focusses on the 'and' (Buck-Morss 2009, p. 12). Likewise Dipesh Chakrabarty points to a similar ambition in his attempt at 'Provincializing Europe' seeking to 'situate [himself] theoretically at the juncture where we give up neither Marx nor "difference"' (2000, p. 95).¹²

This thesis pursues such ground via a more modest analytical scale and timeframe (post-colonial Tanzania rather than 'World history' *per se*) and does so in historical sociological rather than the grand philosophical-historical register that seeks to rework Hegel. Nevertheless, it similarly looks toward some notion of interactivity to mediate between modernity and difference, thereby discovering their commensurability. The source of that *interactivity* is *international relations*; as such integration of that

⁹ Invocations of Marx were common in commentaries on Tanzania at the time. Indeed, these were often the spirit of critique of Nyerere's project as insufficiently radical or mistakenly divergent from Marx. As such Nyerere's line is intended as a riposte to those critics.

¹⁰ For explicit claims around the necessary universality and diversity of socialism see (Nyerere 1968, pp. 22–23).

¹¹ There are various versions of Nyerere's claim (Nyerere 1968, p. 16). One directly contrasts these two works: 'if Marx had been born in Sumbawanga, he would have come up with the Arusha Declaration instead of *Das Kapital*' (Shivji 2012, p. 108).

¹² For his concluding thoughts on the question of the commensurability, or not, of the universal and 'local' and the 'contradictory but profoundly connected tendencies' in social thought represented by Marx and Heidegger (hermeneutics) see (Chakrabarty 2000, pp. 254–255).

perspective is proposed as being an analytical additive of unique (though not itself sufficient) significance.

The contribution of this thesis, then, can be stated as follows. The Arusha Declaration, as observed before, stands for the centrality of the question of modernity and difference in its Tanzanian context. More concretely stated, the core nature of that difference is indicated through a sociological category: the peasant. Tracing the genesis and then subsequent career of the policies Arusha stood for, a concrete set of historical patterns are derived. Whilst the vision of socialism of the Arusha Declaration undoubtedly failed to take root it is a crucial link in a remarkable chain of causation that goes directly to the issue of modernity and difference. The emergent property of which is what is referred to as the *citizen-peasant*¹³ social formation; a specific hybrid form pointing in its very formulation to the combination of what might otherwise be considered modern (citizenship) and non-modern (the peasant).¹⁴

This analysis relies on interactivity, and international relations in particular, since that is the analytical additive that allows sense to be made of that historical process. This is done through engagement with the key precepts developed by those that are developing a theory of 'Uneven and Combined Development' (Rosenberg 2006, Matin 2013a, Anievas 2014). Due to the basic fact that societies exist in ontological multiplicity they interact with each other. A further consequence is that interaction necessarily impinges upon patterns of development such that they are multi-linear. Chapter 3 will specify the framework by which the thesis will trace the citizen-peasant in precisely these terms; showing it to be an aspect of multi-linear development and, as such, a manifestation of the necessary commensurability of modernity and difference. Put another way, difference is, and must be, inscribed in universal history (Matin 2013b). Thereafter the remainder of the thesis (Chapters 4-7) will add empirical flesh to that framework to complete the claim that the *citizen-peasant* is a concrete historical illustration of the commensurability of modernity and difference via the lens of international relations.

¹³ I note in passing that, in a very different context, Ellen Wood (1989) developed a 'peasant-citizen' category for her analysis of ancient Athenian democracy, of which some use has been made in analysis of the United States in the 19th century (Post 2011, pp. 255, 264-274).

¹⁴ The thesis as a whole is more concerned with the historical sociological bases of citizenship rather than as category of political philosophy. Nonetheless citizenship has its own problem of difference. 'On the face of it', says Ruth Lister, 'to link citizenship and difference is to create an oxymoron...Janus-faced, citizenship operates simultaneously as a force for inclusion and exclusion both within and at the borders of nation states' (1998, p. 71).

Before proceeding though a potential objection, around the necessity of seeking out a point of commensurability between modernity and difference, must be addressed. Why, it runs, do we need to concern ourselves with modernity at all, would it not be better simply to focus on identifying difference? The remainder of this Chapter provides an answer arguing that both African Studies in general (Section II) and more briefly that study of Tanzania in particular (Section III) have been caught *between* modernity and difference. Indeed, it turns out that the difficulties in those literatures is, to a great extent, attributable to that very impasse. As Lynn Thomas puts it, African Studies is still confronted by:

‘one of the most challenging questions faced now by multiple generations of scholars: how to counter the pernicious and persistent positioning of Africa as outside of the modern while simultaneously acknowledging the historical depth, complexity, and difference encompassed within its social domains’ (2011, p. 733).

II. African Studies: colonialism and inequality in international relations

Some sixty years after *The World and Africa*’s publication, on the 26th July 2007 in Dakar the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, gave an instantly infamous speech that well illustrates the urgency of Thomas’ question. He declared that ‘[t]he tragedy of Africa is that the African has never really entered into history...They have never really launched themselves into the future’ (McGreal 2007, Cumming 2013, p. 34). Sarkozy, audacious in his recycling of Hegelian tropes, appears to bely the progress African Studies has surely made since Du Bois wrote. But, turning to that literature in this section, it transpires that in fact Lynn Thomas’ question remains unresolved; it remains unclear how Africa can be positioned as part of the modern world without falling prey to a denial of difference. And it is this which leaves scope for Sarkozy’s reading of ‘Africa’ as ahistorical.

The core tendency of African Studies in recent decades has, quite rightly, been to resile from the false verities of modernisation and dependency theories. Both offered, in their own ways, a mirage of homogeneity. The welcome reaction thereto has been clear-throated insistence on African *difference*. Even so, the course that African Studies has charted has led it into troubled waters. Whilst moving from the illusions of homogeneity that so much thought around modernity has fostered, this advance has come at the cost of an analytical disjuncture between modernity and African difference.

There are two key thematics of this literature in which this is the case, colonialism and international relations. Exploring each in turn, the intellectual costs this has imposed are shown, thereby underlining the dividends that might flow from reconciliation of modernity and difference.

One upshot of these trends has been to lapse into what will be referred to as narratives of success and failure. Treatments of the Arusha Declaration's place in Tanzanian history are a clear instance, rendering it a series of more or less untheorisable historical incidents to be understood as successes or, more often, as failures in their own terms.

There are two responses to the *problem* of difference. The first is an impulse toward its treatment as *inferior* and the second toward its *assimilation*, an impulse to recognise 'common humanity' but at the 'high price of negating differences between self and other' (Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, pp. 9–10). The limitation of the turn away from modernisation and dependency theories, then, is that it addresses the latter but neglects the former. Thus, whilst not themselves reinforcing it, space is left for the reassertion of old tropes of ahistorical Africa in the vein of Sarkozy's speech.

It is for this reason that debate around modernity is a repetitive feature of African Studies. Frederick Cooper (2005, pp. 117–118), for instance, reflects that '[f]or someone of my generation...there is an irony to the modernity fad of the 1990s and 2000s. We cut our eye teeth...on modernization' and yet debates over modernity 'have not gone away'.

Africa and Colonialism

Debate over both the nature and consequences of colonialism have been central features of African Studies and, as Olúfémi Táíwò has complained, colonialism tends to be treated as interchangeable with modernity (2010, p. 3). Beginning with a vision of colonialism as the seedbed of modernity, it quickly becomes a proxy for modernity in general. So conceived, the centrality of colonialism in African Studies also serves to establish the centrality of modernity. Yet, it will be argued, the interchangeable quality attributed to colonialism and modernity serves to entrench a disjuncture between modernity and African difference. Accordingly, it is a significant example of the problem that both Nyerere and Du Bois grapple with.

The establishment of colonial institutions in Africa, especially pronounced in the 19th and early 20th centuries, has long been a central feature of African Studies.

Mahmood Mamdani, in what is already a classic work *Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism* (1996), identifies what he calls a *bifurcated state* as the central legacy of colonialism. Basil Davidson (1992), meanwhile, sees the nation-state as a 'curse'; an artificial set of institutions introduced to Africa by colonialism that are at the epicentre of his account of the problems of post-colonial Africa. Crawford Young (1994) similarly points to the state as a fundamentally colonial institutional innovation that goes to the very heart of African politics. In these three major works, and many others besides, colonialism is considered to have established Africa's pattern of engagement with the external, modern world.

To understand what these perspectives have in common, let us begin with a sketch of how colonialism is seen as having introduced modernity. With the entry of the industrialised European powers and the (very nearly) full extension of colonial power over the continent a pattern of engagement with the rest of the world is enforced. Graham Harrison provides a typical sketch, attributing to colonialism both the creation of 'a national economy' and 'a nation-state'. Colonial incursion generates 'infrastructural development' (railways etc.) and 'the integration of African farmers into global markets' through cash crops that produces a process of 'peasantisation'. Meanwhile some 'small-scale capitalists' emerged from these agrarian processes, able to begin accumulating in their production of cotton, coffee and tea. Furthermore, working classes of a sort began to emerge in the cities as wage-labourers came to be employed to service that new infrastructure. The container for that 'national economy' was the 'nation-state', an often repressive political form¹⁵ that allowed the national economy to function and perpetuate the supply of primary commodities to the world market (Harrison 2002, pp. 4-5).

In the hands of modernisation theory this sort of sketch allows the projection of a straightforward and singular trajectory of (continued) modernisation. The number and size of those 'small-scale capitalists' would continue to grow, as would wage-labour and all the attendant physical and social features of modernity. Any deviation (difference) from that projection was explicable by reference to pathological 'tradition'. Modernity, as implanted by colonialism, either took hold or it did not; by the same token Africa was to either be modern or it was to be different. Meanwhile dependency theory (Rodney 1972), though strictly concerned to take difference (dependence/under-development etc.) more seriously, even more forcefully locates

¹⁵ Thus the idea of the 'overdeveloped state'(Alavi 1972) as a distinctive feature of colonialism had its attractions.

explanatory significance outside of Africa in a global structure of modernity. African difference is still created by - the fault of - imperial modernity. Thus in both cases difference is either irrelevant/pathological (modernisation) or secondary (dependency), and both have been roundly rejected by African Studies in recent decades.

Now all three texts – Mamdani, Davidson and Young – all aspire to take African difference far more seriously than that; indeed they are part of the general turn against both modernisation and dependency theories in African Studies (Young 1999). Their attempts to account for African difference whilst accounting for the centrality of colonialism are both innovative and deeply instructive as to the nature and quality of the tension between modernity and difference.

Mamdani's approach to colonialism and African history has been hugely influential and opens up an enormous intellectual field. The impetus comes from forceful rejection of both modernisation and dependency as 'history by analogy', wherein analysis of Africa is done by reference to categories derived from European history (1996, pp. 9–11). Whilst colonialism was of the deepest significance, it must be understood through distinctively African categories. The specific features of African politics that he identifies are not timeless and immanent, owed to a deep-rooted specific African 'culture'. Rather, he argues, difference was a profound aspect of colonial governance.

For Mamdani the creation of (in Harrison's terms) 'a national economy' did not entail 'a nation-state' in anything like the 'European' sense; but rather a *bifurcated state of citizens* (settlers and/or local elites) on one hand and *subjects* on the other. These are the core categories of African difference in this text. *Citizenship* pertains to the urban features of colonised societies; contrastingly, rural areas were governed indirectly (tribal authorities) by means of 'custom', in which forms of personal dependence (subjecthood) were the dominant political logic. The consequence of this bifurcation was to inscribe both questions of ethnicity and kinship into African politics and a deep divide between town and country.

According to Mamdani these institutional innovations were part of the abandonment of imperialism's wider 'civilising mission' from the mid-19th century onward. Liberal empire that had aspired to transform its the colonies in their own

European image (of modernity) turned instead toward ‘holding the line’ and maintaining order (Mamdani 1996, p. 50, Brown 2006, p. 141).¹⁶

But there is a sociological aspect of this shift too. Recall the ‘African farmer’ producing cash crops as a fundamental feature of colonialism’s generation of African intercourse with the modern world. What Mamdani’s argument emphasises is that the key difference, subjecthood and very limited citizenship, is the means by which that intercourse is regulated; the peasant is governed as a subject in order to maintain the stability of the colony. Difference in this sense is *necessary* to its participation in modernity. Likewise, the political constitution of land ownership is central to that system, regulating access to land, production and distribution.¹⁷ Moreover, as Catherine Boone (2014) has carefully demonstrated, the centrality of land to African ‘political order’ stretches up to the present day.

Thinking back to what emerged from the Arusha Declaration, Mamdani’s work seems to move a long way down the required road of travel. It recognises that both modernity and difference in general, whilst also being sensitive to the particular sociological premise of difference – rural relations, the peasant and so on – which was so fundamental for Nyerere. Mamdani pinpoints how difference is an institutional necessity to Africa’s colonial-modernity. He reveals in specific terms that beneath the homogenous veneer of the global market lies difference. Peasants, governed (or captured) by customary law, participated in the market on that, fundamentally political, basis. As such, *here* it was custom and kinship, not the invisible hand of ‘the market’, which was the essence of modernity.

There are, of course, critics of this account. A common suggestion is that Mamdani’s concepts are too stark and clean and that institutional structures were ‘more varied...more ambiguous, than the notion of the bifurcated state suggests’ (Ahluwalia 2001, chap. 5, Schneider 2006, p. 99). Mamdani’s elegant conceptual structure inevitably invites calls for more nuance and texture. But if that were the only problem one might be forgiven for thinking that Mamdani has already furnished us

¹⁶ Indeed, this switch in grand imperial policy can be seen as a shift from one reaction to the problem of difference to the other. Whereas liberal empire aspires to homogenising immersion, the bifurcated state model is a vision of colonial inferiority, in which citizenship is for the few.

¹⁷ Whereas colonial customary law in India ‘was limited to matters of personal law, in Africa it stretched to include land. Unlike the variety of land settlements in India, whether in favour [sic] of landlords or of peasant proprietors, the thrust of colonial policy in Africa was to define land as a communal and customary possession...procuring basic sustenance required getting customary access to communal land’ (Mamdani 1996, p. 50).

with the conceptual toolkit needed for tackling the Arusha Declaration and its significance even if it left room for more allowance of the messiness of actual history.

The real difficulty with straightforward adoption of Mamdani's framework, however, is as follows. His somewhat structural conception of 'late colonialism' is intended to speak decisively to the post-colonial 'impasse' in which he says Africa finds itself, between 'modernists' and 'communitarians' (Mamdani 1996, p. 3). Yet the whole framework is 'more conducive to finding out about Big Structures than Large Processes' as Chris Youé puts it (2000, p. 408).¹⁸ Why, projecting from the colonial to the post-colonial era, 'should "inherited impediments" continue to have effects?' (Young 1999, p. 154). In the final analysis this is the problem adverted to above, colonialism serves as a proxy for modernity, dictating a set of 'inherited impediments'.

Closer examination of how this works analytically in the post-colonial era reveals the problem. As Mamdani is well aware, the newly independent post-colonial states were by and large intent on reform of those impediments. He accounts for this by sketching the approaches of 'radical' and 'conservative' states (1996, pp. 25–26). Conservative states bridged the urban-rural divide between citizen and subject; but did so by embracing the ethnicity immanent to indirect rule as the organising principle of national politics. Clientelism, the neo-patrimonialism that is so prominent a feature of African Studies now (Bach and Gazibo 2012), was a clear consequence as was the real potential for ethnic conflict between winners and losers.

Radical states, and Mamdani includes Tanzania in this category in *Citizen and Subject* (1996, pp. 172–177), meanwhile centralised power and 'deemphasised' custom and ethnicity in favour of national identity. But, he suggested, that required a push for development that 'deepen[ed] the chasm between town and country' (1996, p. 26). Even if the political tensions around ethnicity might be removed (or weakened) the exploitative relations between town and country, ultimately capital and peasant, were maintained. 'Native authority', in John Lonsdale's (1997, p. 521) droll précis, 'has come to town as party hack'.

The difficulty with this insistence on the abiding nature of the inherited impediments of colonial-modernity in the post-colonial era is that it underplays key aspects of nation-building. The reform process those states entered into, consisting in both powerful claims to the extension of citizenship and the quest for development, were filled with contention and debate (Lonsdale 1997, p. 522, Cooper 2005, pp. 17–18,

¹⁸ Obviously he is invoking (Tilly 1984) here. The point is a general one though, for similar points about the somewhat static nature of Mamdani's argument see (Lonsdale 1997, p. 522, Schneider 2006, p. 113).

51–52). Mamdani's approach insists that those reforms could not fundamentally alter the calculus; the choice was between conservative politics of ethnicity and radical assertion of citizenship but at the cost of authoritarian developmentalism, perpetuating the exploitation of country by the town.

Many of Mamdani's reviewers have suggested these are the sorts of difficulty involved in applying his reading of colonial governance to the post-colonial (Lonsdale 1997, Cooper 2005, pp. 17–18, 51–52). Indeed, some even point specifically to Tanzania as a difficult case (Ahluwalia 2001, p. 104, Schneider 2006). For all the innovation of Mamdani's analysis of the colonial character of African states, the supposition that that character is its post-colonial destiny is more dubious. Indeed it might even be the case that Mamdani has become more sensitive to the point, having recently taken a fresh look at Tanzania (Mamdani 2012, pp. 107–125). In that more recent work he seems open to a wider range of possibilities than the radical or conservative pathways he had sketched.

The condition for the recognition of any *further* difference, beyond that engendered by the bifurcated state of citizen and subject, is an appreciation of agency. Yet agency, in Mamdani's treatment of the post-colonial period, plays a circumscribed role. It is limited to an anti-systemic character and, even after lengthy considerations of resistance to those colonial patterns, Mamdani sees that colonial character as ultimately reasserting itself (Mamdani 1996). Even his apparent willingness to modify that reading in the case of Tanzania sees those reforms as emanating from the exceptional agency of Nyerere (Mamdani 2012, pp. 107–125). Whilst agency is not discounted, it stands outside of the overall structure of his theoretical framework; thus agency ultimately emerges as an exception that proves the rule. In the case of the anti-systemic resistance of *Citizen and Subject* it makes no discernible difference, or, when it does make a difference as in the case of Nyerere, it is untheorisable.

In precise terms what this means is that Mamdani's bifurcated state reconciles modernity and difference only in a synchronic sense. In the period of colonial-modernity he has managed to demonstrate, with deep insight, the commensurability (indeed, indispensability) of modernity and difference. However, modernity and difference remain deeply uneasy bedfellows diachronically speaking. As soon as one attempts to put the picture into motion – to move from 'Big Structures' to 'Large Processes' – that reconciliation begins to break down. Further difference, such as that in Tanzania which this thesis will characterise as the 'citizen-peasant', is neither theorisable nor an aspect of modernity.

In so doing Mamdani runs foul of a warning of his own. It is 'only when abstracted from structural constraint', he suggests 'that agency appears as lacking in historical specificity'. Yet that diachronic disjuncture results precisely in such an abstraction, albeit in time rather than space. 'At this point', he continues 'abstract universalism and intimate particularism turn out to be two sides of the same coin: both see in the specificity of experience nothing but its idiosyncrasy' (Mamdani 1996, p. 11). The very real danger here is that post-colonial experience, radical or conservative, begins to appear as little more than *idiosyncratic* difference. Overall, Mamdani's framework does not justify subscription to Nyerere's claim that Marx *would* have written the Arusha Declaration. The former may (or not) be the domain of a defensible social theory of modernity, but either way the difference of which Arusha is a referent is untheorisable idiosyncrasy, a once-for-all contingency.

Nor is this difficulty confined to Mamdani, even though his approach is perhaps the most innovative. The basic pattern, the view that African difference resides in the peculiar patterns generated by the colonial state, is likewise present in the work of both Basil Davidson (1992) and Crawford Young (1994, 2012).

Davidson views the colonial state in Africa as authoritarian (a point Young develops to an even greater extent), but more importantly as an artificial imposition ill-suited to African societies. This imposition also subverted what would otherwise have been a natural pattern of socio-political development in Africa. Thus Davidson invites the reader to consider 'the road not taken' contrasting what might have been *but for* colonialism with the success of never-colonised Japan (1992, chap. 2). Thus the nature of modern Africa is perverse; the grafting of a modern western form (the nation-state) onto a different society whereby that state became increasingly monstrous, authoritarian and predatory toward 'civil society' (Davidson 1992, p. 11).

Meanwhile, Crawford Young's 'vertebral thesis' is that 'retrospective examination of the African colonial state' - epitomised as *bula matari*, he who crushes rocks - exposes 'some of the frailties of its postcolonial successor' (1994, p. 9). Again, the view is of an alien and oppressive state imposed by colonialism. For that reason, and this is the point of interest for current purposes, the African state must be taken as essentially 'free-standing' in relation to society (Young 1994, p. 24). Both Davidson and, more explicitly in Young's case, conceive of the African state as separate from civil society. That separation is the basis on which, in this thesis' terms, both recognise difference by contrasting it to the alien nature of modernity (the state). This is an intellectual manoeuvre that has vast implications.

To explain this, it is necessary to return to Mamdani, who is troubled by the frequent resort to 'civil society' as a common refrain in African Studies. Indeed, for him, it is a particularly common source of 'history by analogy'. 'Civil society', he says, is a device 'more programmatic than analytical, more ideological than historical'. It is analytically flawed because, in spite of references to its artificiality, it is mistakenly seen as 'a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe' (1996, pp. 13–14). The origins of that formation in Europe lay in a vast and turbulent historical process (Rosenberg 1994, chap. 6), whereas no analogous process had taken place in these African societies. Talk of civil society in such an instance is no less teleological than modernisation theory. The danger, then, is not just that difference is lost when the categories of modernity are applied. Those categories themselves become inapposite. 'Civil society' is the end-result of a historical process of differentiation of political and economic power, state and society, which results in the appearance of an 'autonomous legal sphere to govern civil life' (Mamdani 1996, pp. 13–14).

The entire point of dividing citizen from subject that Mamdani insists on is that governing the peasant required something quite different from civil society. The state could not stand apart from society, it had to directly intervene to constitute and regulate society. Without any doubt this left a great deal of scope for exploitative relations, but it requires great vigilance to avoid illicit reliance on concepts drawn from 'history by analogy'. The cost of doing so is, *inter alia*, that it might appear that a theoretical toolkit is being used to advance our understanding of Africa; but in reality terms such 'civil society', and indeed 'capitalism', are very possibly more harmful than anything else.

Whilst Mamdani's clear-sighted critique of 'history by analogy' in African Studies, so often based on the notion that colonialism imported the categories of European history (modernity), is a singular contribution it also points to a further difficulty. That was the one which Mamdani himself ran into. For in rejecting 'history by analogy' one must still account for the historical significance of the intrusion of the modern world (which to a great extent African Studies has done under the label of 'colonialism'). Mamdani managed to show how the 'Big Structure' of colonialism must integrate modernity with difference. Notably though, he had less success in tracing how that could be worked through as a matter of an ongoing historical process. And tracing the significance of the Arusha Declaration necessarily requires a sense of that process. Furthermore, *if* Nyerere was right (and Du Bois too) it is necessary to show that that process is just as theorisable as, say, the emergence of civil society in European history.

African Studies and International Relations

The key stepping stone in this argument will be a notion of ‘interactivity’ that amounts to a reading of the causal significance of international relations to (African/Tanzanian) social relations in the post-colonial era. International relations, in the broad ‘world politics’ sense of the term, are also the second major thematic after colonialism in which African Studies encounters the modernity-difference problem. Thus, as a preliminary exercise, it is necessary to show the difficulties existing approaches to this very thematic encounter. Has the interactive potential of international relations been missed, and if so why?

Some of the most outstanding literature in African Studies in recent decades has carefully scrutinised ‘Africa and the world’. Whilst diverging in many significant respects, they share an emphasis on the *inequality* of the international system vis-à-vis Africa (Clapham 1996, Bayart 2009).¹⁹ Clearly the notion of inequality has a great deal of purchase, recall for instance Du Bois’ fear that his view of African importance in world history might be subject to ‘violent contradiction’ (Du Bois 2007, p. xxxi). This part of the Chapter will argue that these notions of inequality (or unevenness) have not yet been deployed in a way that is systematically *interactive* in the required sense.

Indeed, related to this point, there is an important sense in which these are often not analyses of African *international relations*. Whilst a robust notion of Africa’s place in world politics is sought, these works exhibit a sharp delineation between social (Africa) and international (the world) levels of analysis. Indeed, this problem is fundamentally related to the difficulties observed above around colonialism, modernity and difference in African Studies. For the disjuncture between modernity and difference in African Studies is also mapped onto the divide between social and international theory; difference becomes associated with the (African) social, modernity becomes associated with its external relations.

The State in Africa: the politics of the belly (Bayart 2009) has, since its first publication in 1989, been amongst the most prominent texts in African Studies and is often taken as a strong demonstration of how Africa’s international context is the key to its distinctiveness. Setting out to establish the ‘historicity’ (in effect, difference) of Africa Bayart points to what he calls its ‘extraversion’. By this he means the specific cultural logic through which African politicians make use of *unequal* external relations

¹⁹ A feature Mamdani regards as one (of three) core tasks for the post-colonial states, pointing to the necessity of ‘developing the economy in the context of unequal international relations’ (1996, p. 287).

to their own domestic ends. That is, concerned with the maintenance of their own power in societies that have limited resources domestically relative to that outside world, they comport themselves so as to best secure resources from the outside.

Like Mamdani, Bayart's canvas is vast and his reading prodigious. Furthermore, he similarly rejects both modernisation and dependency theories in pointed terms, outraged by their homogenising contortions in the name of 'theory'. The 'application to Africa' of dependency theory, says Bayart, 'has given rise to an increase in dogma and hypocrisy'; nor does he think there is much to be said for the 'woolly universalism' of modernisation (2009, p. 5).²⁰ Rather, understood in terms of its own cultural logic, the African state consists of neither modernising nor comprador elites but actually manifests a deeply specific African 'governmentality'. This is what he calls the 'politics of the belly', which is sustained by extraversion. In stark contrast to Davidson and Young the African state in Bayart's analysis is anything but alien.

Difference, this imaginative argument runs, is not threatened or even created by that powerful outside world but is in fact merely sustained by it. Accordingly extraversion *inverts* the categories of dependency as Mamdani points out (1996, p. 10). Whereas dependency theory emphasised structure, Bayart stresses African agency. But both conceive broadly similar relations between Africa and the outside, an African elite sustained by a more powerful outside world which it turns receives various commodities. Yet, Mamdani stresses, for Bayart these relations are 'the outcome of an African initiative' (1996, p. 10).

Actually, that inversion goes further still. Alongside agency and structure, modernity and difference are similarly turned upside down. On the one-hand dependency theory posits difference (underdevelopment) as an upshot of a singular world-systemic market logic that is a derivative aspect of a theory of modernity (Rodney 1972). Difference is secondary to, indeed a product of, the workings of that market logic which, albeit on a world scale, is a peculiarly *social* logic.²¹ Instead Bayart starts with difference, making two broad claims. First, is the distinctive cultural logic.

²⁰ Bayart is also critical of 'Weberian Sociology' that has 'proudly ignored' the continent, pointing to the silences of leading figures Barrington Moore, Reinhard Bendix, Perry Anderson and Theda Skocpol on Africa (Bayart 2009, pp. 5, 275). Chapter 2 shall consider what such work might nonetheless offer to the concerns of this thesis, and finds them limited. Not due to simple ignorance or neglect of Africa, in actual fact we find the opposite: more or less the same problem afflicts their attempts to engage with the historical development of a range of other societies in the face of 'modernity'.

²¹ The under appreciation of something like geopolitics, and its subordination to a social logic of the market, is a core point advanced by Theda Skocpol (1977) in her critique of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974).

Secondly he relies on the fact of inequality and relative material weakness. Thus the *longue durée* 'politics of the belly' operates on a materially richer outside world. To the extent that modernity, or anything else like it, enters into the analysis, it is secondary; incidental to explaining the happenstance of external wealth and power.

Furthermore, in both cases there is no specific significance assigned to fact that African societies exist in multiplicity. Each has a foundational logic (world market or politics of the belly) which is founded in a presumption that society can be conceived in ontologically singular form. Thus in one case a social logic of modernity is prized, whilst reference to anything like international relations is more rhetorical than theoretically real. In the other, a social logic of difference is prized whilst similarly honouring the significance of the international more in the breach rather than observance.

In Bayart's case does this matter?²² After all the homogenising flaws of dependency (and modernisation) are well-known, but the actual drawback of divorcing difference from modernity (and the social and the international) are not. Indeed, Bayart's own argument could be deployed as an objection to the project this thesis is itself engaged in: if modernity and other universalisms are disposed of in favour of clear focus on difference might African Studies not be better off for it?

The consequences of holding modernity at arm's length from African difference are arresting. For, in cleaving to difference in this manner, Bayart's claims to 'historicity' become increasingly divorced from various features of African history. This leads directly to those aspects of his work that reviewers have found most troubling. One of these is the marked emphasis on continuity, the *longue durée* over all else. For Bayart the politics of the belly and the extraversion that sustains it has endured over centuries. To make out that claim he is driven to disavow the *significance*, as opposed to the reality, of various features that are undeniably a part of African history. Most remarkably of all this includes the coming and going of colonialism (Clapham 1994, p. 438). He is fundamentally uninterested in the proliferation and differentiation of institutions, whether forms and features of the state or the market. All are dismissed as insignificant; careful study of any or all of them is a 'pure waste of time' (Bayart 2009, p. 211) because underneath them all is the same cultural logic he begins with.

This, his reviewers have lost no time in pointing out, is astonishing for a text entitled *The State in Africa* (Clapham 1994, p. 439, Young 1999, p. 151). Justification of

²² Especially as notions of extraversion have been fruitful, see for example (Corkin 2013).

these claims is sought through what Clapham calls 'a sleight of hand' (1994, p. 437). Institutions, whether colonial or post-colonial, are deemed to be importations – creatures, that is, of the external sphere – and, conceived as such, cannot impinge upon the politics of the belly because they inhabit different theoretical logics. One is social the other is always and forever external. 'In short', Clapham continues, 'Bayart does not so much contest the conventional 'externalist' view of the post-colonial African state, as erect an alternative model alongside it' (1994, p. 437).

All of which does, at least, suggest one negative conclusion. Whether starting with modernity (dependency) or difference (Bayart), when either perspective is forced to account for its other it does so through ever stricter adherence to its own preferred logic of explanation whether it is the world market or a form of governmentality. The curious thing about this is that it engenders an intellectual stalemate, each side taking comfort in their own strengths and obscuring their weaknesses by externalising them. In neither case, though, is international relations deployed in the sense that this thesis shall.

There are, of course, others that resort to a more developed notion of the international system in African Studies. Perhaps the most notable are Christopher Clapham (1996, 1998) and Frederick Cooper's (2002) 'gatekeeper' concept. Both point to the manifest inequality in Africa's dealings with the outside world with greater attention to the social significance of those international relations. Tracing those arguments now reveals the difficulty of the task at hand.

Clapham's work emphasises the importance of external recognition of sovereignty in the post-war period. Beginning by drawing upon ideas of the quasi-state in Africa (Jackson 1993), Clapham suggests that the shortcomings of African states are such that they fail to establish themselves as full 'Weberian' states with a monopoly on violence and so on. This internal, or social, failure gives the deepest possible significance to external recognition that when obtained yield a host of vital advantages to the recognised state (Clapham 1996, pt. 2).²³

As the cold war receded Clapham considers that African politics became much more fluid. Far less able to exploit a bipolar cold war international scene, its internal weaknesses (as quasi-states) tended toward ever further dissolution of those state forms (Clapham 1996, pt. 3). That being so, argues Clapham, (African) states are relative concepts that exhibit 'degrees of statehood' (Clapham 1998). This is so much so

²³ Herbst (2000) makes a similar set of claims.

that increasingly these states are not the locus of African politics (international and domestic).

Over the course of the thesis, concerns with some aspects of these claims will be raised. The post-war world was not as friendly to post-colonial Tanzania as this supposes, and certainly not automatically so. Moreover, the vision of African states as different from western states is one thing but understanding them as ‘failed’ Weberian states leaves something to be desired. First, it neglects the diversity of African politics. ‘For every Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia, there is a Botswana, Tanzania and Kenya’ (Brown 2006, p. 135). That is, for every ‘failed’ state there is an African state that is relatively robust, stable and authoritative. Second, it veers toward another variant of ‘history by analogy’, understanding African difference by reference to what it is not (‘Weberian states’).

Third, and most importantly for now, Clapham’s logic of explanation alternates *between* social and international levels. Whilst this is surely an advance on Bayart’s subordination of the international to the social, it still imposes an intellectual cost. Setting out from the notion of African state weakness, Clapham is offering an ‘internal’ or ‘social’ logic for that weakness. Based on that, he proceeds in a second intellectual moment to conclude that external relations are therefore deeply consequential. Thus each logic proceeds along parallel lines, occasionally being related to each other by Clapham. At the African (social) level, weakness continues and increasingly results in economic crisis. Separate thereto is the transition from Cold to post-Cold war world politics. Thus, finding itself ever weaker, any given African state finds the external world now far less advantageous. Articulation of the reasons why this division between social and international dimensions is a limitation is a complex point and reserved for Chapters 2 and 3. For the time being it can simply be noted that this division, for better or worse, obtains in Clapham’s work.

Indeed, a similar division obtains elsewhere in disciplinary IR’s approach to Africa. A body of insurgent critique has emerged here, deeply troubled by the very pronounced neglect of Africa by ‘traditional IR theory’ (Dunn and Shaw 2001, Shaw 2001). The reason for which, they suppose, is that IR theory is inapposite to the realities of African *difference*. The accusation is that it is altogether too wedded to a Eurocentric idea of ‘Westphalian’ nation-states as its units of analysis. Thus it ignores regions of the world, such as Africa, which do not match that Westphalian image.

The point is then developed into a suggestion that IR’s core theoretical category, *anarchy*, is itself inapplicable to Africa’s place in international politics (Shaw 2001).

Instead, runs this argument, *hierarchy* is the dominant ordering principle of African international politics as properly understood. Furthermore, these categories are in fact inverted since anarchy is understood as being the ordering principle of African *domestic* politics. The rationale is that because Africa stands at the lower ends of an unequal international system established by European nation-states, it is hierarchical from an African perspective. The end of formal colonialism does not alter this in any fundamental sense, tending more to substitute the IMF and World Bank for the colonial powers in those positions of authority.

William Brown points out that this critique turns on a dichotomous understanding of anarchy and hierarchy (2006). This consists of a basic misunderstanding of what anarchy in IR theory is intended to encompass. If anarchy is the division of the world politically, the fact of unequal power does not in any way preclude it; an international system can be both anarchical and hierarchical so long as that hierarchy is not absolute. And, if it were, then it would be in no helpful sense international. Thus this critique of 'traditional IR', from within the discipline, is actually a critique premised on a social theory; because African states and society are *unlike* the Westphalian image, its international relations must be different.

Thus if 'it is at the international level that the extraordinary drama of modernity rises up to its full height' (Rosenberg 1996, p. 5) then Africa has no role to play in modernity in this sense either, other than to suffer what it must. If, as Inayatullah and Blaney (2003) suggest it could be, IR should be recast as the science of difference this critique is not a promising basis either. For it starts from a premise of social difference and concludes that this entails a focus on hierarchy. In Brown's sense this leaves IR's central observation with nothing to offer. Likewise, so far as social analysis goes in this critique, modernity and (African) difference seem as distant as ever. Once again the point is not to offer any particular critique of those propositions, except to say that it is more social than international and therefore does not operationalise the international as a fundamental premise in the manner this thesis recommends in subsequent Chapters.

What can be said, however, is that the leading texts of African Studies (Mamdani and Bayart) and its core thematics (colonialism and unequal international relations) all exhibit a problematic understanding of modernity and difference. For the most part the tendency that emerges is that each exhibits a preference for one or the other. In reaction to the distortions of modernisation and dependency theories this has, in recent decades, tended in the direction of emphasis on difference. But in the absence

of resolution of awkward conceptions of its connection to modernity, this has produced notions of Africa as different in an idiosyncratic or untheorisable sense.

African Studies: narratives of success and failure

Whether this matters does not depend solely on one's belief (or not) in the possibility of theory. For the drift to untheorisable difference has also generated what can be called *narratives of success and failure* in African Studies. In actual fact, approaches to the Arusha Declaration are a near classic instance of the genre.

Crawford Young, seen earlier advancing a colonially derived analysis of the African state (1994), has more recently produced a text with a more pronounced emphasis on the post-colonial era (2012). In doing so he adopts a framework that proceeds explicitly in terms of success and failure, or what he calls 'cycles of hope and disappointment', which overlaps with wider discursive waves of 'Afro-optimism' and 'Afro-pessimism'. These proceed in three cycles. The first is from 'the euphoria of independence' to the disappointments of single party rule in the late 1960s. The second from the 1970s and renewed optimism in state expansion and the high-water mark of developmentalism which then gives way to the 1980s and the failures of economic development, crisis and decline. The third, in the aftermath of the cold war, starts with the optimism of democratisation which once again gives way to a more mixed picture in the early 21st century (Young 2012, chap. 1).

Plainly this narrative has considerable purchase on post-colonial African history. What is concerning about this is that the implication is that as each wave of optimism gives way to failure there is a return to the drawing board, a reassertion of a default position. There is a sense in which this impinges both on social theory and on the political programmes that are adopted in each period. In both senses projects such as the 'African Socialism' of the Arusha Declaration are seen as not just contingent, idiosyncratic responses to any given set of conditions but also fundamentally in the nature of temporary experiments.

Upon failure in their own terms – and the cliché that all political lives end in failure surely hints that this is neither rare nor peculiar to Africa – erasures of difference become a possibility in both intellectual and programmatic terms. In this regard it is worth noting that amidst each of Young's successive cycles of hope and disappointment one or another *homogenising* universal notion reasserts itself. In the 1960s and 70s it was developmentalism; in the 1980s Robert Bates' *Markets and States*

in *Tropical Africa* (1983, 2005) and the articulation of universal market rationality; whilst the 1990s wave of democratisation literature was deeply influenced by the Fukuyamist *zeitgeist* (Fukuyama 1992, Clapham 1993).

By conceiving of a phenomenon such as the Arusha Declaration as a failure,²⁴ the analytical categories that tend to reassert themselves are those drawn from the dominant strains of social theory at the time. Thus in any of Young's three cycles one could identify strong strains of African Studies that approach their subject matter through a series of negative propositions. One variant of this common theme is the suggestion that Africa is 'still not yet capitalist' (Saul and Leys 1999). Narratives that do not go beyond 'success and failure' thereby engender recurrent cycles 'history by analogy'.

This section began with Nicolas Sarkozy's Dakar speech of 2007. It is not coincidental that he sought to buttress his image of ahistorical Africa as follows:

'The African peasant, who for thousands of years has lived according to the seasons, whose life ideal was to be in harmony with nature, only knew the eternal renewal of time ... In this imaginary world, where everything starts over and over again, there is room neither for human endeavour, nor for the idea of progress' (McGreal 2007).

The timeless 'African peasant' is a timeworn trope, and one might express surprise at its recycling in the 21st century. But to do so risks missing an important aspect of the intellectual difficulty in question. To illustrate his notion of history by analogy Mamdani makes direct reference to Goran Hydén's (1980) thesis that the Tanzanian peasantry was 'uncaptured'. That thesis, Mamdani complains, proceeds by establishing the ways in which 'Africa is *not* like Europe, where the peasantry was "captured" through wage-labour' (Mamdani 1996, p. 13). Moreover, it is a key way in which Africa, for Saul and Leys, is *not yet capitalist*.

Yet it is precisely this set of negative propositions that risks obscuring what it was the Arusha Declaration *did* vis-à-vis the peasant and therefore what its ongoing significance even after its formal programme had fallen away might be. Yet that is precisely what is often done. No less prominent an Africanist than Frederick Cooper has suggested that whilst the Arusha Declaration was a 'radical alternative', upon its failure Tanzania reverted to 'being a conventional impoverished country' (2002, p. 180).

²⁴ Plainly it was a failure in some very important senses, denial of which would be bizarre. My point is not denial of failure, so much as that recognition of failure ought not be conceived as necessarily an intellectually exhaustive point.

This pattern is noteworthy, proceeding from ‘radical alternative’ (i.e. idiosyncratic) via failure through return to ‘conventional impoverish[ment]’.

It is the objective of this thesis to break out of the intellectual limitation of this resetting of the intellectual framework. And it has been the contention of this Chapter that the means to doing so are to be found in reconciliation of modernity and difference. That is, as Nyerere would have it, to re-read Marx *and* Arusha as compatible with one another.

III. Modernity and the Peasant in Tanzania

Writing an Introduction to the same collection of his essays which contained the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere offered the most sustained elaboration of his thoughts on this problem (1968, pp. 1–32). Having reiterated his Marx and Arusha claim, he offers a basic methodology:

‘A really scientific socialist would therefore start his analysis of the problem of a particular society from the standpoint of that society. In Tanzania he would take the existence of some socialist values as part of his material for analysis; he would study the effect of the colonial era on these attitudes and on the systems of social organization; he would take account of the world situation as it affects Tanzania. After doing all that he would try to work out policies appropriate for the growth of a modern socialist state. And he could well finish up with the Arusha Declaration and the policies of ujamaa!’ (Nyerere 1968, p. 17)

On the same page he insists that the outcome of such analysis would vindicate his own programme for the skipping capitalism and pursuit of ‘African socialism’ instead. The elements of this method are threefold: 1) a set of values,²⁵ 2) the ideological and structural impact and legacy of colonialism and 3) ‘the world situation’. The second and third broadly map onto the primary concerns of African Studies observed in this Chapter, colonialism and the world context (international relations in the broad sense).

Thus proceeding from (1) which Nyerere, at least, was convinced were a set of social values that pushed in the direction of socialism, Nyerere invokes the (2) legacy of colonialism, which in a sense is an invocation of the sociology of Tanzania as it stood at independence; and, as was observed, the peasant was a central sociological

²⁵ The apparent contradiction of materialist philosophy might be deliberate on Nyerere’s part. Either way, it is probably meant as a reference to what Nyerere regarded as ‘traditional African values’ of familyhood which he regarded as being open to a socialistic orientation rather than a philosophical provocation.

category in Nyerere's analysis of Tanzania. Thus in Chapter 2 which follows, the body of social theory on modernity *and* peasant will be scrutinised for what it offers this attempt to re-read both Marx *and* Arusha.

The most interesting point from Nyerere's method is the close proximity of the sociological (2) to the international (3). What, he wondered, was the 'affect' of the 'world situation' for Tanzania? *If* Nyerere's intention was to suggest through their close proximity that (2) and (3) were intimately linked, Chapter 2 will build progressively toward further encouragement of that intuition.

Chapter 2: 'This report of my death was an exaggeration': Peasants, modernity and incommensurability

"For those who savor historical irony it is indeed curious that the peasant in the modern era has been as much an agent of revolution as the machine, that he has come into his own as an effective historical actor along with the conquests of the machine. Nevertheless the revolutionary contribution has been very uneven..."

Barrington Moore Jr. (Moore 1966, p. 453)

Introduction: peasants under capital?

Embarking upon the search for Marx *and* Arusha, this Chapter takes the first step, finding out both the content and liabilities of both modernity and peasant. Turning to the resources of both classical and contemporary social theory, it discovers that the incommensurability of each concept is inscribed in their intellectual makeup. Accordingly, this is not just an issue for Nyerere in Tanzania, nor still is it peculiar to African Studies; it is also a general problem of social theory.¹ From Marx and his commentators (Mitrany 1951, Duggett 1975, Coulson 2014), by way of post-colonial theory (Chakrabarty 2000, Chatterjee 2011, chap. 10) and on through to Barrington Moore (1966) this problem is diagnosed with a view to its resolution in subsequent Chapters.

At the outset it is intriguing to note that none of the theorists engaged with in this Chapter neglect to consider the relation between modernity *and* peasant. Indeed, all have devoted a great deal of scholarly effort to understanding their relation. The real point of interest, then, lies in uncovering why their attempts to address the issue nonetheless run into difficult waters. Conceiving, often inadvertently, the peasant as

¹ Indeed, the problem is more general still. Even the general *peasant* problem of difference examined in this Chapter is just an instance of a more general problem of difference (Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, Rosenberg 2016, p. 11).

antithetical to modernity – each Section will get down to definitional matters – these approaches are confronted by a two-sided problem: *either* the peasant’s continued existence in spite of modernity *or* the bare fact of the intrusion of modernity in some meaningful sense on the peasant.

So confronted, there is a tendency for each theorist to appeal to some kind of *historical process* in order to make sense of the problem. Stipulating that the classical pathway to modernity (England etc.) necessarily involved the death of the peasant as a sociological form, theorists of modernity are tempted to ascribe the continued survival of the peasant elsewhere to its being a leftover of the past during an extended transitional process toward modernity. Thus, runs the idea, as that transitional process unfolds and spreads through the world that classical pattern will recur and the peasant will recede and eventually perish as a social form.² In this sense much of the weight of social theory has provoked both reportage *and projection* of the death of the peasant (Hobsbawm 1995, p. 289). The trouble is that such reports have long turned out – from Marx to Hobsbawm – to suffer from *exaggeration* (as opposed to simple falsity).³

The epigraph above, drawn from Barrington Moore’s work, helps to identify the problem as it flows in the opposite direction, from peasant to modernity. Noting that the peasant has been present in the ‘modern era’, Moore adds an ‘iron[ic]’ complication. Not only have these reports of the death of the peasantry been exaggerations – not dissolving as capital created a world in its own image (Marx and Engels 1985) – the peasant has also been a vital agent (‘of revolution’) in the modern era. More than just a figure of importance in the Arusha Declaration, the peasant has been central to the Russian and Chinese revolutions (Moore 1966, Skocpol 1979) as well as modern India (Moore 1966, chap. vi, Guha 1983, Chakrabarty 2000, Chatterjee 2011, chap. 10). Moreover, this importance stretches up to the present. From ‘post-Socialist China’ (Wen 2007, Day 2013) to the vigorous *La Via Campesina* movement (McMichael 2006) the peasant is an issue that has not gone away. And, if Barrington Moore’s agency point is taken, the intellectual penalty of inability to approach the peasant *qua* social theory begins to seem far too high.

² Philip McMichael notes, critically, that ‘the absence of peasantries in the First World is a key register for development theory’ (2012, p. 8).

³ Mark Twain’s phrase (Fishkin 1996, p. 134) has been appropriated for this Chapter’s title because the impulse to *exaggerate* is central to the problem. It is *not* wrong to suppose that modernity has impacted upon the peasant in profound and often transformative ways; nor *vice versa*, as we shall see.

Indeed some go so far as to posit the peasant as *the* crucial difference in world politics: ‘the disappearance of the peasantry in capitalist Europe’, notes Partha Chatterjee, as opposed to ‘the continued reproduction...of a peasantry under the rule of capital in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America’ is ‘the crux of Chakrabarty’s distinction between History 1 and History 2’ (Chatterjee 2013, pp. 74–75, Chakrabarty 2000). However, in saying so Chatterjee’s usage also points in the direction of the problem. Although the peasant is deemed to be the vital difference, it is captured as ‘a peasantry *under* the rule of capital’. Yet what, in theoretical terms, does it consist of and entail to speak of the peasant *under* capital (or modernity)? This Chapter explains that this far from clear, still less are such claims intuitive. By reason of this theoretical uncertainty, perhaps, Barrington Moore felt impelled to refer to the peasant’s agency under modernity as an ‘irony’.

Primarily concerned with diagnosis of the problem, this Chapter proceeds in Section I to unpack ‘modernity’ (or, for Chatterjee and many others, ‘capital’) to reveal why those that begin from this concept find themselves in difficulty upon trying to draw the peasant into their accounts. Section II reverses gaze, considering attempts to begin with ‘the peasant’ that then progress toward ‘modernity’. It finds that the problem cuts in both directions, whether one sets out from ‘modernity’ or the ‘peasant’, the ever present danger is a backsliding into exaggerations or untheorised perceptions of historical ‘irony’.⁴ Finally it shall be possible to draw these threads together in the Conclusion to point toward the need re-read these concepts as *interactive*, the method for doing so then being offered in Chapter 3.

I. Diagnosis: the incommensurability of modernity with the peasant

Modernity was the principal interest of classical social theory (Sayer 1991, Giddens 2001) and, whilst in some quarters it is seen as deeply problematic, it continues to be a central category for a great deal of more contemporary scholarship (Giddens 1991, Wagner 2012). This includes historical sociology, both inside disciplinary IR and beyond (Rosenberg 1994, Delanty and Isin 2003, Teschke 2003, Buzan and Lawson 2015). In spite, or perhaps because, of the concept’s popularity there is little consensus around its content. All the more reason, then, for its critics to insist that modernity is

⁴ In this paragraph both ‘modernity’ and ‘peasant’ in quotation marks to indicate that the content of both of these concepts is, in an important sense, up for grabs. This is not done elsewhere in the thesis simply because it would be wearisomely repetitive.

far better understood as an intellectual construct or discourse than a theory (Cooper 2005, chap. 5).

Critics aside for the moment, there are two key elements of consensus amongst those that see modernity as an analytical tool or theory. First, that modernity is constituted by some set of *social* institutions, such as capitalism. These institutions, howsoever understood, are seen as fundamentally differentiating, say, the last 200 years from all preceding human history. A second broad point of consensus is that a fundamental quality of modernity is that it is an expansive and dynamic social form.

Moving from consensus to the field of dissent reveals more still of the concept's content. A great deal of debate revolves around the attempt to populate modernity with a particular set of social institutions that can explain its distinctive and dynamic nature. The basic candidates for inclusion amongst these social facts are indicated by Buzan and Lawson's 'tripartite configuration': 'industrialization, the rational state and ideologies of progress' (2015, pp. 3–7). Controversy is aroused principally over whether modernity is an upshot of the interplay of all three (and/or others too) or, instead, flows from a single dominant social institution. One of the most enduring debates in social theory is constituted in this way. For Marx 'capital' is the singular form of modernity and the key to understanding its wider institutional matrices such as that three-way configuration. Weber's approach, meanwhile, was deeply marked by his insistence on multi-causality.

That debate is especially relevant because it seems to point to a clear short cut through the peasant-difference problem. If modernity is truly multi-causal, ought it not be perfectly compatible with peasant difference on a case-by-case basis from the outset? If this is so the peasant-modernity problem is no more than empirical, and this thesis can and should simply proceed straight to facts of the Tanzanian case. To understand why this problem has a prior, theoretical, dimension, further digging into treatments of modernity is called for.

This will reveal a further point of near-consensus, even between a Marxist and a Weberian approach to modernity which is at the epicentre of the difficulty. Even the broad tripartite institutional configuration above is constructed in such a way that it is *not* compatible with the peasantry. This is because a vision of wage-labour and capital as a social logic of reproduction is shared; what is in dispute is whether such a vision is sufficient or merely necessary. Either way, this Section progressively reveals, this forecloses the multi-causal possibility because the peasantry is conceived as incommensurable with that logic of reproduction.

Capitalism, and Marx's approach thereto, is the foremost *singular* conception of modernity. The most powerful version of which is derived from his later work identifying the emergence of a particular set of social relations, containing a logic of reproduction, as the core of modernity (1974, 1990).⁵ Where labour and ownership of the means of production are separated, such that both labourer and (capitalist) owner *must* achieve their *reproduction* (through securing wages and labour respectively) via exchange relations, those relations *uniquely* constitute *dependence* on 'the market' at a societal scale.

On that basis, too, stands what has been called the 'separation of politics from economics' (Wood 1981). For it is only when this condition has emerged that surplus extraction is possible without the (immediate and direct) necessity of political coercion. Accordingly, the *political equality* of putatively modern citizens stands on the basis of their *economic inequality*. Civil society, in this sense, is vital to modernity but it stands on these particular relations. Similarly, the dynamism of modernity in Marx's view flows from these relations too. That is, *dependence* on the market constitutes both the generality of commodity production and its (apparently) ineluctable dynamism (Brenner 1977, Wood 1981, Rosenberg 1994). Thus industrialism is treated as a product of the dynamism these relations create. Similarly, modern politics, both the domestic politics of citizenship as well as international politics in the modern forms of sovereignty and anarchy, emanate from the peculiar separation of politics and economics those relations engender. Finally, that there is a connection, howsoever exactly construed, between these claims and 'ideologies of progress' is clear enough.

This view is most strongly associated with so-called 'Political Marxism', sometimes paid the somewhat backhanded compliment of being so 'rigorous' or 'platonic' an approach to capitalist-modernity that a gap between theory and empirical reality arises (Anievas and Allinson 2010, p. 201). This is not, however, (only) a rarefied local dispute within Marxism. As anticipated above, attachment to the view that modernity is rooted in the social relations of wage-labour and capital is both widespread and in current use (Wagner 2012, p. 83, Buzan and Lawson 2015, pp. 151–152). Furthermore, whilst it will become clear that this gap between 'theory' and 'empirical reality' especially afflicts approaches to the peasantry vis-à-vis modernity, bridging that gap is difficult for seemingly good theoretical reasons.

⁵ For fuller exposition of the following points, see (Brenner 1977, Sayer 1991) whilst careful considerations of its implications for IR are also available (Rosenberg 1994, Teschke 2003).

Take Anthony Giddens, for instance, as representative of a multi-causal perspective. Whilst explicitly advancing a multi-causal view he advances a remarkably similar claim around wage-labour and capital (1991, pp. 56–57) to Marx (Rosenberg 2000, pp. 116–117). His multi-causal purpose is, of course, a significant difference; but it does not detract from the centrality to his argument of that same logic.

A further point should be made about this. Leaving out this social logic of reproduction threatens serious deleterious consequences for social theory. Witness a notable alternative approach, what has been described (polemically) as the ‘Smithian’ view (Brenner 1977). This features market logic at its core: capitalist-modernity is conceived as the natural unfolding of the logic of the division of labour where production is geared toward profit. This view is not just associated with Adam Smith (1982); *early* Marx (1965, 1985) bore its hallmarks, as do the ‘neo-Smithian’ frameworks of dependency and world-systems theory (Wallerstein 1974).

The problem with this view is that it *presumes* the market as a social institution, erecting it as a timeless feature of human society *but for* the presence of obstacles in the way of the expression of commercial human nature. Modernity, in this sense, is no more than an upshot of the removal of said obstacles at some point in history. The consequence is that core institutional features (the market) and effects (dynamism) of modernity are taken for granted rather than explained. Without a clear-sighted theorisation of the *social* logic of reproduction, the intellectual virtues of modernity fall away.

‘The only definite dynamics of Wallerstein’s world capitalist system’ points out Theda Skocpol ‘are market processes’ (1977, p. 1078). The upshot of these *presumptions* around the market is arresting, since what emerges ‘is a vacant and homogeneous totality created by eliminating differences instead of articulating them’ (Laclau 1977, p. 45). Aside from its other flaws, collapsing all difference into homogeneity hardly seems apt to resolve any incommensurability of modernity and peasant.

Polemic from either side apart (Brenner 1977, Blaut 1994), there is a reason why this debate persists nonetheless. Simply put, if the sociological picture of modernity that rests on the relation of wage-labour and capital is maintained, the potential difficulty it will have in encountering difference (from that central logic) is clear. The basic fact of unevenness across human societies, in this case that peasant societies exist in some places even alongside any society that is modern in this sense, means at a minimum that ‘[m]odernity is not a structure but a process’ (Teschke 2003, p. 41).

Yet there is a significant difficulty in shifting toward a mode of analysis that is sensitive to *process*. Indeed, identifying this difficulty points to the basis for the intellectual popularity of ‘Smithian’ approaches in the 20th century in spite of its flaws, whether in liberal or Wallerstein’s more critical vein. For the very ‘vacancy’ in the Smithian conception of the market allows it to be filled with *any* sociological content, virtually at will. Accordingly, *all* forms of labour – be it slave, peasant, proletariat and infinite hybrid variations thereof – can be integrated into the model. If that is the attraction, one should also add that it has been fruitful too, especially for those engaged in the study of the Third World. To give just one recent example, Giovanni Arrighi (2007) has offered a rich approach to the rise of China by building on precisely this vein of thought, locating Adam Smith in Beijing.

It is this openness of the Smithian model that, for all its deep theoretical problems, the strict sociological claims for modernity, for all its other virtues, struggles to match. This can be understood by examining what happens when the strict version of modernity is applied to a diverse (uneven) world; that is, when the analysis shifts from structure to process. Rosenberg, for instance, posits precisely this view of the social reproductive logic of modernity as a central problématique for IR (1994, chap. 5). Proceeding to the final chapter (1994, chap. 6) he seeks to develop a *historical* understanding. But in so doing he encounters significant friction; and the continued existence of the peasant and other forms of labour that have not been separated from the means of production is central to the difficulty.

‘Capitalism, once in existence, has a logic which can be captured by abstract theory’, proposes Brewer, ‘but its origins are a once-for-all process that must be explained in terms of specific historical circumstances’ (1990, p. 36). At first, one might conclude that Brewer’s view threatens to impose a view of pre-capitalist history as entirely untheorisable, a realm of ‘once-for-all process’ in contrast to capitalism that bears an ‘abstract logic’ that is amenable to theory. In fact, the danger is wider. It *also* appears to rule out theorisation of difference that this ‘abstract theory’ of capitalism *subsequently* encounters. Upon an intellectual encounter with peasant difference, say, there is a real risk that it is treated as no less an untheorisable ‘specific historical circumstance’ as pre-capitalist history might be. And this, it will be argued, is what happens as the account of modernity that Rosenberg offers shifts toward accounting for difference amidst the process of modernity’s spread.

In a paragraph concerned with *empirical* sensitivity to difference in dealing with the ‘primitive accumulation’ that is supposed to produce wage-labour and capital, he writes:

‘What *can* [his emphasis] be said, however, is that since for most of history most humans have been *peasants* in possession of the means of subsistence, the emergence and spread of capitalist society *must* [my emphasis] be brought about by a historical process of expropriation which reconstitutes them as propertyless individuals compelled to sell their labour’ (Rosenberg 1994, p. 160).

This is more than mere specification of what *must* happen *if* capitalist society is to exist somewhere (‘emergence’). It is also a claim about the fundamental condition for capitalist-modernity to ‘spread’. Whilst it is noted that its spread was ‘uneven’ (1994, p. 161) the approach to that unevenness falls into the trap that Brewer’s logic encapsulates. For, whilst the actual history of the spread of modernity is messy in the sense that it encounters unevenness, it does not impinge on the theorisation of modernity as that core logic of reproduction. Difference, including peasant difference, is thereby subordinated to, or marginalised from, the ‘abstract theory’ of capitalist-modernity.

Observe how this plays out in the account of the 19th and 20th centuries that follows. It starts with a review of data from the 19th century ‘explosion’ of modernity as a social form, both within Europe and spreading beyond it. The dispossession of European peasants, the migratory spread that gave rise to and the subjection of peasants elsewhere through colonialism are all placed at the heart of the account (Rosenberg 1994, pp. 162–169). Thus far something like Mamdani’s innovative account of the profound difference involved in that ‘subjection’ of the (African) peasantry observed in Chapter 1 has not been precluded by the argument.

It suggests that whilst 19th century imperialism sometimes involved the attempt to implant private property in a direct reproduction of wage-labour and capital relations, it also sometimes opted ‘at least to reorientate production in order to integrate it directly or indirectly’ (Rosenberg 1994, p. 167) in the market. That ‘indirect’ category certainly allows recognition of Mamdani’s analysis, for instance. But so far as the deployment of theory goes it is the achievement of *integration*, rather than its accomplishment through a more diverse set of social relations, that is of interest. Peasant difference, or unevenness, is perilously close to being hived off as a ‘once-for-all’ historical detail in the process of modernity’s spread.

Proceeding to the ‘results’ (Rosenberg 1994, pp. 169–172) derived from that ‘data’ brings the problem further into view, especially as the narrative proceeds into the 20th century. Attendant on the movement between centuries is the shift from British imperialism to US hegemony, a period that is seen as witnessing the fulfilment of the ‘Empire of Civil Society’, which is further supposed to derive from the core social logic of reproduction. Whereas the British era consisted in formal *and* informal imperialism, which allowed some room for the peasant as ‘once-for-all’ indirect feature of modernity, the US era exhibits a pure(r) system of informal imperialism as sovereignty in the 20th century.

Thus in contrast to the admixture of British imperialism (including ‘semi-free’ labour), ‘[t]he internationalization of American production has depended *for the most part* [my emphasis] on the availability of free labour forces and private property rights upheld by alien state authorities’ (Rosenberg 1994, p. 171). Even if ‘for the most part’ is accepted for the sake of argument,⁶ where difference still obtains it is outwith the theory. This time, however, the qualifications associated with the British era are gone; the peasant has dropped out of sight.

If that supposed disappearance were to feature as an explicit element of the theory, the entire theorisation of modernity would begin to seem less stable. Not only would an account need to be provided for how, in theoretical terms, the integration of ‘semi-free’ labour worked, it would also need to show how the theory demonstrates a tendency to extend dispossession. But the theory itself consists of a social logic of reproduction that flows from dispossession, it does not itself theorise that dispossession. That process, in its original form, was a part of Brewer’s ‘once-for-all’ character of non-capitalist history.

The difficulty this imposes is captured by Benno Teschke (2003, pp. 40–41) in remarking that Rosenberg’s ‘thesis overplays the explanatory power of capitalism, leaving the complex historical co-development (but not co-genesis) of capitalism, state, and states-system underexplored’. The greatest virtue of Marx’s theory of modernity – the unique social relations of wage-labour and capital – begins to seem as though it is simultaneously its greatest flaw. The internal logic of social reproduction has real explanatory power, but cannot admit difference into its logic. It seems, drawing out the implication of Teschke, that resort must be made to extra-theoretical matters to make

⁶ If the claim is read as strictly pertaining to ‘the West’ it is a more self-evident claim than if intended to be more encompassing. In the former case, though, it suggests a more limited scope for the explanatory power of modernity.

the theory work. Rethinking this, without reproducing the flaws of Smithian approaches, ‘must not only register its chronological unevenness, but also start from the premise that this course was geopolitically mediated’. That is, difference and the reality of geopolitics (political multiplicity) must be central explanatory features. The spread of modernity cannot be just an ‘economic process’ (a logic of reproduction based on the operation of wage-labour and capital) but also ‘a *political* and, *a fortiori*, *geopolitical* process’ (Teschke 2003, pp. 264–265).⁷

This provides a major clue for progressing with the problem. Pending working out where that clue (and others to follow) leads, for now the problem of incommensurability of modernity with peasant difference has come into view. Modernity, seen as consisting of (Marx) or based on (multi-causal, e.g. Giddens) a social logic of reproduction, encounters the peasant as its theoretical other. Consider Buzan and Lawson’s (2015) ‘tripartite configuration’ of modernity that included ‘industrialisation’. Supposing that the ‘commercialisation of agriculture’ is a condition of both the first and second Industrial Revolution they also reiterate the centrality of wage-labour and capital to that commercialisation. Indeed, the other elements of their tripartite configuration - the rational state and ideologies of progress - both incorporate that social relation one way or another as a premise. This is particularly so through placing reliance on the separation of politics and economics, and the analytical categories of state and market, to develop their analysis (Buzan and Lawson 2015, pp. 147–165).⁸

Whilst there have been many attempts to account for modernity’s spread amidst unevenness (difference), it comes at what for now appears to be a severe cost, critical weakening of the claims and explanatory scope of social theory. For, conceived as a logic of reproduction, it persistently encounters its (peasant) other as untheorisable. Whilst some clue as to the way forward has been noted (e.g. Teschke), it is far from clear that it is even possible to incorporate further elements with the fundamental logic at its heart.

⁷ ‘More often than not’, remarks Teschke, ‘it was heavy artillery that battered down pre-capitalist walls’ as opposed to the metaphorical artillery of commodity prices (2003, p. 265). Curiously, for a remarkably similar point from a writer that sets out from an explicitly Smithian position see: (Arrighi 2007, p. 77).

⁸ In the realm of International Political Economy ‘states and markets’ is a foundational conception, and an ‘undefended dualism’ (Watson 2005, p. 13) which is best understood in terms of those modern social relations (Rosenberg 1994, p. 132). Once again, though, the great virtue of the position is also its limitation, veering toward the erasure of peasant-difference, at least from the domain of theory.

II. Diagnosis: the incommensurability of the peasant with modernity

The full extent of the (apparent) intractability of the problem emerges out of the second diagnostic stage. In this Section social theorists that attribute very real significance to the peasant are examined; curiously, they still find themselves in difficulty, deploying conceptions of the peasant that are incommensurable with modernity in theoretically significant ways. As such, the problem of incommensurability is established as cutting both ways, from modernity to peasant and *vice versa*.

In the discussion of modernity above a broad definition of ‘peasant’ has already been intimated, which can be stated expressly here as the ‘unity of labour and property’ (Mamdani 1996, pp. 204–205). Owning (some) means of production and applying their own labour to it, the peasant cannot be a wage-labourer (or capitalist) in the sense of market *dependency* that was so vital to the theorisation of modernity. A peasant might well participate in market relations, but so long as the ‘unity of labour and property’ holds they are not dependent on that participation *for their reproduction*.⁹ None of this is to say that such a definition adequately captures the historical identity and agency of any particular group – much as the same can be said for the ‘working-class’ (Thompson 1991) – but it will, nonetheless, lead to the nub of the problem with modernity.

In this Section various treatments of the peasant are considered, starting with a set of debates with a more Marxist flavour between Lenin and Chayanov (Bernstein 2009).¹⁰ This debate most starkly illustrates the incommensurability at hand, with Lenin mobilising a view of modernity and Chayanov gaining real intellectual traction by pointing to the liabilities that flow from its incommensurability with the peasant. Encountering difficulties of his own though, Chayanov is likewise propelled toward his own set of exaggerations in an attempt to shore up his intellectual position.

Thereafter two further treatments of the peasant are considered, first the Subaltern Studies group (Chatterjee 2011) that tries to develop a theorisation of the relation

⁹ There are significant variables involved throughout this definition. Ownership or control of means of production can vary in both quality and quantity; more or less of the peasant household’s labour might be applied, indeed it might also be mixed with the labour of others. These variables matter a great deal, but so long the basic unity of labour and property holds they *cannot* be *dependent* on the market. And the point, of course, is that this appears to directly rule out the social logic of reproduction of modernity discussed in Section I.

¹⁰ A Soviet agrarian economist, deeply interested in the peasantry and highly critical of large-scale farming, a position that would ultimately lead to his execution during the Stalinist era.

between modernity and peasant. Yet in doing so they nonetheless still run up against the fundamental difficulty of the incommensurability of each, *qua* social logic of reproduction. The second, and final, body of work is that of Barrington Moore (1966) and his student, Theda Skocpol (1973, 1979). Even though it is an immensely rich body of work, this runs into much the same problem. That said, it also provides a clear clue toward its resolution; which is that social logics of reproduction (wage-labour and capital, peasant) must be supplemented, in some theoretically coherent way, with a theorisation of their *interaction* across an international dimension.

The so-called ‘Agrarian Question’ (Kautsky 1988a, 1988b) which preoccupied many Marxists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, provides the context for a debate between Lenin and Chayanov (Lenin 1960, Chayanov 1986). So well-recognised is their work that each is still seen as constitutive of an intellectual tradition, and the debate between them continues right up to the present day (McMichael 1997, 2014a, Bernstein 2006, 2014).

Lenin, interested in transitions to capitalist-modernity, sought to identify how the peasantry might transform into a modern form in that sense. Dividing the peasantry into three analytical categories of ‘rich’, ‘middle’ and ‘poor’, he claimed the peasantry would be increasingly divided along these lines as both differing ownership of the means of production and differing outcomes of market participation accreted. So much so that these categories would eventually give way to the poorer peasants having to rely on wage-labour to reproduce themselves and richer ones employing that labour rather than their own. Whilst he allowed for a portion of the ‘middle’ peasantry continuing with ‘simple reproduction’ *qua* peasant, he was convinced that this pattern would necessarily take hold and secure the transition to capitalist-modernity (Lenin 1960, Bernstein 2009).

There is one decisive difficulty with Lenin’s position, however, which is that the logic he deploys depends upon market forces conceived as *exogenous* to the peasant society he has in mind. Peasants participate in the market for reasons that are not internal to Lenin’s model. Appeal might be made to one of two justifications for this exogeneity. The first is that it is human nature to enter into market (exchange) relations, and therefore it need not be a specific feature of any model. Second, that those market forces are in a more literal sense exogenous, impacting the peasant society from the outside (e.g. urban areas or industrialised countries), across *unevenness*.

Alexander V. Chayanov enters this intellectual field by both pinpointing and exploiting the difficulty that this theoretical exogeneity poses for Lenin. Without having to deny market participation, he repeatedly presses the basic point alluded to above. Peasants are constituted by a fundamentally *different* social logic of reproduction because of the unity of labour and property, which in no way fosters dependency on the market. Absenting such dependency, Lenin's model of differentiation that gradually converges on classes of rural capitalists and labourers is on far shakier, and certainly less theoretical, ground. Instead peasant households,¹¹ says Chayanov, make decisions about production (utilisation of their own land and labour) that emphasise their demographic life-cycles and the weighing-up of the benefits of consumption against the sheer drudgery of *self-exploitation*. According to this logic any surplus beyond the requirements of subsistence might be marketed, but this is subject to choice, one choice being to simply reduce production (Chayanov 1986, Shanin 2009, Bernstein 2009).

Chayanov, no less than theorists of modernity discussed in Section I, posits an internally consistent logic of social reproduction. The difficulty for Lenin is that he cannot show that Chayanov's logic *must* give way to the logic of capitalist-modernity based on that logic of reproduction alone nor can he introduce alternative logics of explanation without weakening his intellectual position. Even if it is allowed, for the sake of argument, that capitalist-modernity is more productive¹² this will still not sustain Lenin's argument in the face of their incommensurability.

Much like the discussion in Section I, in order to have an impact the raw assertion of *unevenness* between capitalist and peasant society would need to be re-introduced as an element of the theory itself. In the absence of any theoretical means to break the deadlock, both Lenin and Chayanov can be reasonably accused of resort to exaggeration of the extent to which their respective social logics hold water. Lenin insisted that the Russian countryside was converging on capitalism, whilst Chayanov

¹¹ Thinking in terms of peasant households can, of course, conceal that the most exploitative relations in such societies can be *intra-family*.

¹² Chayanov disputes this too, arguing that peasant agriculture is more efficient than large-scale capitalist farming. Whereas Lenin, and the weight official Soviet thinking, drew the opposite conclusion. Comparative efficiency debates along these lines also continue to rage in contemporary debates (Sender and Johnston 2004, Mueller 2011, p. 29, van der Ploeg 2014) but are not of direct concern here. Rather, one objective of the thesis is to show instead that the need for a more dynamic or interactive conception of 'peasants' as combining with aspects of 'modernity' is a more helpful intellectual strategy than comparing two separate models.

insisted that the putatively modern, outside world had not impinged on peasant society in any fundamental way. It was, in this sense, pristine.

The contemporary debate that has been inherited from Lenin and Chayanov persists in this deadlock. Differentiation, along Leninist lines, remains a common approach (Bernstein 2001, Mueller 2011) whilst others persist in treatments of peasants as a radically different and separate 'mode of production' (Hydén 1980).¹³ Unsurprisingly, though, dissatisfaction with the exaggerations (of convergence or pristineness) that follow has impelled participants in these renewed debates to seek a way out. One notable attempt has been to advance categories that purport to capture hybridity. Insisting that theory must address 'actually existing capitalism', it has been suggested that the commitment to the centrality of capital-labour can be maintained by recasting peasants as 'semi-proletarians' or 'worker-peasants' (Bernstein 1990, 2004, p. 202, 2006, p. 456).

Prima facie, compound words such as these appear apt to resolve the problem, specifically pointing toward some kind of combination of peasant and capitalist logics of reproduction. Indeed, this thesis will go on to offer a compound of its own, the citizen-peasant, as a means of re-reading Marx *and* Arusha. Unfortunately, though, Bernstein's terms do not actually combine these logics, serving more to obscure than resolve difference. There is no analytical or theoretical sense in which his 'worker-peasants' evince any trace of the logic Chayanov had pointed to. Rather they are *workers*, in terms of the logic they are subject to, and have only been re-labelled.

The upshot of which is persistence in problematic exaggeration. He says, for instance, that these 'worker-peasants' are subsumed by the deep logic of the 'agrarian question of *labour*' that is only 'manifested in struggles for *land* [my emphases]' (Bernstein 2004, p. 202). Yet there is no theoretical means to actually explain the centrality of land to these struggles. As McMichael points out, '[i]f one asks why labour would struggle for land, rather than adequate employment, the limits of this formulation become clear' (2006, p. 477). This does not mean that there are not substantial portions of humanity that do both earn wages and have an interest in land; the point is that the challenge of theorising such hybridity is so great because as the two social logics do not fit together (or subordinate the other) in any straightforward *and* satisfactory way.

¹³ And both have been directly applied to the study of post-colonial Tanzania (Hydén 1980, Mueller 2011).

One of the most sustained, and innovative, approaches to this issue is Philip McMichael's study of the '*La Via Campesina*' [The Peasant Way] social movement. Setting out from a position that is sympathetic to the peasant in political terms, and sceptical of the soundness of social *theories* of modernity, he goes a long way toward recognition of *both* peasant difference and keen awareness of the impact of modernity (or capitalism, or globalisation) (McMichael 2006, 2008). He criticises the notion that capitalism is a world-historical condition that dictates 'a path-dependent resolution of social forces into the capital-labour relation, and/or that "peasants" are a historical anachronism, as scale is necessary to survive in the market or realize the potential of "social labour"' (McMichael 2006, p. 475).

Whilst resistance to notions of path-dependence in this sense are close to the ambition of this thesis, there are some limitations to McMichael's work as it currently stands, at least *for the purposes of this thesis*. First, since McMichael is interested in a contemporary social movement, his claims are mostly confined to the contemporary conjuncture and an appeal to the distinctiveness of both the era and *La Via Campesina* as a social movement. This temporal limitation is unfortunate, if nothing else because his critics use it to suggest that it cannot impinge on wider historical and theoretical arguments around the impact of modernity on the peasant. Indeed, runs that suggestion, work such as McMichael's ultimately pursues the 'resistance' of the peasantry into a theoretical dead-end (Bernstein 2014).

This limitation is not only due to the choice to focus on a contemporary social movement, it is also partly methodological. If there is a governing theoretical framework to his work it is his prior work on 'food regimes' which is broadly comparable to a World-System logic (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, McMichael 2009). Thus it seems that his reading of *La Via Campesina* fits into that wider framework as a conjunctural possibility that arises from resistance to, and the possibility for change of, the latest ('corporate') food regime. If so, the argument is subject to similar criticism of 'Smithian' views encountered in Section I. Peasant difference is able to participate in the framework because it is disinterested in sociological forms (worker, peasant etc.) regarding all as market participants and potential resisters.

The challenge, in his terms, is to achieve a '[d]e-centering' that 'uncouples *modernity* from its abstracted Eurocentric claims, reformulating it as an unfinished, differentiated, and contradictory project, open to new possibilities' (McMichael 2010, p. 10). This suggests a notion of hybridity, but does not establish the theoretical means to

find and sustain it. Thus, whilst in full agreement with the suggestion, it should be added that it shall not be possible without *theorisation* of those unfinished, differentiated and contradictory elements and their relationship to the peasant. Furthermore, if the only theoretical toolkit left for this attempt is the broadly 'Smithian' set, then the debate is likely to persist in unconvincing premises of a timeless market and valorisation of resistance versus Bernstein's partial but impeccably sociological logic (of modernity) in 'worker-peasants'.

The difficulty involved in moving toward hybridity as a resolution of incommensurability is rendered more explicit still by reference to the second set of literature in this Section: Subaltern Studies. It has focussed on Indian history, and the sociological figure of the peasant, with a deep interest in vindicating *difference* in intellectual and political terms. Its key figures that evince specific, sociological interest in the peasant most clearly are Ranajit Guha (1983),¹⁴ Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) and Partha Chatterjee (2004, 2011, chap. 10); the latter of whom shows especial interest in developing a relevant notion of hybridity. Nevertheless, this body of work likewise reproduces notions of modernity (they tend to prefer 'capital') and peasant as incommensurable, seeking refuge in extra-theoretical fixes (including Chatterjee's intimation of hybridity) to the problem.

Chakrabarty's project hinges on his distinction between 'History 1', which stands for capital's 'being' or 'structural logic', and 'History 2', capital's 'becoming'. The former contains the social theoretical commitments of Marx to the wage-labour-capital relations; the latter category is Chakrabarty's attempt to import *difference*, especially in the form of concrete (peasant etc.) rather than free-labour. Whilst capital attempts to subjugate History 2, it in turn *resists*. Whilst there is theoretical room for peasant difference here, it is aptly referred to as the peasant 'under the rule of capital' (Chatterjee 2013, pp. 74–75). History 2 is reactive (resistant) to History 1. Capital's 'histories are History 1 constitutively but unevenly modified by...History 2s' and therefore capital 'cannot escape the politics of the diverse ways of being human...the restless and inescapable politics of historical difference to which global capital consigns us' (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 70).

The problem with this is that, upon scrutiny, 'capital' is not actually modified by History 2 resistance. The reputed 'modifi[cations]' generated by peasant resistance amount to little more than what Mamdani referred to as 'idiosyncrasy' (1996, p.11).

¹⁴ Guha's (1983, Chakrabarty 2000, pp. 11–16) seminal work was prompted, in part, by critical reaction to treatments of peasant movements as 'pre-political' (Hobsbawm 1959, p. 2, 1973).

Capital is not so much modified as forced to concede a realm of marginal peasant difference. Or, in other words, a peasant conservation zone. As Matin argues, this body of work is ‘insouciant to the differentiated components of its heterogeneous constitution’ in which ‘[m]argins are heard and seen without ever ceasing to be margins’ (2013b, p. 364).

This logic in operation, its limitations and the reason it matters can all be identified by turning from Chakrabarty’s more abstract treatment to Chatterjee’s treatment of peasant questions ‘today’ (2011, chap. 10).¹⁵ His starting point is that there has been a fundamental change in post-colonial India since the foundational work of *Subaltern Studies* (1982). This change entails revisiting ‘the position of the peasantry’ because ‘forms of capitalist industrial growth now under way in India *will make room for the preservation of the peasantry, but under completely altered conditions*’ (Chatterjee 2011, pp. 208–209). The prime mover in this logic is ‘capitalist industrial growth’ (History 1) which just so happens to ‘make room’ for the preservation of peasant difference. The causal flow is primarily from modernity to peasant; it is not the peasant (History 2) that has played any theoretically necessary role in establishing this change. As such History 1 has not, in fact, been ‘unevenly modified’ (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 70) or impacted causally by reason of ‘its heterogeneous constitution’ (Matin 2013b, p. 364).

Part of those ‘altered conditions’ are peasantries ‘under conditions of electoral democracy’. These consist of the ever-increasing penetration of features that seem to come within the ambit of modernity in a broad sense. State services are extended into rural areas, an advance made possible by industrialisation, but are based on ‘*political exchange*’.¹⁶ Meanwhile agrarian reforms that have removed landlords from ‘the village’ have been achieved, in significant part, by the power of the modern state. He also refers to other factors, such as urban migration which fits a similar pattern. The curious thing is that, as a matter of theory, all of these things have happened within the ambit of History 1. Capitalist growth both makes these changes possible, and proceeds according to its own logic (of reproduction). Indeed, whilst reference is made to peasant resistance in its History 2 sense, what really brings these changes about is

¹⁵ An aspect of his broader project around ‘political modernity’ and ‘the politics of the governed’ (Chatterjee 2004).

¹⁶ Specifically *political exchange* is a form that will be deeply significant in the analysis of Tanzania over chapters 4-7 too. I will develop the term ‘political market’ in an attempt to capture this.

the intersection of the logic of capitalist-modernity with a set of 'global norms' for democracy (Chatterjee 2011, pp. 208–209).

All of this, says Chatterjee, is capable of arresting tendencies in History 1 toward dispossession of the peasant. Yet, even if one is entirely convinced of their empirical content, these claims are unavoidably extra-theoretical. 'Democracy', 'global norms' and History 1 do all the intellectual work in explaining how it is that the Indian peasant can continue to exist on the *margins* (Chatterjee 2011, pp. 212–213). Whilst all this generates a second domain of 'political society' and 'non-corporate capital' alongside the categories of classical modernity (civil society and capital "proper"), they are separate from each other; indeed, the former categories are secondary to the latter too. Peasant and modernity are incommensurable as ever; and that incommensurability is only obscured from view by introducing the peasant at the end of a logical sequence of explanation in which it plays no substantial part. It is, in theoretical terms, simply a coincidence that the prevailing winds of modernity (capital plus 'global norms') are favourable to the peasant.

What has been observed so far is a deep incommensurability between modernity and peasant, best exemplified by the debate between Lenin and Chayanov. There is widespread dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, yet it is an abiding state of affairs since discussions of peasant difference vis-à-vis modernity remain rooted in the clash of two, necessarily incommensurable social logics of reproduction. Turning to Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol, the third and final body of literature this Section is concerned with, reveals much the same problem but also the clearest indication yet of the way forward.

Recall the epigraphic statement from Barrington Moore at the outset of this Chapter. Clearly intent on registering the significance of the peasant in the 'modern era' he closely juxtaposes 'the peasant' as an 'effective historical actor along with the conquests of the machine' (Moore 1966, p. 453). However, his view of peasants 'along with' modernity ['the machine', industrialisation and so on], conceals what careful examination will reveal is yet another instance of incommensurability. Each actually inhabits a fundamentally different theoretical framework. One is *political*, in which the peasant is (potentially) important as agent of political revolution in producing communist polities (i.e. the Russian and Chinese Revolutions). The other, in which Moore expresses less formal interest but is actually fundamental to his thought, is what he regarded as the endpoint of political modernisation: modern, industrial society proper (Moore 1966).

Theda Skocpol (1973, pp. 4–9) has been able to detect three key variables in Moore's (1966, pt. 3) attempt at a coherent theorisation of three forms of political modernisation, democracy, fascism and communism. These are (1) the bourgeois impulse, (2) whether agriculture is labour-repressive or market-oriented and, finally, (3) the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. (1) is an attempt to capture the degree of urban-based commercial society that a case exhibits, (2) whether agricultural surplus is extracted through political coercion or market mechanisms whilst (3) is sufficiently self-explanatory for now.

Examination of the operation of these variables begins to reveal the problem. Taken in conjunction (1) and (2) seems to be a reiteration of the core features of modernity discovered in Section I. Where the (urban) bourgeois impulse is strong and agriculture proceeds on a market basis, including and especially reliance on a labour market, Moore is providing us with no less classical a sketch of modernity than Marx himself. Where (2) is the market form, this is especially so. Labour has been separated from the means of production and is now constituted as wage-labour, whilst owners must equally employ labour through economic (the market) means rather than politically coercive ones (this being the other side of this binary variable).¹⁷ Peasant revolutionary potential, (3), meanwhile is almost an index of the *absence* of modernity in that same sense. Where both the bourgeois impulse and marketization of agriculture is absent or limited, their revolutionary potential is high (Moore 1966, pt. 3).

Simplifying matters, it can be said that Moore comes very close to suggesting that *only* where a society is not yet modern, its peasants might very well exhibit agency in terms of revolutionary potential. Indeed, he seems susceptible to the view that peasants cannot be part of modernity in any sense. Where a peasant revolution succeeds, he writes:

‘peasants have provided the dynamite to bring down the old building. To the subsequent work of reconstruction they have brought nothing; instead they have been – even in France – its first victims’ (Moore 1966, p. 480).

It does appear Moore was strongly inclined to regard the peasant as necessarily apart from modern industrial society in all cases, including where it had been vital to bringing around its pre-conditions.

¹⁷ Moore seems to have thought that where *urban* commercial society (1) had arisen alongside a politically coercive regime in the countryside (rather than market) the outcome would be more likely to be fascist (Moore 1966, chap. 8).

Thus, all things taken together, Moore's reference in that epigraphic statement to peasants as actors of the 'modern era' is actually reference to two sharply delineated theoretical frameworks. Modernity in one sense might be immanent in a society (bourgeois impulse and market-driven agriculture) in which case peasant agency is ruled out. In the second framework, where capitalist-modernity does not (yet) exist, the peasant *can* be vital in paving the way for modernity. But as soon as peasants have dynamited the old, modernity returns to the stage to victimise and replace them.

Nevertheless, there is a further interesting feature to Moore's work, and the epigraphic statement in particular. Given the logical underpinnings of his work, the only reason Moore can get away with his suggestion that the peasant has been an actor of the 'modern era' is because of the coincidence in time of modern societies¹⁸ with peasant societies. In fact, his remarks that this coincidence is both a 'historical irony' and 'curious' goes to the very heart of a dilemma in Moore's work which Theda Skocpol identifies. And, in turn, unpacking that dilemma yields another vital clue of the whereabouts of the path out of the incommensurability problem this Chapter has surveyed.

This is found in Skocpol's (1973, pp. 28–30) suggestion that there is a tension between 'intra-societal' and 'inter-societal' approaches in Moore's work, whilst she is in no doubt that the intersocietal must be preferable. Her argument is that Moore (1966, pp. 413–414) seems to struggle in choosing between conceiving his patterned political forms (democracy, fascism and communism) as either 'alternative routes' or 'successive historical stages'. That is: whether these are simply alternatives, the selection of which is dependent simply on what the *internal* conditions of that society happens to be, or, in the alternative, does one society taking a particular route impact the course of history in another? Skocpol (1973, pp. 31–32) seizes upon that indecision to reinforce her preference for an 'inter-societal' argument, which is important, but in doing so she also risks obscuring the theoretical difficulty that explains Moore's hesitation.

How so? Moore might well have preferred the view that these *political* forms had a 'determinate relation to each other' and that the 'methods of modernization...in one country change the dimensions of the problem for the next' (Moore 1966, pp. 413–414). The difficulty, however, resides in giving theoretical expression to the phrase 'dimensions of the problem'. It is straightforward enough to argue that each country, confronted by the severe inequalities in power that modernity gives rise to, is likely to

¹⁸ In the classical sense to which he more or less subscribes.

attempt incorporation of modernity into their own social relations. But if one wishes to consider the possibility of a shift in the *dimensions* of the problem, one needs to be prepared to reconsider the content of modernity itself.

This is a difficulty that cannot be overcome simply by shifting from an intra- to inter-societal gear. And this is best demonstrated by Skocpol's own attempt to address the issue. It might be possible to re-read fascism and communism as 'attempts to maintain substantive national political sovereignty' in the face of a world 'dominated by the earlier "Bourgeois" (economic and/or political) modernizers' (Skocpol 1973, p. 32). But the parentheses here serve to gloss over the difficulty. 'Bourgeois' modernisation, she suggests, might be 'economic *and/or* political'. Yet the forms she proposes as 'successive stages' (fascism and communism) are only the *political* forms which arise on the basis of the original bourgeois separation of politics from economics.

This limitation is evidenced by Skocpol's use of the formulation 'politics in command' (1973, p. 32). It seems to amount to a notion that 'the state' can extend control over otherwise unchanged institutions of modernity (separation of labour and means of production and all that goes with it).¹⁹ That manoeuvre seemed to be sustainable in Moore's original schema because he had deliberately glossed over *socio-economic modernity* by treating it as a variable (bourgeois impulse etc.) but not scrutinising it further. Indeed this was what she called 'the phantom of *Social Origins*' (Skocpol 1973, p. 12).

Moving beyond this 'politics in command' formulation, then, imperils the whole project; and Skocpol is well aware that 'Social Origin's entire structure of assumptions and sequence-explanations collapses' upon doing so (1973, p. 33). However, this is not only (as she thought) due to the addition of her 'inter-societal' perspective. Whilst that would require rethinking many of Moore's arguments, it would also entail direct consideration of the peasant as a social institution in the round. That is, not just as an agent that may or may not react politically to 'phantom' economic processes; but also as social beings *somehow* (and uncertainty here is precisely the point) embedded in those 'economic' processes. Even if that process was one of dispossession of the peasant, transitional in the classical sense to modernity, explanation of this would have to be integral to the theory.

¹⁹ In this regard there is a more than passing resemblance between these formulations and the 'developmental state' as conceived for East Asia (Woo-Cumings 1999, Gray 2014) and increasingly referred to as a possibility in both Africa in general (Mkandawire 2004) and Tanzania in particular (Aminzade 2013a).

And much as was witnessed in Section I, the social logic of reproduction in ideas of modernity (Moore's included), cannot do so. In short, at the same time as integrating an inter-societal perspective Moore would *also* have had to directly confront the incommensurability of the peasant with modernity.

Conclusion: the need for interactivity

In conclusion, following Skocpol in considering a move to an inter-societal perspective might be the key to resolving this incommensurability. But to actually address the issue of incommensurability this *must* be able to account for the peasant as a social element amidst those 'successive stages'. That is, if an inter-societal perspective is to perform the labour required of it, then it must be able to uncover how these two (very) different social logics of reproduction *interact* with one another. Or, put another way, what does it mean in theoretical terms to refer (as Chatterjee does) to peasants *under* the rule of capital?

Taking one final cue from Moore in this pursuit once again, the epigraph above trails off with a vital clue. The revolutionary contribution of the peasantry was, he says, 'very uneven' (Moore 1966, p. 453). Whilst Moore seems to have regarded that unevenness as a *descriptive* feature of his historical irony, much as Lenin and others treated unevenness, the next Chapter shows that unevenness taken in conjunction with an inter-societal perspective is at the heart of the methodological fix to the problem of incommensurability this thesis will deploy to re-read Marx and Arusha.

Chapter 3: The interactive method: Uneven and Combined Development and the reconciliation of modernity and difference

Introduction: re-reading the ‘and’ in Marx and Arusha

This Chapter establishes the method deployed in the thesis to resolve the incommensurability of modernity and peasant *qua* social logics of reproduction; thereby, at last, establishing the means for re-reading of Marx and Arusha. A few clues for its resolution have been picked up in the course of diagnosing that problem.

First, and actually the essence of the problem itself, is *difference*. Second, various signals in the direction of hybridity have been noted. In attempting to account for peasants that subsist in some sense alongside modernity compound terms, such as Henry Bernstein’s ‘worker-peasants’, have been offered as a notion of hybridity that might iron out the difficulties encountered (Bernstein 1990, 2004, p. 202, 2006, p. 456). Whilst it was suggested that these attempts fail to hit the target, the reason was that the hybridity was more rhetorical than real in social theoretical terms. The third clue, meanwhile, lies in the suggestion that modernity¹ must be captured as a process *because* of difference (Teschke 2003, pp. 264–265). Fourthly, and finally, various scatted clues were also detected that ‘the international’ dimension was somehow fundamental to the issue. From the original salience of colonialism and international relations in African Studies, all the way through to the suggestions in Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol’s work, the call that social theory *should* be ‘inter-societal’ became ever stronger.

This Chapter shows that these clues all find coherent reflection in one theoretical framework, Uneven and Combined Development (“U&CD”). Originating in the work of Leon Trotsky (2008, pp. 3–12) his ideas have been systematically organised, and perhaps to some extent reorganised, in the past decade or so (Rosenberg 2006, Matin 2013b, Anievas 2014, Makki 2015). Its broad thrust can be stated as follows. Whilst U&CD is conceived as a *social* theory, difference (clue 1) is not an embarrassment to it;

¹ Moreover, there is no real reason not to say the same of the peasant, even if it seems less urgent for now.

indeed, it is its fundamental premise (Rosenberg 2016, p. 11 and 15). Furthermore, an indispensable aspect of that premise of difference is that it is also seen as (a matter of social theory) generative of an *international* dimension (clue 4) to *social* life. If difference and ‘the international’ are so conjoined, then it is little wonder that the discussion has been recurrently thrust up against international features in its exploration of the problem in Chapters 1 and 2.

Noticing difference and the international, of course, is neither unique nor itself constitutive of a theory. Indeed, both have been repeatedly noticed by many of the thinkers examined thus far. What gives U&CD its particular value is that it proceeds from this premise to further posit that *because* difference so obtains human development (that is, history as *process*) (clue 3) is *combined*. This not only specifically focuses on hybridity (clue 2), it unveils a methodology for deriving it from a specific theorisation (of the general body of these clues). For this reason, the Chapter argues that U&CD offers a method that is capable of generating a sustainable theorisation of peasant-difference amidst modernity as an instance of *combined development*.

The essence of that method is its *interactivity*. By operationalising its premises – unevenness, combination and development – a series of causal mechanisms are derived. When these are applied it becomes possible to not just bridge the two social logics of reproduction in question, but to actually reconfigure the sense of how that reproduction works. In particular, its object is to trace how their *interaction forms part of their logic(s) of reproduction*. It is on that basis that a concrete and theorisable basis for *hybridity* emerges.

Interactivity that founds a notion of hybridity in this sense can be seen as discovery of the fundamental content and consequence of the ‘*and*’ in Marx and Arusha. For, in uncovering the way in they had always been interactive with one another, the fundamental problem turns out to have been the widely held but mistaken view that one could be conceived without the other at all.

Section I discusses U&CD in abstract theoretical terms. Unpacking the content and significance of its foundational premises, it proceeds to discuss the causal mechanisms that the current literature recognises: including a ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘privilege of backwardness’ and ‘substitutionism’ (Trotsky 2008, pp. 3–12, Rosenberg 2013a, 2013b). An important debate around U&CD has arisen amongst its advocates, some insisting it should be primarily understood as a feature of modernity (capitalism) (Allinson and Anievas 2009, Anievas and Allinson 2010) and others that view it as a ‘transhistorical’ abstraction that stretches beyond modernity (Rosenberg 2006, 2009, Matin 2007).

Section I offers some comments on that debate, pointing out how it impinges in an important way on the prospective methodological fix the Chapter offers to the incommensurability problem. This is especially so because it has an important bearing on how the causal mechanisms of U&CD are understood.

Thereafter Section II brings that abstract discussion back together with explicit consideration of modernity and peasantry. It shows how U&CD brings those conceptions together into an interactive whole, proceeding to sketch how that amounts to a method for sketching a historical sociological resolution of their incommensurability in the Tanzanian case. In doing so it also illustrates the key steps of argumentation in this thesis.

In that pursuit Section II expounds the key concepts that the thesis develops and deploys. Flowing from the re-reading of modernity and peasant as *interactive*, these are an articulation of modernity as, *inter alia*, a process of (concept 1) *fission*.² On that basis the peasant can be conceived as a feature of that process of fission; in particular it can be recast as an agent of that process so long as it is also recognised as itself mutable. In consequence, the peasant in such circumstances should be understood as a (2) *protean subject* of (fissile) modernity. Reiterating a point about the causal mechanisms of U&CD from Section I, (3) *substitutionism* in a deliberately broad sense can be deployed as a mechanism for capturing this process, proceeding to show the concrete social-institutional consequences of this process in Tanzania. These are the emergence of what will be called (4) the *political market* as a social logic of reproduction that takes within its ambit interactivity. Finally, upon that basis, the ultimate hybrid form of ‘peasant’ and ‘modernity’ which the thesis offers as a re-reading of Marx and Arusha can be specified: (5) the *citizen-peasant*.

Finally, on the basis of these two Sections, the Chapter concludes with one final overview of the steps in the overall argument. This time it serves to show the particular empirical work each of the subsequent Chapters undertakes in order that the argument can ultimately be completed.

I. Uneven and Combined Development as the intellectual source of interactivity

² This is an analogy to nuclear physics and its notions of ‘fission’ and ‘fusion’. To a great extent conceptualisations of modernity are in the nature of ‘fusion’, thus ‘fission’ is offered as a corrective but *not* an alternative. None of the argument that will follow is intended to suggest that modernity does not also consist of ‘fusion’, some thoughts on which are offered in conclusion in Chapter 7.

Trotsky begins with an oft-quoted line, '[u]nevenness', he says, is 'the most general law of the historic process' (2008, p. 5). Whilst objection to the suggestion that it is a 'law' is sometimes taken, it is actually so straightforward an observation that the greater intellectual jeopardy is its appearance of banality. The point of unevenness is that the social world is *always* ('law') diverse (Rosenberg 2006, pp. 313–319, Anievas 2014, pp. 43–45); 'complexity is the point', says Justin Rosenberg, 'not as patternless jumble, but an inner differentiation of parts, across many dimensions, but within an ontological whole' (2006, p. 316). Secondly, an additional feature of fundamental importance is that 'inner differentiation of parts' also means difference in the sense of *multiplicity*: 'unevenness contains an ontological premise of more-than-one' (Rosenberg 2006, p. 318).

Unevenness, in the sense of difference, could be said to be obvious to anyone. Exploring unevenness to further reveal multiplicity is somewhat more novel; but then again, none of the writers consulted in Chapters 1 and 2 would have needed to be informed that either difference obtains in the general sense, nor in the particular sense that it does so inter-societally.³ The real distinction between U&CD and other usages of unevenness, including those observed in Chapter 2, is that in U&CD it is an initial premise of a theoretical whole rather than simply a description of how things are.

Thus Trotsky's 'principal innovation' (Anievas 2014, p. 41) lies in the addition of *combined development* to unevenness; indeed this is what renders the whole framework interactive in the requisite sense. 'Development...is not only differentiated: it is also, consequently and intrinsically, interactive' (Rosenberg 2006, p. 319). This is so because it is a consequence of multiplicity that any society must be able, in one way or another, to manage its relations with other societies. Therefore, multiplicity 'is everywhere expressed in a condition of inter-societal coexistence'; moreover, when expressed as a proposition of social theory, the vital significance of combined development becomes explicit:

'the conditions of reproduction which define the concrete existence of any given society are not limited to the "internal" structures of social relations which formed the starting point of Classical Social Theory. They always include, by virtue of the bare fact

³ Sometimes referred to as 'the international', but either way can be thought of as 'that dimension of social reality which arises specifically from the existence within it of more than one society' (Rosenberg 2006, p. 308). To avoid the confusion of anachronistic slippage around the international, this Chapter uses 'inter-societal' unless the context specifically allows 'international' (i.e. an impeccably modern context).

of inter-societal coexistence, those external conditions which are the object of diplomatic management' (Rosenberg 2006, p. 320).

Matters have moved quickly, such that a stock check is already in order. From the initial premise of difference and multiplicity (unevenness), and the threat of banality, the logical sequence has moved with speed to what will become *the* reconfiguration of social theory that is required. The modification in question goes to the heart of social theory, proposing that 'conditions of reproduction' – which were the essence of notions of modernity, peasant and their incommensurability – *cannot* be "internal" alone. They must also, and simultaneously, account for the imposition of 'inter-societal coexistence' on how that social reproduction is done.

There are three ways in which combination must be registered to draw out the significance of all this. The first is that any society is 'causally integrated with a wider social field of interacting patterns of development'; this means that events – say, the collapse of an empire – will have causal consequences elsewhere, rippling out to its neighbours and beyond. Second of all, this extends beyond events to 'structures of social, material and cultural life'. Thus events such as collapse of an empire could very well impinge on social institutions, such as trade, and social classes such as those especially attuned to war in deeply significant ways (Rosenberg 2006, p. 321 and 324).

The third and final sense of combination is also the most vital, since U&CD's operationalisation of hybridity revolves around this innovation. Social formations are 'hybrid[s], a changing amalgam of pre-existent "internal" structures of social life with "external" socio-political and cultural influences'. Combination is not something external that impinges on a society because there can be no 'pre-combination' society, instead they are always and everywhere hybrid in nature. This does not mean that all categorical labels must be abandoned, but it does mean that in deploying them they must be understood as necessarily a product of combined development. Thus, Justin Rosenberg further argues, one has 'to abandon at the deepest theoretical level any notion of the *constitution* of society as analytically prior to its *interaction* with other societies' (2006, p. 325).

Completing the logic, this impinges on how 'development' can be conceived too. All societies are hybrid, thus the logic that captures the direction of their change over time (development) is necessarily interrelated with those of other societies. '[T]he results of one instance of social development enter into the conditions of another' (Rosenberg 2006, p. 326). In another sense, development is both interactive *and* itself

consists of (is produced by and productive of) *difference*. Even more simply, development is and must be interactively multiple.

What this amounts to is a theoretically-rationalised *mandate* to reconceptualise social theories of reproduction based on the successive logic of *uneven* and *combined* development to capture the *interactivity* which embraces *hybridity* (the third and final form of combination). The promise of U&CD, then, is resolution of incommensurable social logics of reproduction on this basis; so long, that is, as concrete patterns of interaction can be traced. The question now, of course, is: what is the method for doing so?

The causal mechanisms of U&CD – whip of external necessity, privilege of backwardness and substitutionism (Trotsky 2008, pp. 4–5, Rosenberg 2013b, pp. 195–197) – are, of course, built on those abstractions covered above. As such the eventual outcome of the argument that follows is that the conjunction of core abstractions (U, C and D, as it were) with these causal mechanisms *can* be deployed to the ends of this thesis. To get there, however, a more extensive ground-clearing exercise is called for than might be expected.

‘Under the whip of external necessity’, said Trotsky, a ‘backward culture is compelled to make leaps’ (2008, p. 5). The specific feature of this first mechanism is the fact and nature of this *compulsion*. It is *geopolitical*, inasmuch as that compulsion depends on a multiplicity of societies, exerting pressure on one another. Crucially, this obtains across different – uneven – societies, such that a ‘backward’ (less powerful) society experiences those pressures more acutely and must respond to that stimulus.

The second mechanism, the ‘privilege of historic backwardness’, directs attention to those responses. These responses will not be in the nature of repeating the other, more powerful society’s, pattern of development. Rather it can draw on elements of that development, importing them, without having to retrace the long historical process which originally produced them. Therein lies the ‘privilege’ in all this, since it allows ‘skipping a whole series of intermediate stages. Savages throw away their bows and arrows for rifles all at once, without travelling the road which lay between these two weapons in the past’ (Trotsky 2008, p. 4).

Crucially, though, this ‘would be no straightforward acceleration of an ultimately unidirectional developmental process’ (Rosenberg 2013b, p. 196). That is, U&CD is *not* a theory of accelerated transition toward eventual convergence on a single capitalist-modernity. Yet the ‘privilege of backwardness’ mechanism might, if interpreted strictly and in isolation, appear to imply precisely such a view of transition. Stages are skipped,

and societies move from lower technologies to higher. That this is not so, *as far the explicit mechanisms go*, is best revealed in Trotsky's work by his third and final mechanism.

He introduces this by first qualifying the former 'possibility of skipping' which is 'by no means absolute'. The reason being that it is 'determined in the long run by the economic and cultural capacities of the ['backward'] country'; that is to say that the operation of the mechanism is conditioned by the social nature of its object. Leaving aside the vaguely internalist quality of his language here, which would be a misreading given the thrust of Trotsky's work, it is this qualification which propels him to the next point. These 'achievements borrowed from outside' can, he says with regret, be 'debase[d]'. The 'introduction of certain elements of Western technique and training, above all military and industrial, under Peter I, *led to a strengthening of serfdom as the fundamental form of labor* [sic] *organization* [my emphasis]' and therefore 'a strengthening of tsarism, which delayed in its turn the development of the country' (Trotsky 2008, pp. 4-5).

This is what has been called 'a socio-political "curse of backwardness"' whereby 'the directive role in industrialization would necessarily fall instead to "archaic" political groups'. Whilst this 'third mechanism is a compound of the other two' – whip and privilege – 'it issues in a quite different class of effects' which is neither geopolitical compulsion nor developmental (skipping stages). Rather it 'ramif[ies] social structure'. Referred to as 'substitution', because tsarism stepped in to play a role in industrialisation performed by the capitalist class in classical pathways, the effect was to 'radically differentiate[s] the socio-political structure' (Rosenberg 2013b, pp. 196-197).

Real care is called for in unpacking this third mechanism. For it is pregnant with the most significant aspect of U&CD, at least for the purposes of this thesis, which is a *theorisation of hybridity* that will eventually resolve the incommensurability problem. No longer can there be any mistake that what is under consideration is simply an acceleration in the extension of a uni-linear pattern of capitalist-modernity. This mechanism leads to direct interest in *differentiation of socio-political structure* by reference to the interaction of different societies.

The requirement for care, however, flows from how this general possibility, immanent in U&CD's logic, is expressed as a specific mechanism. For its general quality is imperilled by a temptation to present its operation in binary terms that arise from the circumstances of the specific use to which Trotsky was putting it. These include the terminology of 'curse' as opposed to 'privilege', and the notion of regressive

social classes (tsarism, serfdom) being reinforced as opposed to ‘skipping’ forward. But in terms of its ultimate logic of combination, especially hybridity, there is really no reason why an outcome (radical differentiation) *must* fall into one or the other binary. Nor still need the case be so straightforward that a comparison (tsarism versus capitalist class) exhausts the analytical possibilities.

Indeed, Justin Rosenberg notes, as he transitions from ‘privilege of backwardness’ to ‘substitution’, that:

‘the technical products of development [can] unfold new possibilities when transferred from their original setting into a new one’ (Rosenberg 2013b, p. 196)

This is much closer to an expression of the broad possibilities of hybridity U&CD discloses. Substitution, as it appears in Trotsky’s exposition and subsequent commentary, is a non-exhaustive expression of that broad possibility. In Russia, he thought, the introduction of industry, had resulted in strengthening the hand of tsarism and its basis in serfdom because it had substituted itself for a capitalist class in so introducing industrialisation; and he regarded that as negative, which is hardly a controversial judgment. Nonetheless, a better understanding of what it means as a theoretical proposition is as a mechanism that serves to ‘ramify social structure’. Rather than *necessarily* being reinforcement of a society’s *specific* socio-political structure (tsarism, say) – it is the reinforcement of its *general* logic of social reproduction. This may, or may not,⁴ involve changes so radically differentiating that new categorisations must be developed for the purposes of analysis. Either way though, the core point is the shifting quality and content of the logic of reproduction the effect of which is social ramification.

On this argument, there is no reason in the basic logic of U&CD to exclude the broader possibility by inadvertently narrowing down the field due to Trotsky’s particular application of it. Indeed that is not what is intended by Trotsky either, who amidst his discussion of these mechanisms insists that the ‘laws of history have nothing in common with a pedantic schematism’ (Trotsky 2008, p. 5). Nevertheless, what follows from this is that care is taken to maintain the link between theoretical premises – unevenness, combination and development – and the specific mechanisms invoked. Taken out of their original context the mechanisms Trotsky speaks of might on their own obscure the potential of U&CD.

⁴ Trotsky’s particular example falls into the may not category.

Thus, whilst in the context of the wider U&CD literature it is somewhat idiosyncratic, the term ‘substitution’ shall be used in this deliberately more general sense. Not only conceiving the specific possibility that a class will substitute for the role of another class and thereby also sustain itself, but that the substitution of various social artefacts of the development of one society in another will have profound effects on the logic of reproduction such that it can be reasonably regarded as a radically differentiated hybrid form.

Another point that flows from this, then, is to recognise that the mechanisms Trotsky specifically articulates are not just a straightforward reflection of the general abstractions of U&CD. They are also a product of their application to the analysis of a specific historical conjuncture. This brings the discussion directly to the debate over whether U&CD is primarily (or wholly (Ashman 2009)) a phenomenon of capitalism or transhistorical. The former argument (Allinson and Anievas 2009, Anievas and Nisancioglu 2013, pp. 100–101) is on strong textual ground, inasmuch as Trotsky was focussed specifically on capitalist-modernity and the sociology of industrialisation in Russia (Rosenberg 2006, p. 319, Anievas 2014, p. 51). On the other hand, and as has been suggested, the fundamental logic of U&CD rather suggests that the transhistorical position is the stronger.

This matters slightly less *if* one is prepared to modify the specific understandings of the causal mechanisms in the manner suggested. Nevertheless, objection might be taken to that suggestion on the basis of this debate around capitalism’s relationship to U&CD. For this reason, engagement with that discussion cannot be further put off.

Consider one of the foremost proponents of the view that U&CD is best seen as a ‘methodological fix’ to Marx’s historical materialism because it is primarily a feature of capitalism (Anievas 2014, p. 53). Conceding that U&CD can be ‘a truly *transhistorical* phenomenon’ he nonetheless insists that:

its distinct causal determinations, articulated and expressed through intersocietal competition, are in every instance historically specific to and variable across any given mode of production. Only under the specific sociohistorical conditions of generalized commodity production of the kind found in the capitalist epoch do these determinations take on their full scope and intensity. In the absence of these conditions, the instances and qualitative forms of uneven and combined development will tend to be *context-specific* (Anievas 2014, p. 53).

The invocation of ‘distinct causal determinations’ is significant, alluding to those three mechanisms discussed thus far as Trotsky understood them. In this view they are distinct, moreover, to capitalism as a mode of production by virtue of its ‘rules of reproduction’ (Brenner 2005, pp. 7–8, Anievas 2014, p. 54). Modernity, understood as capitalist, and theorised as an emergent property of the wage-labour-capital relation, begins to come into view once again. Finally, in the absence of capitalism, he says U&CD tends to be ‘context-specific’.

On the contrary, capitalism is better understood itself as context-specific instantiation of U&CD, not the other way around. Consider how the claim that privileges capitalism proceeds:

‘After capitalism emerges somewhere, the self-expanding and totalizing nature of capital locks all against all in the battle to cheapen commodity production through a historically unprecedented development of the productive forces...the ruling classes of all other modes of production must submit to it or face peripheralization’ (Anievas 2014, p. 55).

First, capitalism (modernity) emerges as prime mover (after it ‘emerges somewhere’) that dramatically heightens competitive pressure in world politics. Second, presumably conscious of the Smithian liabilities of detaching his proposition that this ‘generalize[s] commodity production’, he relates this to difference (‘the ruling classes of all other modes of production’) in an attempt to keep the proposition within the proper bounds of social theorization.

Yet it is precisely here that the logic threatens (and it is put no higher than that) to veer away from U&CD as expressed in this Section. For the consequence is said to be that different societies must either ‘submit’ or ‘face peripheralization’. Submission is a broad category and can safely take within its ambit Trotsky’s sketch of Russia, in which the Tsar submitted to the need to industrialise but (because of U&CD processes) in a way that was generative of heterogeneity.

That, as Anievas recognises, cannot be the only logical possibility. Nor is it the only historically observable one. These possibilities are conceived as an alternative to submission, ‘peripheralization’. The implication is that ‘submission’ must be the preferable option; but as a theoretical proposition within U&CD it is not clear exactly why this must be so. First of all, ‘peripheralization’ is not the same thing as ‘loss of independence’. Therefore, and secondly, it is not clear why that should be an option to be avoided according to any rationale that U&CD can properly recognise.

If that is so, then the third upshot is even more troubling than it otherwise would be. If the causal mechanisms obtain properly only with capitalism, and are only interactive with difference in the event of ‘submission’ to generalised commodity production and industrialisation, then any ‘peripheries’ seem to be excluded from the ambit of the theory (or methodological fix). This is because the causal mechanisms so construed cannot have purchase. Where ‘peripheralization’ obtains it appears to be untheorisable because ‘the whip of external necessity’ has not performed its *compelling* function in subjecting said society to ‘generalized commodity production’. There might be technological and social institutional transfer that resembles the privilege of backwardness; likewise, that might well also eventuate in hybridity in a manner that mirrors substitution (in the deliberately, if idiosyncratically broad sense advanced here). But in neither case are they theorisable phenomena if these causal mechanisms flow, as Anievas argues, from what is effectively a capitalism that is ‘analytically prior’ to the processes of U&CD.

Instead it is a consequence of the transhistoric logic of U&CD, and the argument of this Section, that capitalism must be seen as another ‘context-specific’ instantiation of U&CD even if it is a tremendously significant one at that. If so, then capitalism must be registered as being ‘co-eval’⁵ with any societies to which “it” can be traced as interacting with.

All this can be evaded. If one recognises that ‘the fact of geopolitical multiplicity extends historically beyond any individual form of society’ with distinctive causal effects then they cannot be derived ‘from the particularities of any given mode of production, or even...of each and all of them considered individual and serially’ (Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008, p. 87). This does not mean that the mode of production (although more permissive terms like “logic” or “rules of reproduction” are preferable) should be dispensed with as an analytical form. On the contrary, the logic of reproduction *must* be captured because the abstractions of U&CD cannot in themselves ‘furnish the particularities of any given society’ (Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008, p. 88). But it does entail that U&CD cannot be U&CD-“proper” if the logic of explanation begins with an *a priori* ‘pre-combination’ (and therefore ‘internalist’) logic

⁵ ‘Analytically prior’ and ‘coeval’ (Rosenberg 2006, p. 325 and 326) are both terms encountered above, to argue for the theoretical impossibility of conceiving the ‘societal’ without the ‘inter-societal’.

of reproduction. And *that* is the nature of capitalism in Anievas' (and others') treatment of U&CD.⁶

None of this, to indulge in one final clarification, means the term 'capitalism' must be disposed of in order to "do" U&CD. What it does mean is that in order to extend (or maintain) U&CD's relevance for 'peripheral' and/or peasant societies which are incommensurable with the strict logic of the capitalist mode of production then matters should proceed in a 'context-specific' manner. That is, the premises of U&CD and its mechanisms must now be considered with direct reference to the specific historical context of Tanzania and the intellectual context of peasant-modernity incommensurability.

II. Application of the method: modernity as fission and the citizen-peasant

The specific concepts deployed by this thesis begin to emerge upon return to the broad understanding of Tanzania, Marx and Arusha and peasant and modernity derived from Chapters 1 and 2. Proceeding through that discussion these concepts emerge from the application of U&CD and are, in logical sequence:

1. Modernity is (in substantial part) a process of *fission*;
2. The peasant is a mutable element of that process, as such it is a *protean subject* of modernity;
3. The broad notion of *substitutionism* from Section I is reiterated and its application to Tanzania discussed;
4. The ramified social logic of reproduction that emerges from that process is specified as the *political market*;
5. On the basis of (4) the *citizen-peasant* emerges as the theorised, but also concrete form of, hybridity in Tanzania that vindicates the re-reading of Marx and Arusha proposed by the thesis.

The starting point then is to identify the relevant pattern of unevenness, including that which relates directly to an 'inter-societal'⁷ dimension. Once again this is, in its essence, the problem of peasant difference vis-à-vis "western modernity" or, if one

⁶ For completeness, it can also be added that this remains the case even with the addition of a narrative of the origins of capitalism if it nonetheless reasserts a logic of *pre-combination* as it then *proceeds* from that point of capitalism's origins.

⁷ Because the context for this discussion is now the 20th century 'the international' is also viable terminology.

prefers, capitalism.⁸ On one side stands a logic of reproduction that stems from *capital-labour relations*, and on the other the peasantry's *unity of labour and property* whose logic of reproduction is so different, as exemplified by Chayanov (Chayanov 1986, Bernstein 2009). Referring for simplicity's sake the former as *modernity-A*, it can be further stipulated that within its ambit is (if nothing else, the genesis of) industrialism and that its productive power is vastly greater than the Tanzanian peasant society which is the analytical base point.

That this pattern obtains across political multiplicity in the 19th and 20th centuries is obvious, save that for a substantial portion of this time Tanzania was, along with so much of the rest of the globe, a colony of *modernity-A* societies.⁹ The fact of colonialism does not trouble this account for two reasons. First, colonialism in a sense underlines the gap in productive power (unevenness in general). Second, multiplicity obtained before colonialism in a relevant sense, and more importantly still it has been continuous ever since the point of independence, which is the period the thesis is concerned with.¹⁰ All of which is to say that pressure of a geopolitical on Tanzania as a peasant society can be anticipated.

Unsurprisingly, then, unevenness can be established straightforwardly enough. Proceeding to the role *combined development* plays, matters become a little more involved. The three dimensions of combination (interdependence at the level of *events*, *structures* and, finally, *hybridity*) requires vigilance for the historico-logical possibility of elements of *modernity-A* being subject to transfer to the peasant society (Tanzania). *A priori*, any social artefact associated with *modernity-A* could, in principle, transfer.

This raises the first and most basic concept. The possibility of transfer of some aspects of modernity as a feature of the logic of U&CD looks rather like a *process of fission*. This is an analogy drawn from nuclear physics, in which a form of transmutation consists of an atom that may undergo a process in which constituent elements can split off. This in no way presupposes that its former state was incoherent

⁸ This is not to necessarily endorse the view that in some pertinent sense capitalism can be understood in a 'Eurocentric' sense. Instead, the intention is to show that the subsequent approach does not *depend* on the success of a 'non-Eurocentric' account of capitalism's *origins* (Hobson 2004, 2011, Anievas and Nisancioglu 2013).

⁹ Germany from the late-19th to early 20th centuries, when it became a British Mandate in the aftermath of WWI until independence. In point of fact, this pertains to *mainland* Tanzania, then known as Tanganyika which became Tanzania upon unification with the islands of Zanzibar, which had been a British colony throughout, shortly after independence.

¹⁰ Which is not to say that a U&CD analysis could not take within its ambit the colonial period as well. But that complication does not arise here.

(the original atom), but neither does it require that the new product reproduces the qualities of its former state. Indeed, its qualities may be radically different.¹¹ All of which is to say that some technological and social features of modernity-A might transfer through U&CD processes *without* the capital-labour relation also being reproduced.

Following closely on the heels of fissile modernity is the notion that, again only as a logical possibility for now, the peasant social form experiencing the effects of that fission might be an active agent in the process of combined development that ensues.¹² If allowance is made that *some fission* is sufficient to mandate the term modernity, then it must also be said that it has become conceivable for the peasant to participate in it. Taking that thought forward, it can be reasonably anticipated that the peasant could well both itself be changed *and* be an agent of change in that process. In consequence it can be said that the peasant is thereby (potentially) a *protean subject* of modernity. Out of all this arises the possibility of multiple types of modernity, that is, *modernity-B*.¹³

None of the foregoing establishes a theoretically informed methodology for surpassing the incommensurability of peasant and modernity. Doing so means returning to the mechanism(s) that might reveal processes of combined development in action. The previous Section outlined a deliberately broadened notion of *substitution*, taking within its ambit the geopolitically driven transfer (substitution) of social artefacts that resulted in the reinforcement of the social structure. That reinforcement was argued to be the *general* logic of reproduction, and that same definition can be taken forward here.

How any such processes might work is a matter of empirical argument, and that will only emerge in detail as the forthcoming Chapters proceed. Postponing their specification for now, something can nonetheless be said about the nature of the transmuted logic of reproduction that emerges out of that process of substitution. The term deployed in this thesis for this is the *political market*.

The inspiration for this term comes from a work on Tanzanian socialism which advances a sophisticated version of modernisation theory to develop a reading of

¹¹ In contrast, a process of fusion can be thought of as the addition of new elements to an original starting point.

¹² As opposed to a local elite being the only identifiable “domestic” agent.

¹³ Because it is based on the notion of interactivity drawn from U&CD, it is therefore very different from the ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000, 2002) literature which proceeds on the basis of separate and different cultures reaching their own accommodations with the challenge of modernity.

Tanzania and its ‘uncaptured peasantry’ (Hydén 1980).¹⁴ In a brief comment, he refers to policies in Tanzania which ‘in the wake of the Arusha Declaration [were] to replace the *capitalist market* with the *political market-place* as the principal forum for interaction with the peasants’ [my emphases] (Hydén 1980, p. 131). The thrust of this argument was supposed to establish how distinct this institution (the *political market*) was from the capitalist market, *because* the peasant was uncaptured and non-dependent on the market. This, Hydén was sure, was antithetical to development and the achievement of modernity, and disastrous in that sense.

Taking the thought in a quite different direction to suggests that this was the essence of the emergent logic of reproduction, two elements of the political market are identified. The first, which is broadly in line with Hydén’s meaning but put to a different purpose, is that *politically equal citizens* in Tanzania were able to make effective claims on the state for the provision of various social goods. Thus, even to the extent one might have been able to identify any incipient process of dispossession of the peasant, that was fundamentally subverted by a competitive and ultimately victorious logic of political equality.

Crucially, the state’s ability to actually make significant provision along these lines depended on the geopolitically driven transfer of key social and technological transfers to Tanzania (crucially, a substantial element of which were actually from Maoist China). Simply put, without these transfers, the productive capacity of Tanzania as a ‘peasant society’ could not have made even remotely similar provision. At least not, that is, on the basis of political equality. Whilst it might have been possible to make selective provision to certain areas and ethnic groups, that would have been antithetical to the establishment of political equality. And that equality was crucial to the process under consideration. Of most significance in that regard was that its basis in political equality was essential to forestall both geopolitical pressures and domestic instability.

On the other hand, the second, equally important, dimension to the political market goes beyond Hydén’s original notion. This is ‘developmental’ in a relatively straightforward sense. In the absence of being ‘captured’ in the market-dependent sense, the operation of the political market in the first sense (state provision) induced the Tanzanian peasant to nevertheless enter into, and intensify, a set of reproductive behaviours that went beyond subsistence. That state provision not only boosted

¹⁴ Curiously, this was a text that Mamdani took particular objection to, dismissing the ‘uncaptured peasant’ as the epitome of ‘history by analogy’ (Mamdani 1996, pp. 12–13).

productivity in terms of physical capacity, it also encouraged it since enhanced state provision had increased the infrastructure available to actually market any surplus *and* the commodities available throughout the countryside that could in turn be purchased by the peasantry. Thus with the addition of the *second* sense of the political market is that this was a logic of reproduction which *was* expansionary but *without* market *dependence*; indeed, it contrasts that notion of dependence with these exchange relations in the political market which are closer to the notion of market as *opportunity*.

It was in these regards that the U&CD-processes identified in the thesis are explicable through what has been called substitution. The theoretically explicable introduction of various social artefacts, were both substituted into peasant social relations and in turn allowed the peasant itself to substitute for ‘commercial’ classes and politically-active citizens elsewhere.¹⁵ Through this dual-aspect substitutionism the ultimate result was as anticipated: strengthening of the general social logic of reproduction. The peasant was both physically better able to produce, and embedded in a set of social relations that likewise encouraged production to an appreciable extent. The upshot was a more durable set of social relations and a more durable socio-political structure atop them.

That said, it is necessary to add that the extent of that expansion was very limited; as the forthcoming Chapters will make clear, these relations in no way yielded abundant production. The political market as understood here must not be romanticised in this (or any other) sense. The point, however, is not to pass comment on its success or failure in these terms alone. For whatever else it did or did not achieve, it did emerge as a durable logic of reproduction and, as such, a viable analytic category of significance for the incommensurability problem.

As anticipated, whilst it can be said that the social structure was reinforced in a general sense, its effect was simultaneously in the nature of radical differentiation. Finally, then, the political market’ reproductive logic also founds the ultimate sociological claim for peasant-modern hybridity. This is encapsulated as the *citizen-peasant*. Citizenship connotes the centrality of political equality, whilst peasant indicates that in a meaningful sense the core characteristic of the peasantry has been maintained: the unity of labour and property. That said, citizenship reaches deep into the constitution of both the labour and property because political equality was so vital

¹⁵ Thus, ultimately, this second element of substitution is significantly closer to Trotsky’s original usage. It is for this reason that the term is retained, in spite of the risk of idiosyncrasy, rather than attempting to generate novel nomenclature.

to its new, reinforced logic of reproduction. Thus citizenship fundamentally qualifies, and differentiates, peasant-ness.

Meanwhile peasant-ness qualifies citizenship in a vital way too. For this is *not* citizenship in the sense of civil society, standing on the separation of politics and economics that is characteristic of capitalist-modernity. This is because these citizens, as peasants, are not separated from their means of production. One consequence of this is that ‘market forces’ in a Tanzanian context do not have the same impersonal, apolitical nature *to the same extent* that is associated with capitalist-modernity. This has deep and abiding influence on the content, tenor and trajectory of Tanzanian politics. A central element thereto is that citizen-peasants, poor farmers living in relatively remote villages, have through various entrenched political processes real means to advance claims to ownership over strategic assets and decisions of the nation.¹⁶

The identification of the citizen-peasant as the product of a theorisable process through U&CD allows the enjoyment of two intellectual dividends. In so doing the “facts on the ground” in Tanzania can be more easily drawn into a coherent whole. In particular, it steers clear of the pitfalls of either deeming Tanzania/African/peasant difference as mere ‘idiosyncrasy’ or an index of its ‘backwardness’ and ‘failure’. Second, building on the first, it becomes possible to integrate post-colonial Tanzania with broader world historical or historical sociological readings which have necessarily had to confront the difficulties around peasant societies in the modern world. This includes grand theoretical work like Barrington Moore’s (1966) but also extends, for example, to analyses of the “rise of China” in which the role of the peasant in modern China has attracted so much attention (Day 2013).¹⁷ Thus in this mooted reconciliation of Marx *and* Arusha, the project also contributes to Du Bois’ aspiration: to read African histories as histories that were both particular and part of world history nonetheless.

Conclusion: the re-reading sketched

¹⁶ There is a danger of over-claiming here. The suggestion is not that ‘market forces’ have none of the connotations they do in the sense anticipated by theories around the ‘separation of politics and economics’. Chapters 6 and 7 will reflect on this issue at greater length.

¹⁷ Another example would be the East Asian developmental states (Woo-Cumings 1999), such as Taiwan (Gray 2011, 2014, Amsden 1985), in which land reform has been a deeply significant feature.

Reinhard Bendix, in his famous article on 'tradition and modernity' (1967), points to some of the possibilities which the argument under consideration draw attention to. Beginning with a rehearsal of the core sociological notion of modernity he wrote:

'The permanent separation of workers from their ties to the land obviously facilitates the growth of class consciousness and of political organization in Marx's sense of the word...[whereas] continuation of these ties may result either in a weak commitment to industry (and hence weak group solidarity)'

But, he continued, if in the alternative such ties remained in place that eventuality could have important and no less modern results, including:

'the emergence of segmental peasant-worker alliances in urban and national politics. Where this latter alternative exists, one can begin to appreciate how important it is to consider such phenomena in their own right, rather than treat them as transitions that are expected to disappear with increasing modernization. We do not know after all what forms modernization might take where separation between town and countryside fails to occur, at least for a considerable period of time' (Bendix 1967, pp. 341-2).

The abstract analysis presented here, and to a great extent the empirical fleshing out that proceeds in the following chapters, is related to the possibility that Bendix anticipates. Whilst the context of the citizen-peasant features even less involvement of industry than in Bendix's notion in a societal sense, the logic of U&CD which the argument follows depends on industry elsewhere.

The project also reconnects theory with peasant agency. '[P]easant mobilization within and against the neoliberal project, on a world scale, is politically engaged in a way, and for a cause' that Philip McMichael (2008, p. 207) argues is 'rendered unthinkable by classical social theory'. Whilst that claim is supported by Chapter 2, the argument of this Chapter has been that it can nonetheless be rendered thinkable by the theoretical innovation that is U&CD. In this sense, although via a markedly different approach methodologically speaking, it is an argument that will hopefully prove to be complementary to those that look 'to shift epistemological gears and examine the peasant movement through its own discursive practices' (McMichael 2008, p. 207).

The remainder of the thesis follows the framework set out in this Chapter, deploying and developing the concepts which it has identified. Chapter 4 begins at the

point of Tanzanian independence, sketching its place in an *uneven* world historical context and the peculiar pattern of international interaction that engendered. Most significant of all were the relations established between Tanzania and Maoist China, neatly encapsulated by Nyerere as relations of ‘unequal equals’. These were of deep significance because they were an additional element of interaction across unevenness, with distinctive causal effects from more familiar patterns of unevenness of the west vis-à-vis Tanzania. Indeed, relations with China were significant in the further sense that they also served to impel changes in Tanzanian’s relations with the west.

This prepares the ground for Chapter 5, which proceeds to examine ‘African Socialism’ and the Arusha programme that was a response to these patterns of unevenness. Out of this programmatic response a historical process took hold; and with it the central claims of the thesis begin to emerge. It identifies that the patterns of unevenness and geopolitics examined in Chapter 4 had the *substitutional* nature Chapter 3 has anticipated. As that process is played out the most crucial features of the thesis emerge in full across Chapter 5: the political market and the citizen-peasant.

Chapter 6 continues to trace that combined form into the neo-liberal era, showing how the citizen-peasant was an entrenched and durable feature of Tanzanian modernity beyond its originating context. It further argues that this form was neither eliminated by a fresh onslaught of neoliberalism, nor was it just a residue of either ‘tradition’ or bygone socialism. Rather the citizen-peasant was continuing in its career as a protean subject of modernity, there even being some early signs that the logic of the political market was extending out beyond the village to encompass a more nationwide, strategic dimension. With this the mooted reconciliation of Marx and Arusha is complete, the citizen-peasant is recognised as having been central to Tanzanian social relations and its place in the world up to the conclusion of the 20th century.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with reflection on the implications of the argument. It proceeds with consideration of the arguments bearing on understandings of the contemporary conjuncture as ‘globalisation’ or ‘liberal order’. Thereafter it concludes with a set of methodological reflections.

Chapter 4: Unevenness, state formation and survival in Tanzania, 1961-1967

‘We have survived’

Julius K. Nyerere, describing his greatest achievement (Shivji 1995, pp. 158–9).

‘The friendship between Tanzania and the People's Republic of China is a friendship between most unequal equals. Perhaps for that reason some other nations of the world find it hard to understand’

- Julius K. Nyerere, 21 June 1968 (Nyerere 1973, p. 40).

Introduction

This Chapter begins the process of applying the interactive methodology to post-colonial Tanzania. Providing a broad narrative of the first years of independence, 1961-1967, a series of crises are analysed. What this reveals are three planes of unevenness that impinged on Tanzania in this period. Each plays a foundational role to the overarching analysis the thesis subsequently develops, the causal significance of each building progressively over the course of the Chapter.

The first two planes of unevenness are largely anticipated by African Studies, and are reflected in two of the major themes of Chapter 1. The first is the unevenness flowing from the heritage of colonial-modernity visible in Tanzania’s social structure. The second, building on the first, is the inequality of the international system as confronted by Tanzania in the 1960s. Taken together, these two planes show that the conditions in which post-colonial Tanzania found itself were so disobliging that ‘failure’ seemed likely from the outset.

The severe difficulties these patterns engendered are examined by particular reference to the resistance that the Nyerere government faced in the years before the Arusha Declaration. A signal moment of which was the Army Mutiny of 1964. So severe was both the general condition, and the Mutiny in particular, that Nyerere would

repeatedly refer to mere *survival* as his greatest achievement.¹ Furthermore this achievement, and its apparent improbability, yields a recurrent temptation to analyse Tanzania (and often Nyerere too) in romantic terms, an intellectual condition Ali Mazrui (1997) diagnosed as ‘Tanzaphilia’.

The promised reconciliation of Marx and Arusha ultimately offers a theoretically sensitive escape route from said ‘Tanzaphilia’ and, turning to the second epigraph to the Chapter, a preliminary resource for doing so is found in the third plane of unevenness. Looking to a particular pattern in Tanzanian international relations that began to emerge in this era, those between it and Maoist China, its consequences are considered. This was undoubtedly a form of unevenness, referred to by Nyerere as a ‘friendship between most unequal equals’. In a sense, then, the third plane of unevenness is in fact an aspect of the second; that is, these relations of unequal equals were just another set of diplomatic relations.

But in another sense they would be so deeply consequential that it is worth underlining their distinctiveness by designating it as a third feature of unevenness. Their central importance is due to the key role they play in understanding the process of substitution Chapter 5 will focus on. Nevertheless, there was a more immediate impact which is covered in this Chapter; for the early consequence of relations with Maoist China was to alleviate the various crises confronted by Nyerere’s government long enough to provide a sort of “breathing space” that allowed Nyerere to embark on the Arusha Declaration programme.

Matters proceed in two Sections. Section I examines what is referred to as the state-nation building problem, a problem that was particularly exacerbated by the first plane of unevenness, the heritage of colonial-modernity. This specifies how the Tanzanian state was beset by a lack of capacity to deal with the problems that its colonial heritage imposed. In the face of these problems, Nyerere’s ‘survival’ does indeed seem surprising. More surprising still, it turns out that not only did the government survive but the 1960s are now interpreted as being the key to Tanzania’s subsequent renown as stable and peaceful, with a robust but non-ethnic, non-sectarian sense of national identity (Bjerk 2015, Hunter 2015). In short, the problems inherent in this plane of unevenness seem, somehow, to have been overcome.

¹ This first epigraph should be broadly construed. There is a sense in which every sovereign state in Africa has ‘survived’ in the sense that the loss of formal sovereignty since decolonization has not been a substantial feature of African politics. However, survival in the broader sense - of the state, ruling party, Nyerere himself and his political programme - was, as this Chapter uncovers, very much in doubt.

Section II turns more directly to unevenness across an international dimension. It begins by setting out the international relations of Tanzania with “the west”. Whereas it had been imagined that these would be benevolent in a developmental sense, thereby alleviating some of the difficulties encountered in Section I, this was not to be. Indeed, this plane of unevenness was, in fact, a further dimension of that original problem.

This begins to yield the key point of the Chapter. Both the colonial heritage and international inequality planes of unevenness are best understood as features of one broad pattern of unevenness. Each are aspects of the infelicities involved in Tanzanian integration into the modern world; the general pattern of unevenness, then, is that between modern world² and Tanzania. And that unevenness mirrors, to an extent, the intellectual problem of incommensurability between peasant society and modernity.

Finally, then, the same Section turns toward relations with China. Before proceeding, it is worth adverting to a limitation in the extent of this Chapter’s argument. Rather like contemporary interest in ‘China in Africa’ (Brautigam 2009, Shinn and Eisenman 2012, A’Zami 2015), ‘Maoist China’s’ relations with Africa attracted considerable, often anxious, scrutiny in the 1960s and 70s (Cooley 1965, Ogunsanwo 1974, Hutchinson 1975). Moreover, Tanzania’s relations with China were amongst the most prominent of all, both then (Bailey 1973, 1976, Yu 1975) and now (Baregu 2008, Kamata 2013).

Yet these were understood as notable developments only in terms of geopolitics or, often for propagandistic purposes, as a passing feature of Cold War politics. Whilst this Chapter will make the basic “breathing space” point alluded to above, pushing beyond these perceptions and on to the real causal significance of Sino-Tanzanian relations requires something further. They must be placed in the context of the overarching process of *combined development* in Tanzania. This intellectual labour, and the epicentre of the empirical part of the thesis, is the task of Chapter 5.

I. State-nation building: capacity and survival

Recent literature has focussed on what Mahmood Mamdani (2012, p. 108) calls ‘Nyerere’s seminal achievement: creating an inclusive citizenship and building a nation-state’ (Aminzade 2003, 2013a, 2013b, Pallotti 2009, Bjerk 2010, 2015, Mamdani 2012, pp. 106–25, Hunter 2015). Not only is the notion the basis of what eventually

² This is a broad, indicative designation and not intended in a technical sense.

becomes a political ‘success’ versus economic (Arusha’s developmental programme) ‘failure’ narrative (Fukuyama 2014a, pp. 329–333, 2014b), it is an achievement that is all the more remarkable for having emerged in a newly independent country marked by all the features of colonial-modernity.

Chapter 1 noted in Mamdani’s idea of the bifurcation of *citizen and subject* (1996). In particular, this consisted of a hierarchically multi-racial – black, Asian and white – order where the privileges of citizenship were variously linked to racial identity and urban dwelling. Meanwhile the majority were, in accordance with Mamdani’s general sketch, governed as subjects via indirect rule (the Native Authority) and no less multi-ethnic (with over 100 tribes) a political order than other comparable African countries. Alongside this Tanzania exhibited plenty of linguistic diversity and, at the point of independence, no cohesive shared national identity.

Given this the pronounced shift in scholarship on Tanzania away from taking the nation-state for granted, and most especially opposed to its treatment as a straightforward facsimile of ‘classic’ western, 19th century nationalism, is both welcome and necessary (Bjerk 2015, Hunter 2015). For instance, as Aminzade (2013a, pp. 6–7) points out, a defining feature of Tanzanian nationalism was that it was built on the *constraint* rather than mobilisation of ethnicity.

That said, their unpacking of the historical contingency and *difference* in Tanzanian nationalism, primarily through mobilising a discursive methodology (Bjerk 2015, Hunter 2015), has its limitations. Firstly, the occasional implication that Tanzanian nationalism was a discursive achievement of the 1960s underestimates quite how drawn out a process its achievement was. Indeed, an upshot of this thesis’ argument is that this achievement rests primarily on the citizen-peasant form which emerges in the 1970s (Chapter 5).

Second, these processes cannot be entirely apprehended by discursive methodologies. At every step along the way the policies that led to this political success were deeply contested, perhaps even especially so before the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Whilst much of that contention was itself of a discursive nature, it was also contended in a deeply material sense too. One major instance of this, to be examined in detail, is the Army Mutiny of 1964. Not only does the Mutiny highlight the existential threat that existed, it also points to the state’s very limited *capacity* that was material as well as ideational. To underline this, it is worth recognising that to resolve the mutiny Nyerere had to call on the British for assistance. Deeply compounding his humiliation in having to do so, the Mutiny that came close to toppling Nyerere was

briskly resolved, ultimately with little fuss, by a force of a mere 60 British marines equipped with a helicopter (Clapham 1998, p. 147). Few things highlight the very limited material capacities of the Tanzania as this, but it also brings into clear view the unevenness involved in all this: an existential threat to Tanzania was extremely minor in the face of British power.

Developing this point, this section now proceeds to sketch the powerful segments of society *opposed* to the Nyerere government's programme and the form Tanzanian nationalism would eventually take. Specifying the incapacity problem (state weakness plus powerful resistance) reveals it as a manifestation of the uneven heritage of colonialism.

The uneven heritage of colonialism

Nyerere was fond of pointing out that at the end of colonial rule, 'there were 2 trained engineers and 12 doctors. This is the country we inherited' (Bunting 1999, Kamuzora 2010, p. 102). He was doing more than pointing to the limitations of colonialism and the need for development. In addition, and in characteristically homespun fashion, he was pointing to the deep unevenness that characterised Tanzania's place in the world in 1961.

'2 engineers and 12 doctors' is also suggestive of Tanzania's very limited enjoyment of the status symbols of modernity more generally. Its situation can be reviewed as follows. With little or no industry to speak of, a bureaucracy that was both limited in capacity and staffed in its upper echelons by British workers that would leave within a few years, a particularly weak and under-resourced military and security force and, finally, overwhelmingly populated by subsistence farmers/peasants that produced a modest surplus at best (Aminzade 2013a, chap. 2).³ Nyerere and the Tanzanian elite – nor anyone else – could hardly doubt their unfavourable position at the hard, uneven end of modernity.

Up to this point in time Tanzania's place in colonial-modernity lay in its provision of a handful of 'cash-crops'. A significant minority of its peasant-farmers were engaged in non-subsistence production along these lines, producing coffee, cotton and tea. Far less common, meanwhile, were a handful of sizeable sisal and tobacco plantations producing on a more capital-intensive basis (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 31–37). Such limited

³ This was anything but a situation of an "overdeveloped" postcolonial state in Alavi's sense (1972, Leys 1976, p. 42).

infrastructure as was constructed in the colonial era flowed almost entirely to those areas that produced those crops.

Central to the nationalistic programme of Nyerere's TANU party was strict adherence to the principle of formal equality amongst *all* Tanzanians. (The language of citizenship is not, in this most basic sense, a Eurocentric misreading.) Fundamental to understanding that programme is recognition that it amounts to an aspiration to reform the political inequality of citizen *and* subject that was at the heart of colonial governance. That pattern of governance was, as observed in Chapter 1 and by Mamdani himself, functional to the operation of colonial modernity. And, in embarking on this programme, the government would soon find that they had provoked a series of contentious reactions over the proper place of 'race' and 'tribe' (Mamdani 2012, p. 109). The argument that follows develops the proposition that much of that contestation was a feature of unevenness.

The reason that 'race' proved so contentious was the very pronounced pressure for 'Africanisation' policies. In essence these were demands for race-based affirmative action, hopes for which had been aroused by many independence advocates that had based their arguments on reversing colonial racial hierarchies. Moreover, in the early years of independence those racial hierarchies remained very visible. Many civil servants were white (British), as was almost every single senior army officer. Meanwhile Asians were a major commercial presence, owning and operating many key enterprises at the intersection between the colonial cash-cropping system and the world market. Thus Africanisation was very popular amongst urban Tanzanians, seen as an opportunity to take over these positions of privilege; unsurprisingly, the pressure they exerted on the Nyerere government to pursue this path was tremendous (Mamdani 2012, pp. 109–124).

So much so, in fact, that at least some gestures toward Africanisation proved necessary under Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa in 1962 (Pratt 1976, pp. 124–126). President Nyerere, on the other hand, remained implacably opposed to compromise on the issue of *formal* equality, least of all in racial terms. Whilst readily accepting that racial composition had, necessarily, to move toward proportionality he refused to do so in any way that compromised the equality of every Tanzanian citizen. TANU became increasingly associated with Nyerere's personal stance in the course of the 1960s, whilst the opposition ANC (African National Congress) sought to exploit that by ever more firmly linking itself to Africanisation. Not coincidentally the ANC, along with

significant Trades Union support, were subsequently linked (but not in straightforward ways) with the 1964 Mutiny (Mamdani 2012, p. 110).

Before arriving at the Mutiny, and to complete the point around the general unevenness inherited from colonial-modernity, the structural basis of those oppositional forces' power stands to be identified. If the first obstacle to formal equality was the temptation amongst some to try and assume positions of privilege (citizenship for some) in the guise of Africanisation, there is a second too. This was the other side of Mamdani's binary, subject, a category that takes in ethnicity (tribe), Native Authority and indirect rule. Indelibly linked with the colonial project of the 19th and 20th centuries, it was the *difference* that achieved the integration of colonial Tanzania with the "outside" world of modernity. That is, constituting the majority of the populace as *subjects* in this sense facilitated both governance in general and the procurement of cash crops in particular; and, moreover, this was done without the reproduction of the relations of capitalist-modernity.

It was atop this structural, political inequality that the privilege of citizenship sat. Underlying Nyerere's passionate opposition to any formal inequality, aside from particular distaste for racialised thought, was the firm conviction that reform of colonial governance had to stretch to the relations between citizen and subject. Indeed the extension of citizenship across the country, rural and urban, is the core of 'Arusha' (Mamdani 2012, pp. 119–123).

It was this conviction, as the Mutiny episode demonstrates, that goes to the heart of contention in this period. It evidences (relatively) powerful urban classes that sought primarily to take over those privileged, racialised positions of power within the structure of citizen and subject; a point Nyerere sought to make with regularity in these years (Nyerere 1967). Indeed, it was the heart of his concern in the Arusha Declaration around models that might "develop" urban areas at the cost of the peasant as discovered in Chapter 1.

The Mutiny as unevenness

The 1964 Mutiny has, fortunately, been recognised as a key event and received extended treatment by several writers as such (Bienen 1967, chap. XI, Pratt 1976, pp. 178–9, Parsons 2003, Barany 2012, pp. 286–90). What can be derived from this body of work in particular is that even the limited machinery of power available to the post-colonial state - its military - was deeply unreliable *because* of the way the colonial

heritage of Tanzania influenced its politics in the direction of a contest *for* privilege. This was especially pronounced by 1964 given that the new Nyerere government had repeatedly made clear that it would frustrate the desire for Africanisation.

The Army was formed of those colonial units that happened to have been stationed in colonial Tanganyika, whereas British colonial forces as a whole had been organised on a larger East African basis. Thus independent Kenya inherited the headquarters, better-equipped units and most of the logistical support. Tanzania, meanwhile, was left with a total of 1,000 poorly equipped personnel, led by British officers since (virtually) no Africans had been trained to officer level. So bad was the reputation of the Tanganyika Rifles that it soon became known as 'a refuge for up-country illiterates' (Barany 2012, p. 285).

Nevertheless, its personnel had clear expectations of advancement upon independence. And frustration began to grow with the prolonged reliance on British officers to the disgruntlement not only of the Army itself but also many Nationalist voices in public discourse (Yu 1975, p. 99). 'In other words', points out Barany, 'native soldiers could wonder with good reason whether they were serving in the army of their own sovereign state' (2012, p. 285). It can be added that they were likely also wondering what that meant for their own prospects.

The picture had changed somewhat by time of the Mutiny in 1964. Although the Army remained modest, it had increased to roughly 2,000 soldiers (Bienen 1967, p. 363). And it was this force which would now prove itself to be a major challenge to Nyerere and his government. Modelled still on the British ideal, this was supposed to be an apolitical army with promotions based on merit and some black African officers had begun to be promoted (Bienen 1967, p. 363).

The Mutiny began with wage complaints and quickly grew into a demand for rapid acceleration in the substitution of Tanzanian for British officers. Although, on the balance of evidence, the mutiny was *not* intended to be a full-blown coup, the threat it posed nonetheless surely highlights the state's chronic weakness. For it had no immediate alternative support base to turn to. With Nyerere in hiding, the mutineers resolved to seize the radio and police stations, airports, railways and the State House. Events were moving so rapidly that, having begun on a Sunday night (19th January 1964), by the Monday morning Dar es Salaam was under their control. With Nyerere already in hiding, '[r]umors were rife, one of which was that the TANU government had fallen' (Bienen 1967, p. 366).

This was not an isolated episode. The wage complaint component of the Mutineers' demands aroused both the interest and pronounced sympathy of the urban labour movement, to the extent that a General Strike was rumoured to be planned in support of the Mutineers (Bienen 1967, chap. IX). In addition, and compounding the sense of chaos, looting had broken out in Dar es Salaam with a pronouncedly racial component, targeting Asian areas and businesses. Finally, mutiny also spread to the only other Army barracks in the country, Tabora, which stood at the centre of the country and through which all the major rail links ran, connecting cash crop producing regions with the port of Dar es Salaam (Bienen 1967, p. 366).

Not only had urban society expressed its dissatisfaction in clear terms, the state's links to the countryside, such as they were, had been broken too. Nyerere's control over both aspects of governance as bequeathed by colonial-modernity teetered on the brink. Urban-citizens were actively discontented, and the hollowness of professions to exert control and reform rural society had been made clear. Even though TANU continued to rule outside Dar es Salaam (Bienen 1967, p. 380), it was not able to rule it as a coherent whole with urban interests in a state of advanced discontent.

There is a danger of over-extending the point here. Even at the peak of the opposition to Nyerere, this was not a fully organised opposition intent on seizing power. Nonetheless their power, and the danger it posed, was derived from structurally located strength that accrued through urban-citizenship. As noted above, whilst the immediate danger was eventually relieved by British intervention, the structural difficulties they highlighted had not gone away. Who, then, in January 1964 would have bet on Nyerere staying in power, much less instituting a radical reform programme along the lines of Arusha three years later?

Yet, soon after the Mutiny the government embarked upon a series of authoritarian reforms. The Army was dismissed *en masse* and fundamentally reorganised. In particular, it was directly politicised and membership of TANU became an expectation of armed force personnel. The clear design of the scheme, which succeeded, was to allow Nyerere to exercise direct control over the Army and command its loyalty. He would later describe the Mutiny as an opportunity that 'enabled us to build an army from scratch. Many institutions we have inherited, but the army is something we built ourselves' (Barany 2012, p. 286). Alongside this, trades unions were brought under state control and some 200 of the movement's leaders were arrested. The following year a one-party state was established in 1965, which would last until the 1990s. Indeed, TANU (renamed CCM, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Party of the

Revolution in the 1970s) has governed Tanzania continuously from independence to the present day.

These reforms are the first major institutional step of Nyerere's greatest achievement, survival. With the achievement of single party rule, the taming of the Army and trades unions there would be no further close calls for Nyerere. Even with all the trials and tribulations experienced in Tanzania in the decades to come, no crisis ever led to the sort of chaos of January 1964; and Nyerere himself remained in power until 1985. For the moment the rapid achievement of stability in the aftermath of the Mutiny until the Arusha Declaration is a historical moment of "breathing space". Relieved for a time of the pressures that made 1964 so difficult, this was crucial to allow the subsequent emergence of the Arusha programme. Turning to the second plane of unevenness, the expressly international dimension, Section II shall begin thinking through where the ability to complete these reforms and achieve that "breathing space" came from.

For now, though, what does this sketch of the Mutiny reveal about the first plane of unevenness? It emphasises the power, at the time, of urban sections of society. The predominant interests of which were in increased wages, urban investment and occupying positions of privilege previously occupied by colonial elites. If not directly antithetical to reform of the bifurcation of citizen and subject, it was far from a priority.

Much of the strength of these groups flowed from the absence of an alternative power base for Nyerere at the time. The rural population was not just weakened by the inequality inscribed into the political system of colonial-modernity, they were also physically remote from the urban centre of power. Only the chief cash-crop producing regions enjoyed substantial infrastructural connections to Dar es Salaam, and even those had been shown to be vulnerable in the event of strife. Infrastructure aside, this was a rural population that was mostly scattered throughout the countryside, and non-cash crop regions' population were living in single homesteads or small hamlets rather than anything as large as a village (Berry 1970, Mascarenhas 1979). In effect these features meant that 'a relatively unmobilised peasantry' (Arrighi and Saul 1968, p. 166) was overdetermined.

Thus the field of political action was more or less clear for urban interests to predominate. Yet demands for increased privileges, such as wages, could not be satisfied except through increased surplus extraction from the peasantry and/or development; a point that is central to the Arusha Declaration. Not only would such a policy have entailed sticking to the bifurcated state, since that was the available basis

for surplus extraction from subjects, it was simply not possible given to further extend surplus extraction from such a small base, and for this reason Nyerere had set his face against it.⁴

From a certain vantage point much of the foregoing has the appearance of being properly understood as *combined development* rather than unevenness.⁵ And in an important sense that is true; the bifurcated state, after all, could be taken as an example *par excellence* of combined development. Nevertheless, it has been discussed under the rubric of unevenness for a simple reason. What underlay the bifurcated state is a pattern of unevenness between capitalist-modernity and Tanzania, the essence of which was great power differential. That power differential remained obvious enough, witness the ease with which the British resolved the Mutiny. The particular nature of that pattern of unevenness was: modern industrial societies with major advantages in respect of power and agrarian-peasant society with the (sole/primary) interest to the former their ability to provide cash crops. That pattern was fundamental to the genesis of the bifurcated state and can be read as productive of combined development; but unevenness in this sense also remained very much in place, as Section II will discuss.

II. 'The Loss of Innocence': International relations as the crucial plane of unevenness

Pressing on to Tanzanian international relations in the 1960s as the second plane of unevenness, the sense in which it amounts to continuity in the basic pattern of unevenness of colonial modernity progressively emerges. The entire (uneven) structure on which urban privilege rested, which caused the difficulties outlined in Section I, was a colonial division of labour. Tanzania had been geared toward a role in that division of labour in colonial times as an expression, or consequence, of unevenness. And in the 1960s many critical thinkers were convinced that remained the case, and for the most part they had a good case to make. Hence the real popularity of dependency and world-system theory in this period, especially in places like Tanzania where one of the

⁴ These points are largely missed by the literature of the 1970s that saw the Tanzanian state as a class actor (Shivji 1976, Freyhold 1977, 1979, Mueller 1981, 1980, Raikes 1975, 1978, Saul 1979, pt. II). The dominant framework then was to view that state itself as attempting to optimise surplus extraction for itself. In effect, it was seen as having a very similar interest to urban interests as understood in this Chapter.

⁵ Then again, if it is correct that there can *never be a pre-combination society*, as discussed in Chapter 3, then this is always true. Even so, the logic of U&CD analysis still begins with unevenness and proceeds to combination; existing combined forms can be re-registered as an aspect of unevenness for the analytical purposes, and that is the case here.

leading theorists of dependency in an African context was based for many years (Rodney 1972).

Reading this unevenness as nonetheless obtaining across *specifically international* unevenness, the ground for erecting a U&CD analysis will further emerge. The 1960s were an era which Cranford Pratt, a Canadian academic but also a close personal friend of Nyerere, called 'the loss of innocence' (1976, chap. 6). In widening the analytical lens to include 'the international' as a key feature of unevenness, the significance of that loss emerges. In particular, it was discovered that independence would not enable Tanzania to successfully make demands on western nations for assistance to overcome the developmental gap. Unevenness would not melt away with sovereignty; far from it, in some senses it would amplify the problems associated with it.

This section starts by setting out the naïve optimism of the early years of independence. Grand plans for development were produced, confident that 'nature' was, at long last, the only (remaining) enemy with the passing of colonialism. 'From now on', said Nyerere on independence, 'we are fighting not man but nature'. Citing this, John Iliffe (1979, p. 576) notes disarmingly, '[b]ut it was more complicated than that'. Indeed, it was; the core argument advanced here is that *this* was the innocence that Nyerere and those around him would quickly have to shed. Rather than remove politics from the field of action, the realities of political multiplicity meant he had much more to worry about than 'nature' alone.⁶

This imposed two major concerns. One was hostile, powerful neighbours: Apartheid South Africa, the Portuguese in Mozambique and white minority-ruled Rhodesia. The second was disobliging, at best, western powers; they would not generously fund those grand development plans as had been hoped. In both respects these were specifically *internationally generated*, or geopolitical problems, rendered so serious by the power differential between those various countries and Tanzania. But as it is unpacked, this second plane of unevenness reflection of the single, shared unevenness likewise becomes visible.

Later in this Section, Nyerere's discovery of another aspect of his international situation is followed. Casting around, with no small amount of desperation, for

⁶ All this evokes, of course, the theoretical claim advanced in chapter 2 around the limitations of social theory that focuses on *reproduction* which is in its essence a question of 'man's' confrontation with 'nature', see likewise Giovanni Arrighi's (2007, p. 265) commentary on this broad point, suggesting that Marx could vindicate his theory 'concerning the connection between the productive forces and social relations...only if he redefined the productive forces to include the production of protection'.

assistance in the face of the problems he had, the significance of the Bandung moment and incipient Third Worldism (Wright 1956, Tan and Acharya 2008, Lee 2010). In particular, Nyerere would discover in China and the friendship of unequal equals invaluable assistance.

Early Independence and the 'loss of innocence'

Underlying the frustration of development plans was the *relative* disinterest of the modern-industrialised world – *both* the West and Soviet Union – in Tanzania. It did not produce or extract any industrially important materials, its role in the colonial division of labour had been provision of cash crops. These crops were widely produced around the world and not especially valuable. Moreover, Tanzania's near neighbour, Kenya, was far more attractive to (Western) capital. 'Kenya was more attractive' it has been pointed out, 'given her "open door" policy and more developed infrastructure' (Shaw and Msabaha 1981, p. 40). Disinterest in Tanzania also extended to a lack of strategic importance. Not only was Kenya seen as a more reliable partner to 'international imperialism' in the East African region (Shivji 1976, p. 34); the region itself was not a site of serious Cold War contention in the 1960s.

Amidst this disinterest, Tanzania entered the post-colonial stage hoping to procure capital transfers to a developmental end; it is for this reason that 'loss of innocence' epitomises the period. Lacking 'the "traditional" variables of power' such as 'industrial base, strategic minerals, and military power' (Shaw and Msabaha 1981, p. 70), the first Five Year plan was entirely dependent on its expectation of very substantial capital assistance from the western world. Amid increasingly contentious international politics, the western world soon proved its relative disinterest and unwillingness to fund those development projects. Moreover, soon enough a series of international crises would ensue between 1964-67 that expressed the contradictions of Tanzania's position.

The first Five Year plan's assumption was that 78% of its (already ambitious) development budget would be financed externally by the Bretton Woods institutions and the great powers of the Cold War world (World Bank 1961). To say that this 'failed to materialize' is an understatement, whilst some limited support primarily through the World Bank was achieved, it was a small fraction of the amount sought (Yu 1975, pp. 83–5, Mushi 1981). The Soviet Union likewise offered very little capital assistance to

Tanzania and even then on even less favourable terms (Pratt 1976, pp. 159–60, Pallotti 2009, p. 75).

The international crises that would follow this disappointment exhibit a pattern. Each crisis, considered below, involved western powers using offers of (actually rather limited) aid as leverage over Tanzania; in turn, Nyerere would insist on rebuffing those threats. By the mid-1960s Tanzania would find itself at odds with the UK, West Germany and, to a lesser extent, the USA.

A further aspect of these crises were that they were sometimes provoked by the presence of those colonial and white minority regimes. These powers both opposed Tanzania, and in turn Tanzania had adopted a strong anti-colonial anti-racist stance. It supported independence movements where possible, including allowing the use of its territory to guerrillas, co-ordinating international support and regularly reiterating the case for the full decolonisation of Africa in international for a (Pratt 1976, p. 152).

To a great extent this stance was about establishing Tanzania's internal and external legitimacy (Pallotti 2009, p. 82). In the absence of serious development assistance, Nyerere saw crises with major powers as an opportunity to assert Tanzanian sovereignty. Likewise, a strong anti-colonial stance played a key role in both domestic legitimacy and enhanced Tanzanian standing in the wider Third World.

But principled anti-colonialism was also a reflection of security concerns. Independence was still recent, and there was no compelling reason to be complacent. Aside from the instability and weakness seen in Section I, those colonial neighbours were an aggressive presence. They also underlined the racial component of international politics. Not only were aggressive, racist colonial powers on Tanzania's doorstep, Tanzania's recent history suggested that the racial equality independence made possible ought not to be taken for granted. In the last few years leading to the independence of Tanzania the British had attempted to found an East African Federation in place of the individual states of East Africa. That Federation, by design, would have been politically dominated by powerful white-settlers in Kenya (Pratt 1976, chap. 2). All things considered, in 1963, Nyerere was driven to publicly declare his concern about the prospects of 'a second scramble for Africa' (which he also thought 'the Socialist countries seemed to be committing') (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 135).⁷

⁷ This does not contradict the claim that Tanzania was neglected by the industrial world as such, for several reasons. Firstly, this was a perception of Nyerere and the Tanzanian elite more generally, which perhaps somewhat overestimated the importance of Tanzania to any such scramble. Second, and most

In sum, the positions Nyerere adopts in the crises considered below are not only a reflection of principled anti-racism and anti-colonialism. They were also a reflection of geopolitical threat, partly real and immediate, partly imagined or forecast. Whilst security threats do not necessarily seem particularly pronounced, they were nonetheless real and, more importantly, they should be seen in the context of the vulnerability Section I emphasised.

Thus when Nyerere pointed to the presence of 60,000 Portuguese troops in neighbouring Mozambique, Dar es Salaam being within the range of South African bombers and the threat of the white-minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, each time he was invoking the threat imposed by the severe unevenness of the international political scene that confronted him. At one point there was a Portuguese plan to raid and destabilise Tanzania (Newitt 1995, p. 531, MacQueen 1997, p. 47) conceived by the colonial authorities that was only vetoed by Lisbon. MacQueen speculates that the only reason it was vetoed was due to Tanzania's international connections and prestige (1997, p. 62 en. 89). Geopolitics was a considerable concern, and it is a misreading to see Tanzanian policy as 'almost entirely' dictated by internal factors (Parsons 2003, p. 181).

These various threads of international unevenness can be drawn together in considering two episodes of crisis. Relations with Britain, the former colonial power, had become increasingly strained by 1965. Not only had the British not provided anything like the development assistance the First Five Year plan had anticipated, it had not taken a strong line against the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in white-minority Rhodesia (Pratt 1976, pp. 147–52, Pallotti 2009). Thus, only one year after the Mutiny, Tanzania broke off its relations with Britain, prompted by the British government's refusal to strongly oppose Rhodesia. Responding swiftly, the British suspended a loan of £7.5 million further stating its intention to bring other commitments to a halt. In a single moment Tanzania's main bilateral partnership, and most significant source of capital (excepting the World Bank) at the time, threatened to collapse entirely.

So much so that Whitehall was confident that Tanzania would soon back down, for allowing the situation to fester would be 'disastrous'. In the event they were to be disappointed, with relations not restored until 1968. This episode demonstrates a surprising ability and willingness on Tanzania's part to vindicate its own sovereignty

important, the neglect claim is *relative* not absolute. The point is not the absence of Western interest, so much as that it was so limited that it yielded little to no leverage for Tanzania.

and independent foreign policy. Pallotti (2009) makes the vital point that the motivation in this episode was the construction and legitimation of Tanzania as a sovereign post-colonial nation. A key reason for this, as Pallotti (2009, p. 75) also recognises, was the sudden entry of China to the scene. It made clear that it was willing to step into Britain's shoes and offered guarantees to meet Britain's commitments to Tanzania.

This is an early hint of the 'unequal equals' point, but before drawing out its significance there are further episodes that further illustrate unevenness. There was a similar episode involving West Germany, which withdrew its military aid after it interpreted Tanzania allowing a diplomatic presence of East Germany as a breach of the Halstein doctrine.⁸ Tanzania, again looking to assert its independence, responded by ending *all* aid relations with West Germany (Pratt 1976, pp. 139–41). Finally, in a slightly bizarre episode, relations with the US were briefly, but severely, strained in this period too. Following intervention in the Congo, and fuelled by the chaos of the Mutiny, rumours of a US sponsored plot to murder Nyerere and seize the government in 1964 took hold. They were taken seriously by the government and Nyerere personally until the US proved to his satisfaction that it was a hoax (Pratt 1976, pp. 142–7). Slightly bizarre though it was, it does nonetheless reflect both the heightened dissatisfaction with the western world, in the face of the manifold inequality and indifference it exhibited and the active sense of threat in which the Tanzanian state operated.

What can be said is that Tanzania faced an active geopolitical environment of threat from colonial-neighbours and powerful Western nations with limited interest and Tanzania and willingness to use leverage over it. Not only did this frustrate its early development plans, this reflects a continuation in the underlying pattern of unevenness throughout this chapter: powerful, industrial modernity as opposed to agrarian Tanzania.

China as 'unequal equal': the distinction and the difference

Yet amidst the unevenness discovered thus far, its third plane has begun to emerge: between Tanzania and Maoist China. Propelled by the problems modern-agrarian

⁸ The case was complex, an upshot of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the latter having recognised East Germany, which the Tanzanian government sought to compromise by allowing only a consular presence for East Germany on those islands.

unevenness was imposing on him, Nyerere turned to China. Tracing that discovery reveals that dimension of unevenness as an intellectual resource.

This is so in two important senses. First there is deep unevenness ('unequal') between China and Tanzania. China is characterised as a power with industry, that is to say modern in some vital sense, but also significantly different from powers such as Britain inasmuch as it was also in many agrarian and poor. Second, China had far more interest in Tanzania than those other powers. Thus China's combination of industry and agrarianism *and* its apparent interest in Tanzania made for a crucial difference. Whilst Chapter 5 will deal with its consequences in full, for now the emphasis lies in establishing that for all its distinctiveness Sino-Tanzanian relations were nonetheless an aspect of unevenness.

China's priority was alleviating its isolation (Gittings 1974, p. 260), and in particular regaining its UN membership and the permanent seat on the Security Council from the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Spence 1990, p. 628, Hutchinson 1975, p. 251). For this reason, Tanzania was an opportunity to be embraced, in particular a chance to break its isolation by buttressing its claim to membership of a Third World movement. Tanzania, meanwhile, was able to procure some vital 'fruits' of modernity, this is the beginning of the process of *substitution* referred to in Chapter 3.

But they were accurately described as relations of *unequals* (uneven). It was China that had incorporated elements of industrialism in its social form which Tanzania had not; moreover, China was vast in scale and population. Whilst that unevenness was qualified, as unequal *equals*, connoting both the principle of sovereignty and notions of Third Worldism, the inequality between them is plain. 'Perhaps', Nyerere told his Chinese hosts as per the epigraph to this chapter, 'for that reason some other nations of the world find it hard to understand'.

In this period China was threatened by US power and its containment policy (Hutchinson 1975, p. 3). China had an 'American problem' and to counter this it sought 'to win friends and seek allies among Third World states', of which Tanzania was a prominent example (Yu 1975, p. 2). These relations would ultimately been seen as a major demonstration of China's claim to be *primus inter pares* amongst Third World countries (Yu 1975, pp. 43-4, Chan 2013). The centrality of concern for 'the security of the state of China' and 'the continued authority of the Communist party' (Hutchinson 1975, p. 3) likewise serves to underline that confident interpretations, most evident in the contemporary literature (Cooley 1965), that Maoist China was an 'ideologically driven' actor in Africa risks missing the point. Not only do these relations with China

make sense as an aspect of Chinese foreign policy pursued since the Bandung Conference by Zhou Enlai (Keith 2009, pp. 24–7); the search for friends was also impelled by the Sino-Soviet split that shortly preceded Sino-Tanzanian relations.

Naturally this is a complex and difficult subject. The point is not to enter into a detailed analysis of Chinese foreign policy, beyond noting that there very much was something in it for China. Misunderstanding, Hutchison (1975, p. 278) argues, ‘about the friendship between Tanzania and China arises, I think, because the benefits to China are *intangible* whereas those to Tanzania are *tangible* [my emphases]...the ‘friendship’ of Tanzania is precisely “what’s in it for China”’. Moreover, it was a successful strategy. In respect of its core aim, membership of the UN, China would go on to regain its membership in 1971 and achieve a rapprochement of sorts with the US by 1972. This ‘remarkable moment in diplomatic history’ (Spence 1990, p. 633) marked the decisive end of attempts at the encirclement of China. If what has been called ‘the diplomatic success story of the century’ (Gittings 1974, p. 260) was deeply complex, relations such as these with Tanzania were at least an element thereto. Mao Zedong himself was given to attributing a great deal of credit to African nations, declaring that ‘it is our African brothers who carried us into the United Nations’ (Wang *et al.* 1999, p. 1715).

Meanwhile it was China’s industrial power, and vast scope, which both enabled it be “poor” but also generous toward Tanzania. Thus Tanzania was able to enjoy various ‘tangible benefits’ which are fundamental to the process of substitution in Chapter 5. But that process obtains across the unevenness of China *as a type of industrial power* and Tanzania as, for practical purposes, *non-industrial*. This is the key to this particular unevenness. But it also obtains in the general context of unevenness. That is, it is both an instance of international unevenness (Section II) *and* an instance of the gap between Tanzania and industrial societies (Section I and II). Thus third plane of unevenness is also a distinctive aspect of the general unevenness confronted by Tanzania.

Unequal equals: the nature of Sino-Tanzanian interaction

This completes the key work of the Chapter, specifying the three dimensions of unevenness; all of which ultimately specify the contours of the general unevenness of modernity. The Section can now conclude by providing an analysis of the nature of

Sino-Tanzanian *interaction*, which creates the intellectual bridge to establishing the actual process of substitution discovered in Chapter 5.

Beginning in earnest in the mid 1960s, 'Tanzania developed one of the closest and most consistent relationships of all African countries with the PRC' (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 259). Both parties, moreover, were eager to draw attention to it. Whilst Nyerere described the relationship in terms of unequal equals, the Chinese were if anything even more eager to highlight it. The 'friendly relations and cooperation between China and Tanzania', Ji Pengfei the Chinese Foreign Minister claimed, are 'a fine example of international relations of a new type' (Peking Review 1972, p. 22). Even allowing for the exaggerations of politicians' public statements, neither was wrong to point to distinctiveness.

Whilst many observers regarded this 'new type' of relations as explicable in (nearly) exclusively ideological terms – 'Red China's African offensive' (Cooley 1965) or Mao and Nyerere as sorts of ideological 'cousins', one the 'Soldier Revolutionary' the other the 'Teacher Revolutionary' (Hydén 1967) – this was no ideologically driven attempt on Tanzania's part to reproduce China in East Africa, nor the provision of a sort of Maoist 'dogmatic prescription of armed revolution' (Cooley 1965, p. 3).

Instead the 'link between China and Africa has always...been nationalism and not ideology...[the Chinese] gospel has been nationalism, not Communism' (Snow 1988, pp. 318–9). Occasional moments of revolutionary fervour aside, the Chinese sought to further entrench national sovereignty as a norm of international politics; this, and the material support that came with it, was what Nyerere welcomed so warmly. He was otherwise markedly different from Mao in so many respects, a devout Catholic and determined to denigrate class struggle, as a strategy; instead he was in favour of nation-building that was fundamentally inclusive, even in its coercive moments. Both parties entered these relations with clear-eyed focus on what they stood to gain.

The most comprehensive account of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s and 70s remains Yu's *China's African policy: a study of Tanzania* (1975) though it can be supplemented with numerous others (Bailey 1973, 1976, Ogunsanwo 1974, pp. 134–141, 197–213, Hall and Peyman 1976). The core message of this scholarship is insistence on taking 'unequal equals' seriously as a description of the relationship. That said Yu presents a reading of that differs somewhat from that in this Chapter. Although there were 'great disparities' in terms of wealth, power, population and so on, he regards them as '*irrelevant* [my emphasis] to the equality that governed their interactions' (1975, p. 30).

Thus Yu's treatment of 'unequal' besides 'equals' simply serves to juxtapose the concepts, serving to emphasise the novelty of a relationship of equality. Not only is this intellectually dangerous, since sovereign equality was hardly unknown.⁹ It also poses the risk of missing the causal significance of unevenness (industry on *one* side of the relationship). To reiterate the point, it was this unevenness that gave China the capacity to act in the way that proved so significant.

Various powers were willing to provide Tanzania with what might be called social artefacts of modernity. Alongside China stood Britain, Israel, West Germany, Nigeria and Canada that all agreed to provide various, significant forms of military assistance in the years after the mutiny (Yu 1975, p. 100). In part, resort to a wide range of partners was an attempt to appear as 'balanced' as possible in foreign policy on Nyerere's part (Legum 1964, Pratt 1976, pp. 165–6, Parsons 2003, pp. 167–8). That aside though, much of this other assistance was small relative to Chinese aid. Israeli and West German provisions for aid 'were relatively minor sources of military aid' (Parsons 2003, p. 167). Indeed in the German case it would come to naught owing to the diplomatic problems discussed above (Yu 1975, p. 103, Parsons 2003, p. 167). Similarly, the British dragged their feet over a request for £1.25 million for training an air wing, which ran into similar difficulties (Parsons 2003, p. 166). Finally Canadian assistance was more reliable and substantial (Parsons 2003, pp. 167–8), reported as being worth \$15million in 1967 and comprising the construction of a military academy, both pilot and infantry training and, finally, supplying 8 noncombat aircraft (Yu 1975, p. 104).

The contrast with Chinese provision is more pronounced than its resemblance. Losing no time, and within months of Tanzania calling for military aid, China began to provide training and supplies, with 6,000 tonnes of arms and trainers arriving by September 1964. In the following years significant military hardware arrived, all free of charge (Ogunsanwo 1974, pp. 138–9),¹⁰ including tanks and fighter jets. By the early 1970s Tanzania had a functioning air force and navy alongside a far larger (11,000) and better equipped army, that was *reasonably* well-paid (Parsons 2003, p. 185) since military budgets had also been assisted by aid. Already by 1969 Nyerere was declaring that 'most' of Tanzania's military support came from China and around this time Canadian assistance also ended (Yu 1975, pp. 97–8, Pratt 1976, p. 165).

⁹ But the *extension* of a norm of sovereign equality to Tanzania, and to relations between Tanzania and China, is of significance.

¹⁰ Mao Zedong reportedly saying at the time that 'we can be arms suppliers, not dealers'.

Estimation of the total value of Chinese aid is difficult, and vary from \$30 million (Yu 1975, p. 105) to \$42million (Parsons 2003, p. 167). Either way these were amounts that were beyond the reach of the Tanzanian state by any other means, to say nothing of the difficulty in sourcing the hardware from western suppliers. It is not an exaggeration, then, to suggest that Chinese assistance was a necessary condition for the strengthening of the Tanzanian military and the significant buttressing of TANU that went with the military reforms seen Section I.

Again, this can be seen as an early instance of combined development. One of the 'traditional variables of power' that Tanzania lacked was its military, which was not only backward but also actively rebellious. Nyerere's canny reforms, facilitated by Chinese material assistance, fundamentally reconfigured the position not only mollifying the military but actively bringing it under direct political control. Consider the following simplistic, but nonetheless instructive, thought-experiment. *But for* Chinese provision Nyerere's likely choice was between paying for a better equipped, better paid army through 'development'. This would have run up against the problems anticipated in the Arusha Declaration, as an agrarian society this could not be afforded whilst development assistance from the west would clearly remain inadequate. The choice, but for Chinese assistance, would have been between either attempting greater surplus extraction from the peasant or risking further serious strife in the army; neither option would have contributed to the stability for which Tanzania has subsequently become renowned.

As it happened, *with* the support of that 'unequal equal' Nyerere was able to carve out real breathing space. Furthermore the politicisation of the army (Yu 1975, p. 100, Parsons 2003, p. 168, Barany 2012, pp. 287–90) was to further enhance the standing of TANU in society. 'After the mutiny', writes Bienen (1967, p. 381), 'entrance into TANU became...the *sine qua non* for being part of the nation'. Finally, whilst there were a handful of coup plots - 1969, 1972 and 1982 - in the future, they were remarkable for their poor planning and lack of wider support either in the army or from society at large (Parsons 2003, p. 184, Barany 2012, p. 290). Civilian control, but also in the hands of TANU and Nyerere himself, neutralised it as a potential alternative power base, unlike in Ghana (Barany 2012, pp. 290–5, 299) or Uganda (Parsons 2003, p. 26).¹¹

¹¹ Kenya, meanwhile, overcame similar problems and mutiny the same year, through extensive British support, which it was unwilling to do for Tanzania (Parsons 2003, p. 169). This had the effect, though, of leaving in place an army along British lines, 'apolitical' and professionalised.

A further aspect of “breathing space” was the strengthening of the state’s standing vis-a-vis the powerful urban elements of society. In an important sense it was the mollification and extension of control of the army that was crucial in this regard too. Without being able to ally itself with the army, urban discontent had a far lower chance of threatening Nyerere’s position in the near-term.

Nonetheless, there is a wider aspect to Chinese aid relations than military assistance that is worth bringing out, because it is a trend that is most fully expressed in a project considered in Chapter 5 and central to the process of substitution that it articulates. China quickly and readily filled the financial gap left in the wake of those diplomatic tensions with Britain and West Germany (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 197, Bailey 1975, pp. 42–3, Yu 1975, pp. 83, 103–4, Pallotti 2009, p. 75). Particularly illustrative is the dispute with Britain. Upon Britain freezing a loan of £7.5million China, which had agreed a £10million loan in 1964 at the time of agreeing military aid, offered an additional £2million loan and £1million grant (Pallotti 2009, p. 75).

By 1971, of the existing capital assistance loans to Tanzania that amounted to a total of \$436 million, 56% came from China, 15% the World Bank, 10% Swedish and a total of 8% and 5% from the USA and USSR respectively (Yu 1975, p. 75). Whilst much of this aid was due to the TAZARA project (*the* central transfer in the process of substitution to be discussed in Chapter 5), this project does not account for the entirety of the sum (Yu 1975, chap. 4).

As the disappointments of the strategy of capital-intensive, western-financed development became apparent, Nyerere was deeply impressed by China’s own development strategy when he visited in 1965 (Hutchinson 1975, p. 95). Pointing to what he supposed was a basic similarity, since both countries had ‘scarce foreign capital and labour in excess of other factors of production’ (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 140) he resolved that a labour-focussed model was preferable in Tanzania too. Not only would this be influential in his own thinking, impacting on his formulations in the Arusha Declaration up to a point, Nyerere also resolved to seek Chinese assistance in promoting more labour-intensive industry in Tanzania.

In an experiment that turned out to be of limited significance, and still less successful, Chinese technical and financial assistance was provided for labour-intensive industrial development projects. The most prominent of these was the Friendship Textile Mill, opened in 1968 in Dar es Salaam. At the time this was the largest industrial development in East Africa (Yu 1975, pp. 80–2) that employed, at full capacity, 2,800 workers and 200 administrative staff (Yu 1975, p. 81). The labour-

intensiveness of this project is illustrated by contrasting it with the Mwanza Textile Mill, built with French aid, and opened in 1969. The Friendship Mill used 2.5 times more labour per tonne of output than the Mwanza Mill, and only 40% of the capital and at a lower cost per unit of production (Rweyemamu 1973, p. 124, Yu 1975, p. 156, Coulson 2013, p. 330).

Both mills would prove to be commercial failures, Mwanza in particular not surviving long. The Friendship Mill, meanwhile, lingers on but has hardly been a roaring success, mirroring the wider abortive industrialisation of Tanzania. Its significance for this chapter, though, is that these projects also contributed to the wider mollification of urban society by generating both jobs and ancillary commercial possibilities. In this sense aid relations, especially those with China,¹² assisted in the brief “breathing space” that emerged in the build-up to 1967 and the Arusha Declaration.

Conclusion

This Chapter has been in the nature of a ground clearing exercise, identifying three significant planes of unevenness, progressively grafting one onto the other. First was the unevenness of rural and urban society bequeathed by colonial-modernity. The second, bringing in the international dimension explicitly, was the disinterest of the advanced industrial world in Tanzania and the active aggression of colonial and/or racist regimes in nearby Southern Africa. Whilst Tanzania placed all its first bets on the industrial world being willing to supply the means of its development, this was in effect a gamble that the single basic unevenness identified here would melt away upon independence. Having begun independence with the claim that the only enemy now was ‘nature’, Nyerere discovered that in fact he had plenty of opponents that were *social* in nature. And that social opposition flowed from the *unevenness* of industrial-modernity, including both western powers, those local colonial powers *and* “domestic” urban opposition which was closely attuned to the ‘world market’. In this sense, the two planes of unevenness the Chapter developed are an integral whole.

Yet, alongside this loss of innocence, and with it the “discovery” of international relations, Nyerere and TANU found just enough scope to survive through the third plane of unevenness. That is, embarking on significant relations with Tanzania’s

¹² Other, more minor examples, include a Tanzanian-Chinese shipping line (Larkin 1971, p. 95, Yu 1975, pp. 82–3) and Ubungo Farm Implements factory (Yu 1975, pp. 78–80).

unequal equal, Maoist China. In encountering this third plane of unevenness two things have been discovered. First, the general unevenness has been clarified as including this distinctive feature. Second, upon that discovery, the narrative seems to have been propelled forward toward *combined development*. For the consequences of interaction across this plane of unevenness are so significant that their rehearsal quickly lead in that direction. All that has been said so far in terms of combined development is that the interaction of ‘unequal equals’ was crucial to a sort of “breathing space” from crisis that enabled Nyerere to embark on the Arusha Declaration.

Recall that three forms of combined development were discussed in Chapter 3; the level of events, structures of social life and thirdly, hybridity. Combination in the “breathing space” sense is at the level of events and structures of social life. Yet, as was made clear in that Chapter, the real labour of this thesis must be to identify the third level of hybridity in order to resolve the problem of peasant difference or incommensurability.

With three dimensions of a single pattern of unevenness now specified, matters can now proceed to Chapter 5, where that core labour can be performed. With the Arusha Declaration the process of substitution, the origins of the political market and the identification of the citizen-peasant as the hybrid social form that resolves the incommensurability of peasant and modernity can be specified.

Chapter 5: Siasa ni kilimo: socialism, failure and the emergence of the citizen-peasant 1967-1975

‘In 1967 a group of Youth who were marching in support of the Arusha Declaration asked me how long it would take Tanzania to become socialist. I thought 30 years. I was wrong...I am now sure that it will take us much longer!’

Julius K Nyerere (Nyerere 1977, p. 1)

‘[Nyerere] began bridging the chasm between the logic of the peasant household and that of the nation state’

Deborah Bryceson (Bryceson, 1988, p. 47).

Introduction

This Chapter returns to the Arusha Declaration of 1967, first encountered at the outset of Chapter 1. With that Declaration Tanzania fully committed itself to its experiment with ‘African Socialism’. A slogan of the era, ‘*siasa ni kilimo*’ [agriculture is politics], is the quintessential spirit of the time. Peasant agriculture was not just a technocratic issue of development economics; it was at the heart of the nation’s politics. Tracing exactly *how* and *why* the peasant was political is the key task here.

Building on the understanding of Arusha gleaned in Chapter 1, this endeavour is pursued as follows. First, Arusha is analysed as a response to the unevenness discussed in Chapter 4. The key work of this Chapter then begins, identifying how the Arusha Declaration was a signal moment, initiating an historical process of *substitution* in the broadened sense specified in Chapter 3. Drawing on the significance of Sino-Tanzanian relations, it becomes possible to trace the specific patterns that introduced elements of modernity into Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s.¹ To complete the discussion of such transfers *as* substitution, the analysis proceeds and culminates in tracing how that

¹ Which is *not* to say that there were no elements of modernity in Tanzania beforehand.

both *reinforced and altered* the social logic of peasant reproduction in Tanzania. Thus, the *political market* and *citizen-peasant* emerge as the products of the historical process initiated by the Arusha Declaration.

This logical sequence is developed over three Sections. In the first the Arusha Declaration is seen as a considered, and radical, response to unevenness. In order to do so, it must also address some related points. One is to explain that the Arusha Declaration depended, in part, on the “breathing space” point in the previous Chapter. Second, the steps of the Arusha Declaration are retraced, emphasising its nature as a vision of agrarian-modernity. It is this vision which also captures it as a response to unevenness, which has been specified as ultimately being between industrial-modernity and peasant societies. Finally, widespread understandings of the Arusha Declaration as a “failed” socialist policy are also addressed. Indeed, the first epigraph to the current Chapter alludes to something along these lines. In it Nyerere says that ‘socialism’ would take far longer than he had first realised; the best interpretation of this is to regard the Arusha Declaration as something that initiated a process of social change over the long-term, and that is the approach this Chapter adopts.

The remaining two Sections proceed on that basis. Following the logic of U&CD, they together generate the analysis of a historical process of combined development and substitution in particular. Section II specifies the elements of modernity that were part of a process of *fission* in large part due to Sino-Tanzanian *interaction*. In revisiting relations with China, it elaborates on the *unequal equals* argument as interactivity whose most significant manifestation was the TAZARA Railway project. Both this project and burgeoning western-aid by the 1970s, which was itself provoked and facilitated by China’s presence on the scene, were vital to what followed.

Section III is, on these bases, able to show the historical genesis of the key concepts of political market and citizen-peasant. It demonstrates how Arusha as a historical process, consisting in necessary part in interaction across unevenness (TAZARA etc.), gives rise to this dual phenomenon. Reflecting on the suggestiveness of the *siasa ni kilimo* [agriculture is politics] slogan, it shows precisely how elements of modernity intersected with the Tanzanian peasant to both reinforce the peasant as a logic of reproduction *and* simultaneously push it toward citizen-peasant hybridity. Accordingly, this amounted to *siasa ni kilimo* culminating in what Bryceon refers to, in the second epigraph, as ‘bridging the chasm’ between peasant and nation-state.

I. The Arusha Declaration: confronting peasant-modernity unevenness

Having carved out “breathing space” in the mid-1960s, TANU and Nyerere moved toward a radical programme set out in a series of documents and announcements, most clearly in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 (Nyerere 1968, pp. 231–50). Harried by the pressures imposed by the unevenness of a peasant society amidst a “modern world”, which included the demands of urban classes, the pressing requirements of the world market to produce cash crops, and the specifically geopolitical pressures all seen in chapter 4, this was Nyerere’s answer.²

It is true that much of the Declaration consisted of familiar enough policies of a socialistic developmental state. The ‘commanding heights’ of the economy were to be brought under state control, the vogue for import substitution industrialisation was evident, and a widespread programme of nationalisation followed (Pratt and Mwansasu 1979, p. 12). Nevertheless, what was dramatic, distinctive and central to it was its emphasis on the peasant as per Chapter 1. Statements to this effect multiplied. Pressed, for example, by a mass student demonstration seeking improved student grants Nyerere angrily dismissed them *en masse*. Declaring them, and himself, to be exploiters of the peasant Nyerere emphasised that everything from urban development to student grants ultimately had to be paid for by the labour of the peasant; and on that basis refused to meet the students’ demands (Nyerere 1968, pp. 337–66).

Nyerere had developed a ‘sophisticated awareness...of the “rural-urban” dichotomy’ and Arusha amounted to a resolution ‘to use the surplus more productively and in ways that benefit the vast majority of the population’ (Arrighi and Saul 1968, p. 166). Amongst others things, this meant limiting wages of urban workers and state employees as far as possible whilst also shifting away from expensive capital-intensive programmes (Lofchie 1976, p. 482).

Not only did it contain a negative invocation against exploitation of the peasant. Indeed, it was for the most part an attempt to discover the positive means to develop a peasant society. And in doing so, it necessarily meant confronting the unevenness captured in Chapter 4.

Whilst a significant minority of peasants were involved in the production of cash crops, the majority of Tanzanian peasants were both physically and socially remote

² For a good summary of this period see (Nugent 2012, pp. 144–9) whilst a lengthier account can be found in (Pratt 1976).

from cash-cropping. Not only loosely connected to the rest of the country, and the “world market”, this majority lived remotely from each other. Few even lived in villages, hamlets and disparate settlements of a handful of households being far more common in non-cash crop regions; in these cases, the peasantry reproduced itself through subsistence farming. The native authority, as the means of indirect rule, was the basis of government and the only firmly rooted connection between state and rural society. On the other side stood a limited, but unstable and demanding urban society. Arusha aimed at nothing less than the reversal of this unevenness.

This was not just ‘developmental’ in the narrow sense, it also amounted to building a nation or ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) in the sense that it would bring the peasantry into *national* life. Thus the Arusha Declaration also evaded the language of class struggle. Whilst a robust idea of unjust exploitation was at its forefront, it was a call for ‘national justice’ not ‘class based justice’ (Mamdani 2012, p. 118). It was, in these terms, a call for the radical extension of formal political equality (citizenship) to all.

Politically, this meant elimination of the ‘native authority’ and ‘subject’.³ That is, political equality would break down the division – which was functional to exploitation too – of town and country. That, thought Nyerere, was the basic condition for the establishment of Tanzania as a viable political community. And, not coincidentally, that ought to also furnish Nyerere and TANU with the largest possible constituency; no longer would a handful of soldiers and urban residents be able to threaten the state with the ease they had in 1964. This corresponds to moves in scholarship ‘Beyond Developmentalism’ (Sundet 1994) that recognises that Arusha not just a drive at material development (Aminzade 2003, 2013a, 2013b, Pallotti 2009, Bjerk 2010, Lal 2012, Mamdani 2012, pp. 109–25).

Nonetheless, to understand it as such the resources of historical sociology are called for. Although the aims of Arusha can be captured, in part, in the register of political philosophy - nation building, community, justice and formal equality – the programmatic content of Arusha is another matter. This is so because its ultimate objective was reform of *sociological unevenness* as it has been described.

The heart of its programme was rural *collectivisation*, initiated in the late 1960s and gathering momentum into the early 1970s. It had two aims. One was ‘villagisation’ or ‘nucleation’, aspiring to gather peasant-farmers into larger communities (villages).

³ Cranford Pratt’s detailed observations (1976, pp. 11–42) that the colonial government of the 1940s and 50s was trying deepen the use of Native Authorities is instructive of the deep difference between colonial and post-colonial eras that the Arusha Declaration marked.

Membership of a community at this level would also facilitate active membership of the national community. Furthermore, it was reasonably supposed that nucleation would make the provision of social services in the countryside on a mass scale possible. Those villages could be linked through infrastructure, allowing the state to offer villagers both fertiliser and other agricultural inputs as well as health and education services (Mascarenhas 1979). Furthermore, went the hope, that would have benefits in terms of production and wider human development. This is an early sign of the content of the aspiration Bryceson described as ‘bridging the chasm’ between nation-state and peasant; by enabling itself to make provision to the peasantry, the state would be able to bind that group closely to itself. The benefits that would accrue upon such nucleation are obvious enough; so much so that it had long been a colonial ambition (Aminzade 2013a, chap. 2).⁴

It was the second arm, explicit collectivisation of production, which gave Arusha its socialist nature. The idea was that whilst each household would maintain a small private plot, a large proportion of the work time of each person would be given over to collective plots. Out that various economies of scale were expected to accrue, and with it gains in productivity. It is this second aim that has been the focus⁵ of critical attention, seen by James Scott as utopian ‘modernism’ (Scott 1998). And there is no shortage of material in support of such criticism; collectivisation ran into considerable difficulties and generated major problems. Indeed, the peasant population it was supposed to benefit met the collectivisation ambition with real hostility.

What should be borne in mind, however, is that whilst the Arusha Declaration aspired to *both* villagisation *and* collectivisation they were also distinguishable ideas. As it would turn out, these ambitions would be separated out from one another, allowing pursuit of villagisation and abandonment of collectivisation. This, as Section III argues, was crucial to the emergence of the citizen-peasant.

Collectivisation was deeply impracticable for a straightforward reason; there was no support base in Tanzanian society for it. Aimed at the peasantry, it was not a

⁴ The disparate pattern of the population was a major reason why the colonial state had found it difficult to fully extend its power throughout its territory, even with the innovation of indirect rule. Moreover, there is some suggestion that this pattern was a response to colonialism, an attempt to evade colonial authority (Kjekshus 1977).

⁵ But not exclusively so. Villagisation or nucleation has been extensively criticized in its own right, both the plans for the villages themselves, whilst it has also been suggested that locations chosen for new villages were often less than ideal. Often, goes the argument, villagers found themselves relocated to *worse* agricultural land, whilst fertile land was suddenly abandoned (Kjekshus 1977, Freyhold 1979, Schneider 2007).

militant-revolutionary peasantry in the Chinese fashion that had been forged in guerrilla war. In fact, *opposition* to the Arusha programme amongst the peasantry is one of the most notable features of *ujamaa*. Likewise, there were very few Tanzanians that Nyerere could draw upon on an ideological basis for support. Only a tiny minority of Tanzanians identified as 'socialist' even at the peak of *ujamaa*, 'there were very, very few socialists in Tanzania in 1967' commented Nyerere (Pratt 1976, p. 228).

The eventual abandonment of collectivisation will be traced in subsequent Sections. The point for now is that whilst there were key elements of the Arusha Declaration that were impracticable and other elements which simply failed, it should be understood as a general historical process. Some elements survived intact, others were modified and others abandoned.

For the Marxist left the Arusha Declaration was little more than radical clothing for an attempt to turn the state into the primary exploiter of the peasant. The bureaucratic (formerly petty) bourgeoisie, having captured the state, argued Shivji (1976, p. 71) looked to 'further [the] integration of peasants in the cash economy'. In this view Arusha is nothing more than another 'stage'⁶ of exploitative modernity – anchored in 'international capitalism' – striving to achieve the ambition of subjugating the peasantry to the (capitalist) market.

The merits of this interpretation in all its particulars⁷ need not be considered beyond the core claim. The exigencies of modernity, capitalist or otherwise, are widely seen as operative in *ujamaa* and the Arusha Declaration, and Shivji's interpretation is typical in this sense. They boil down to the suggestion that in pursuit of (implicitly singular) modernity the *only* choice was to expand and deepen the exploitation ("development" as a euphemism) of the peasantry.

This much was Goran Hydén's point, save that he viewed that choice as necessary in order to achieve modernisation. Initially he thought that the explicitly socialist programme of collectivisation might be able to 'capture' the peasant to this end (Hydén 1980) but was later driven by the 'failure' of Arusha to the conclusion that there is no substitute for the classical path of modernity. The peasant must be subjected to dispossession in order for capital-wage-labour relations to do their developmental work (Hydén 1983). A variant of this idea is hinted at by scholars that

⁶ Shivji(1976, pp. 76–7) explains the necessity for a different stage as being conditioned by the exigencies of class struggle between commercial and petty/bureaucratic bourgeoisies.

⁷ Such as the debate (Barker 1979) between 'democratic socialists' (Pratt 1976, Pratt and Mwansasu 1979, Pratt 1979) and 'Marxists' (Shivji 1976, Mueller 1980, 1981).

emphasise the continuities between the colonial and post-colonial states. Frederick Cooper (1981, p. 52) has suggested that 'socialist states, notably Tanzania, have cajoled and ordered around peasants in the *manner of the colonial state*'.

In service of the suggestion that Arusha was in the same mould as colonial-modernity (Cooper), or else just simply an unorthodox attempt to capture the peasant as a fundamental pre-condition of modernity (Hydén), these claims are generally supported by reference to that increasingly coercive nature of the Arusha programme. In the early years after the Declaration, the state sought to secure villagisation *and* collectivisation by ideological cajolement of the peasantry. When this did not work it attempted to offer material inducements. When this too failed, active coercion commenced and ultimately the state forcibly transported peasants that refused to the new villages. In 1974 villagisation had become compulsory, and those not already living in villages were moved. Whilst this was undoubtedly coercive, it was achieved without widespread physical violence as such. True as the narratives of coercion are, it is important not to miss that at the very point at which coercion began collectivisation was abandoned. Ultimately, what was forced upon the Tanzanian peasant was living in villages, not collective production.

The scale of that which was achieved was tremendous: whereas only 5% of the population of the country lived in villages (and up to 90% of the population was rural) in 1970, by 1977 79% lived in villages. This amounted to 'an extreme centralization that extended the state apparatus' and 'did away with native authorities, and subordinated the party to the state' (Mamdani 2012, pp. 121–2). Plainly this reorganisation facilitated the extension of government authority throughout rural Tanzania, as well growth in social services that tied the population to the state more closely (Bjerk 2010, p. 299). The gains in mortality, literacy and so on of the 1970s plainly owes a great deal to this too.

The abandonment of collectivisation, however, disturbs analyses of Arusha as in service of exploitation and the capture of the peasant toward 'modern' ends. The very mechanism by which surplus extraction was to be done, if at all, had been abandoned. Moreover, it is sobering for those views that at the very moment of peak coercion the production of cash-crops in particular plummeted (Ponte 2002, pp. 44–47) and would not recover. That *might* have been entirely destructive, but it certainly did not enhance surplus extraction. The best that can be said, if that is so, is that Arusha had failed to capture the peasant to exploitative ends.

The facts of the matter are more suggestive still. Production did not fall uniformly across all categories. Excepting 1974-5, the year of the greatest disruption brought about by relocations combined with a drought, *food* production actually increased rapidly following villagisation (Ponte 2002, pp. 42-43). As a response to unevenness as described the Arusha Declaration had significantly changed Tanzania. Most of the country now lived in villages, service provision to those populations had been enhanced and *food* production had climbed whilst cash-crop production had dropped precipitously. Arusha had not achieved modernity in anything like the sense that Hydén would recognise; the peasant had not been captured to developmental ends, and Tanzania had *fewer* commodities it could realise on the world market.

Only two things then can be said for now. First, the Arusha Declaration was conceived as a means to confront the problems imposed by unevenness. But, secondly, it did not result (for whatever reason) in development according to conventional criteria. It is a mixed picture. To make sense of them, a second review of this historical process will be required in Section III; therein the political market as a logic of reproduction, and the citizen-peasant as its social form, will enable a coherent analysis. Before that step can be taken, however, the process of substitution that is hidden in all this must be ascertained.

II. Unequal Equals: the TAZARA Railway as means of substitution

Various features of the first years of Sino-Tanzanian were noted in chapter 3. Military aid, for instance, was seen given particular significance in identifying the origins of “breathing space”. In this Section a much more fundamental feature of these relations is identified. The TAZARA Railway was, in this argument, the central social artefact of industrial modernity that transferred from its social setting in China, through a process of fission, to Tanzania. It is this transfer that is the first point in developing the analysis of Tanzanian combined development. And it is so fundamental because it directly interrupted and intervened in the general pattern of unevenness confronting Tanzania. Thus, whilst there were other substantial projects such as attempts to assist Tanzania’s industrialisation, these have little causal significance.⁸

As a vast and well-known undertaking, TAZARA has attracted a prodigious literature (Yu 1975, chap. 6, Bailey 1976, Hall and Peyman 1976, Monson 2011, Coulson 2013, pp. 277-9). Whilst Cecil Rhodes, imperial personality *par excellence*, had

⁸ Such as the Friendship Textile Mill, as discussed in chapter 4.

conceived something along these lines as an offshoot of his Cape to Cairo railway (Yu 1975, p. 126, Monson 2011, pp. 17–20), TAZARA was the germ of an explicitly anti and post-colonial ambition. Even having been conceived in the colonial era, the project had never been taken seriously by colonial governments or potential donors. Nonetheless the post-colonial governments of Tanzania and Zambia revived it with especial urgency upon the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia (1965). It was to be a railway between Dar es Salaam on the Tanzanian coast to the interior copperbelt of landlocked Zambia. Its primary objective being to secure the means to transport Zambian copper for export without reliance on existing routes that ran through Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique. The geopolitics of the region were, from its inception, central to the TAZARA project.

Tanzanian interest in the Railway is often seen as being principled, a means to make good on the anti-colonial and anti-racist principles it was becoming known for. And this was true, though as suggested in Chapter 4, such principles were not without geopolitical significance for Tanzania in a more self-interested sense. Even so, there are a further set of even more prosaic considerations around TAZARA, which was also seen as a development project for Tanzania itself. Although this was not the primary consideration in the earliest planning stages of the project, it became increasingly central; indeed, it is at the core of the significance of TAZARA for the current argument.

The route that the TAZARA Railway took through Tanzania is of great significance. Running through what are known as the Southern Highlands of Tanzania on the route from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border, TAZARA opened up that entire region of the country to infrastructure whereas it had been almost entirely neglected in that sense by the colonial state. In opening up this region the political geography of Tanzania was profoundly altered, and with it the trajectory of the Arusha process. Suddenly this region, in a basic physical as well as social sense, was opened to the transfer of *elements of modernity*. In particular, the provision of social services that villagisation was meant to facilitate was especially enhanced by this Railway. In short, the transfer of the Railway to Tanzania as an initial modern technology facilitated further such transfers. Those transfers, as Section III explores more fully, did not simply accelerate development in a unilinear pattern. Rather they had profoundly differentiating social consequences, reinforcing and diverting the logic of reproduction in a process of substitution.

The circumstances of that transfer, however, must first be understood. For whilst both the Zambian and Tanzanian governments were eagerly pursuing it, the project seemed no less doomed than their other development projects. In particular, western disinterestedness meant that neither the financial nor technical wherewithal it required were not forthcoming. Tanzania and Zambia looked to the west and its Bretton Woods institutions in the first instance, and were quickly dismissed. The World Bank and the UN Seers Report both regarded the railway as an irrational and uneconomic exuberance;⁹ because alternative routes through Mozambique and South Africa via Rhodesia for Zambian copper already existed there was no rationale for it (ignoring, of course, the 'anti-colonial' features of the project) (Seers 1964, Coulson 2013, p. 277). The Soviet Union exhibited a similar disinterestedness (Okoko 1987, p. 192) and the geopolitics of Cold War did not offer Tanzania (and Zambia) the leverage it did, for example, for the Egyptian Aswan Dam project.

Turning to China, Nyerere mentioned the project to the Chinese in 1963, and began discussions in earnest upon his 1965 visit to Beijing. Very much in line with the logic of unequal equals set out in Chapter 5, he found a receptive audience where the project was seen as excellent opportunity to promote China as an agent 'freedom from the neo-colonial and neo-imperialist hegemony' (Monson 2011, pp. 217–8). At the time the isolation of China was, if anything, at its peak. Not only was it isolated from the west, the Sino-Soviet split was now out in the open. Alleviating that, still less admission to the UN, seemed remote. It can be little wonder, then, that the offer of an avowedly anti-colonial development project in East Africa seemed like one of the best options available to Beijing.

Thus it was possible to quickly conclude a deal by 1967 (Coulson 2013, p. 278). Chinese technology, expertise, and labour, alongside plenty of Tanzanian and Zambian labour too, would be contributed to the project. It would be paid for through an interest-free loan and the sale of Chinese goods in both countries. Following this, 'construction work was incredibly quick'. Ground surveys were conducted in 1968–9, with full construction begun in 1970. The first 500 kilometres, beginning from Dar es Salaam, were completed in the first year. The most difficult part of the project, and also the most significant for current purposes, was the 160km section ascending into the Southern Highlands. This required the construction of 19 tunnels, 80 million cubic-metres of earth moving and involved punishing working conditions under which many

⁹ One other possibility was a British-Canadian consortium, but on far less favourable terms in 1966 (Coulson 2013, pp. 277–8).

workers perished (Coulson 2013, p. 278). This stage took several years and after the completion of this portion, the remainder of the line was quickly completed and the line was fully operational by 1975.¹⁰

The achievement of this feat of engineering was a boon to the prestige of both of the local governments; but it was an especially important boost to China's standing in the African continent. Without making a simplistic claim on this basis, it is worth reflecting that China finally secured its entry to the UN whilst TAZARA was being constructed. Equally important, it was only by virtue of the great unevenness between Tanzania (and Zambia) and China that the project could be undertaken. As a vast power with industry it had both the resources, technology and ability to realise the project. And the immensity of the undertaking must not be underestimated. It required the construction of 1800 kilometres of railway track, stations and ancillary projects in under 5 years in difficult conditions and virtually no existing infrastructure. It was impossible for Tanzania and Zambia to have undertaken this alone. Lacking the ability themselves, it had likewise proven impossible to raise finance and pay for it privately. Moreover, even had that been possible, the financial cost would have been prohibitive. It is not an exaggeration to say that without China the project would not have happened.

TAZARA also had profound, but indirect consequences. Provoked into competition (Mushi 1981, pp. 63–4) by the high visibility and propaganda value of TAZARA to China and radical 'Third Worldism', the USA and Sweden agreed to construct a comparable highway project, running along broadly the same route (Yu 1975, p. 156, Monson 2011). That project was also of major importance for the opening of the Southern Highlands. But it is reasonable to conclude that it too was an indirect consequence of Chinese assistance. Indeed, this was part of a more general shift in Tanzania's international relations; it had moved from being a minor, uninteresting and occasionally recalcitrant country to being, by the 1970s, a donor darling (Edwards 2014).

Nevertheless, the direct consequences of TAZARA are the most telling. The colonial era had left Tanzania with two main rail lines, one leading to the north and another central line (Monson 2011, pp. 17–8). Both were conspicuously in their service of the export driven cash-crop system. The northern line ran through sisal plantations before reaching the coffee plantations of Arusha and Moshi in the Mount Kilimanjaro area. Meanwhile, the central line ran through semi-arid Tanzania until it reached the

¹⁰ But, notably, the Railway had begun operating into the Southern Highlands earlier.

tobacco-growing Tabora region and the cotton-growers around Lake Victoria (Berry 1971, Coulson 2013, p. 29). In service of the cash-crop system, this infrastructure also tended to buttress the bifurcated state and the privileges of urban power that sat atop the system. In this sense these were railways in the quintessentially colonial vein of modernity; technology and social relations all revolved around export trade.

This Railway was different, but not by reason of geography alone. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that TAZARA had been financed by the World Bank or a fully commercial source instead of the Chinese. As noted above, this would have been significantly more expensive. Even if it had been affordable, it would have generated real pressures to increase cash-crop production in order to repay those more expensive loans.

Even so, both geography and history were significant too. The Southern Highlands, even though no major infrastructure existed prior to TAZARA, was a region that was climatologically ideal for arable farming. It enjoyed the heaviest rainfall in the country and given that almost all Tanzanian agriculture – both subsistence and export driven – was rain fed this had tremendous significance. Likewise, the Highlands also enjoyed rich soil. Due to the failure, for various historical reasons,¹¹ of colonial-settler farming to take root the region had been more or less ignored save for the implementation of the native authority and some limited attempts to encourage agriculture. Another reason for this neglect and isolation, of course, was the expense and difficulty involved in constructing a railway into the region, as already observed.

Needless to say, TAZARA had developmental potential for the region was clear at the time. So dramatic was it that engendered many high hopes, many of which were frustrated. On a far greater scale than the Friendship Textile Mill, the TAZARA Railway was supposed to generate industrialisation by opening up large coal and iron-ore deposits in the Southern Highlands. It was hoped to become ‘the industrial heartland of Tanzania’ (Coulson 2013, p. 279) on that basis. Indeed, Nyerere himself spoke on several occasions hopefully about this prospect; in fact, he hoped that Chinese assistance would be forthcoming to that end in the late 1970s. Neither the assistance, nor the project, ever came to fruition.¹² Along with wider plans for industrialisation in

¹¹ Including the ‘early’ termination of German colonialism, and its replacement with British government whose priority in the region was – and remained – on Kenya.

¹² Curiously, however, the project seems to have been taken up by a Chinese company in 2014, see Chapter 7.

Tanzania, this seemed to end in failure; Tanzania's future seemed to remain rooted in agriculture.

Whilst agricultural development was anticipated to some extent to flow from TAZARA, its most significant aspect was not. Its most profound impact would not be developmental so much as to form the basis for combined development. This is missing link to understanding the trajectory of the Arusha programme discussed in Section I. Section III takes up the challenge of capturing this, drawing together the threads of Sections I and II to cast the overall process as one of substitution.

III. Combined Development in Tanzania: Substitution, the political market and citizen-peasant

Taking a second look at the Arusha process, with the benefit of the discussion of TAZARA in section II, now allows the fully-fledged analysis of the process as one of combined development and substitution in particular. Section I established that the Arusha Declaration was an attempt to confront and overcome the unevenness that Tanzania faced. In doing so it also provided an account of what followed the Arusha Declaration, pointing to two key objectives in that attempt to reform rural society: villagisation and collectivisation. The former was eventually achieved, whilst the latter had to be abandoned.

Likewise, Section II discussed a major instance of Sino-Tanzanian interaction. It suggested that the TAZARA Railway was a geopolitically inspired (from both the Tanzanian and Chinese sides) instance of fissile modernity. One social artefact of modernity had been transplanted in Tanzania by virtue this interaction. Taking a second look at some of these conclusions, this Section combines these two threads to make sense of them as a patterned, theorisable process.

Villagisation and the abandonment of collectivism

At the time of the Arusha Declaration, in 1967, nucleated settlements were 'the basis of existence for a majority of the population' (Pratt and Mwansasu 1979, p. 7). Whilst the Arusha Declaration aimed to replace this pattern with *ujamaa vijijini*

(socialist villages) the ultimate outcome was villagisation but without socialism (Barker 1979, pp. 109–115).¹³

Putting the abandonment of collectivisation to one side for the moment, villagisation is an achievement that calls for further consideration. The rarity of village-size dwellings in Tanzania was, as noted in Section I, partly an attempt to evade colonial authority; it was, to that extent, a reflection of the contentious social relations of the colonial bifurcated state. However, this was not the only reason for the dispersed patterns of habitation. It was also a 'basic fact that over large parts of Tanzania the ecology of the country would not permit permanent settlement to grow to a large size without major additional government expenditures' (Mascarenhas 1979, p. 147). Living in substantially sized villages was not just confronted by the restraint of colonial social relations, in many areas the land simply could not support large numbers of subsistence farmers *without substantial inputs*. Villagisation in such instances required fertiliser and health care, railways, roads and, perhaps, education too. Even where not a strict ecological necessity, the provision of inputs such as these would be socially necessary to convince Tanzanians of the rationale for villagisation at all.

The process of 'villagisation' ran from 1967–76. Broadly speaking 1967–73 was the period in which that aim was pursued via voluntary means. The state attempted to cajole the populace through 'education and administrative inducement' (Barker 1979, pp. 97–9) to move to socialist villages. Regional Development Funds were also made available for small projects chosen by those villagers. Yet these efforts met with very little success, and the relative few that were taking up these offers were mostly in the ecologically poorest areas and where the limited inducements offered made more difference. In all other areas peasants preferred the existing state of affairs to the relatively paltry offerings of the state. The government was not able to offer the 'major additional government expenditures' it would require to decisively tip the balance; but, decisively, the continued demand that these villages be collectivised was critical to that low uptake.

Official frustration with the peasantry grew. From 1969, with the adoption of a second 5-year-plan, coercive operations began to be carried out in certain localities.

¹³ Barker elaborates the rural reorganisation as having 5 ambitions. 1) 'Living together', 2) 'owning together', 3) 'working together for the good of all', 4) building 'democratic communities' and 5) 'integrating agriculture into the national economy'. In this sense 1, 4 and 5 might be considered the most successful; meanwhile it might ultimately be said 2 and 3 were achieved in a non-socialistic sense, a point that emerges later in this Section and again in subsequent Chapters.

The two largest instances, Operation Rufiji and Operation Dodoma, though officially for local ecological reasons (flooding and semi-aridity respectively) (Barker 1979, p. 98), were in many ways the blueprint for the coercive national programme that would follow.

In 1972 the Iringa¹⁴ Declaration, a supplement to Arusha, was issued - bearing the *siasa ni kilimo* slogan - stressing 'the importance of good farming techniques' and government's willingness to support 'more effective and modern practices' (Barker 1979, p. 99). That language is sometimes understood as an ambition for large-scale farming, especially the capital-intensive use of tractors and so on. But in actual fact the techniques that Iringa emphasised as 'effective...modern practices' were 'the use of oxen, early planting and spacing, use of manure and fertilizer' (Coulson 2013, p. 295). No paean to the tractor here, save for some collective uses. The invocation of 'modern practices' was very much intended to be conversant with small-scale peasant techniques, and attractive to them as such. Thus the Iringa Declaration is best understood as part of a shift in emphasis away from collective production and the supposed benefits of scale (which the tractor implied) and toward an emphasis on the means by which the state could assist *existing* small-scale farming of the peasant sort.

How is this shift to be interpreted? Coulson suggests that reluctance to press for collective production signifies reluctance to confront large-scale 'capitalist' farmers. On Christmas day 1972 a TANU Regional Commissioner in Iringa, Dr Kleurruu, was infamously murdered by one such disgruntled 'capitalist' farmer (Coulson 2013, pp. 294-5). This, however, is an over-interpretation of limited evidence. 'Capitalism' in farming, especially in a region like Iringa, was not only rare it was becoming rarer as the coming analysis will show. Even that aside, this was capitalism in a very limited sense. Such wage-labour as was employed was a very marginal activity for those labourers, whose principal occupation and source of reproduction was farming their own (household's) plots. Even a relatively successful farmer, producing substantial surpluses and marketing them was not so much a capitalist farmer as a well-off peasant farmer. This being so the Iringa Declaration did not signal reluctance to confront *capitalist* farmers, but rather reluctance to confront peasant farmers in general over the issue of collectivisation.

The endgame began in 1973 and continued to 1976, with a TANU resolution that living in villages was now compulsory for all rural citizens. With it the period of

¹⁴ It was not coincidental that this was a town in the Southern Highlands.

systematic and coercive villagisation had begun. At the same time all requirements that those villages engage in collective production were dropped (Barker 1979, p. 99). That coincidence in time alone has prompted Bryceson to conclude, as well as Mamdani (2012, pp. 109–121), that ‘villagisation was a nationalist rather than a socialist solution’ that simply aimed ‘to facilitate infrastructure delivery’ (Bryceson 1988, p. 44). To this conclusion it need only be added that elemental to the ‘nationalist’ goal was formal political equality.

Dropping collectivisation did not mean that ‘capitalist’ relations would begin to emerge. Nor would it mean that social relations in the countryside would continue in ‘traditional’ fashion. Whilst much of the literature on this process in Tanzania nonetheless proceeds along one of these lines, thereby producing yet another iteration of the Lenin-Chayanov debate discussed in Chapter 3, debating whether Tanzania thus manifests as fundamentally a capitalist or peasant mode of production. Lofchie (1976, pp. 497–8), for instance, argued that whereas the *ujamaa vijijini* programme had ‘bet on the weak’ via collectivisation and failed the ‘only viable remaining alternative is to “bet on the strong” or...”let the kulaks run”’.¹⁵ Rather than casting around for an appropriate analogy (‘kulaks’), sense must be made of this by reference to methodological resources prepared beforehand; for the debate around villagisation otherwise revolves around the same incommensurability of peasant and modernity as observed repeatedly.

The political market: substitution and the peasant logic of reproduction

In resiling from collectivisation, and satisfying itself with villagisation alone, the government was in fact recognising that a different logic of reproduction was emerging from the Arusha process. Rather than moving toward socialist collectivism, this was a form of peasant logic; government concession to this makes sense as a basis for achieving some of the aims of the Arusha Declaration and achieving stability too. Significantly though, in developing this argument, that logic of reproduction is shown to be the *political market* emerging from a process of *substitution*.

Hydén’s (1980) ‘uncaptured peasantry’ thesis provides a starting point for that claim. Effectively articulating a form of modernisation theory, he posits ‘underdevelopment’

¹⁵ Meanwhile many on the Marxist left took the failure/retreat from collectivisation as an indication of the disingenuousness of Tanzanian socialism (Shivji 1976).

as a result of 'the inability of capitalism' to 'break down the pre-capitalist barriers that still exist' (Hydén 1980, pp. 3-4). This inability of capitalism is due to a still 'uncaptured peasantry' which might be involved in commodity production up to a point but by virtue of its possession of land – i.e. the unity of labour and property – is not subsumed by and dependent on the capitalist market. By now this sort of argument is familiar enough as a feature of debates on modernity and the peasant.

In Hydén's hands this becomes an argument of erasures, pointing to all the things the (Tanzanian) peasant is not and concluding 'they do not lend themselves to an adequate interpretation...based on the premise of the predominance of capital *or any other modernizing agent*' [my emphasis] (Hydén 1980, p. 4). Instead, somewhat reminiscently of Chayanov (Durrenberger 1984, Chayanov 1986, Shanin 2009), Hydén urges analysis of the peasantry 'in the context of their own mode of production' which is separate from 'the capitalist mode' (1980, p. 6). Like Chayanov, this is described as a mode of production dictated by a 'domestically oriented' logic, wherein the 'law of subsistence' very much trumps the 'law of value'. Causing the peasant to be reluctant to work 'too' hard, risk-averse and resistant to innovation (Hydén 1980, p. 14), the conclusion is that the route to modernity runs through *capture* of the peasantry to enforce a developmental logic of reproduction. Otherwise, Tanzania would remain rooted in a trap of 'underdevelopment' in which the peasant continued to operate on the basis of an 'economy of affection'¹⁶ rather than the market.

Formidable data is amassed in support of this claim. In the early years of independence village level development plans tended to circumvent or ignore *production* targets as being too costly in labour terms. However, production targets were generally better tolerated where they were specifically *food* rather than 'exportable' cash-crops targets. Their own priorities, meanwhile, were overwhelmingly for local infrastructure: schools, roads, dispensaries, clinics and wells (Bienen 1967, p. 426, Hydén 1980, p. 87). For Hydén both TANU and Nyerere himself were blameworthy for the underdevelopment this allowed; simply speaking, they were too responsive to peasant demands due to their 'democratic nature'. Neither could make the hard decisions necessary to capture the peasant and let development ensue. Thus, rather than developmental, post-colonial politics were more a reflection of 'the social formations of the peasant mode of production' (Hydén 1980, p. 88).

¹⁶ Based on kinship and other communal ties, in which patronage plays a leading role (Hydén 1980, pp. 18-9).

Thus he reaches the opposite view to Coulson on the question of 'capitalist farming'. Writing about the 1970s and the period after Dr Klerruu's murder, he regards the politics of the time as systematically anti-capitalist. He points to the *villagisation* of the few large maize farms in Ismani, part of the Iringa region in the Southern Highlands. Far from encouraging them, and any other process that might have encouraged capturing the peasant, in fact *non-peasant* (whether 'capitalist' or not) farmers that were being dispossessed. Likewise, in that period most European farmers left Tanzania. 'During these years of intensified *ujamaa* campaigns, most of Tanzania's capitalist farming came to an end' (Hydén 1980, pp. 102–4).

The socialist programme therefore failed to prosper because this social structure was development averse. In consequence, 'the party or state bureaucrat *always* has very little to offer the peasant which he really needs for his own *immediate* [my emphases] reproduction' (Hydén 1980, p. 105). Capitalism, Hydén thought, had been extinguished and socialism in Tanzania had been revealed to be unwilling or unable to capture the peasant through offering inducements (Hydén 1980, p. 122). Nevertheless, the resort to coercion (Hydén 1980, p. 124) and compulsory villagisation is explicable as a final attempt to capture the peasantry (Hydén 1980, chap. 5).

For Hydén that this form of capture would not be especially developmental; but out of his pessimism comes a vital clue to the analysis in question. If the peasant is captured in this limited sense, all it can do is replace 'the capitalist market with the political market place as the principal forum for interaction with the peasants' (Hydén 1980, p. 131). This political market consists in reorganisation of party and state structures in the rural areas to allow peasants to make effective demands on the state. Most especially, the abolition of poll taxes and primary school fees, the expansion of rural health care and village-level democratic governance (Hydén 1980, p. 131).

There were considerable advantages to this arrangement to the peasant. Therefore, in spite of 'bureaucratic high-handedness and other excesses', peasants 'have by and large accepted their new locations of domicile and production' (Hydén 1980, p. 152). Although he accepts that production increased, he remains pessimistic since resistance to 'new production techniques' remained stubborn and the 'constraints of the peasant mode are still in operation' whilst most of the increase in production is attributable to *extensive* growth (Hydén 1980, pp. 151–152).¹⁷

¹⁷ In this sense the claim overlaps theoretically with the debate over 'involution' in Chinese studies (Huang 1990, Wong 1997, Brenner and Isett 2002, Allen 2009).

Yet Hydén's approach remains rooted in the incommensurability of peasant and modernity, feeling impelled to allocate any patterns to either peasant and capitalist modes of production which depends on his binary captured/uncaptured. This is all the more surprising since he himself notes in pointing to a *political market* that this had bound the peasant to both the new villages, and therefore the state to a considerable degree. His approach, therefore, is unable to deal adequately with this notion excepted as an untheorised intermediary category (Hydén 1980, p. 153).

The point now is to reclaim his insight into the political market and expand it so as to identify the logic of reproduction it contains. First, the political market is precisely the medium through which negotiation between state and peasant takes place; it was this mechanism which allowed the compromise between state and peasant in accepting villagisation. Villagisation in turn reinforces the political market, both strengthening a community which could make demands and by facilitating the delivery of health and education services and agricultural inputs. Thus the first arm of the political market as logic of reproduction was that *politically equal citizens* were able to make demands on the state for service provision. Rather than 'captured', it might be more accurate to say that such peasants were much more closely bound to the state.

But there is a second aspect of the political market which Hydén did not recognize. For him it was anti-developmental due to its 'democratic' demands for social services and so on (the first arm of the political market). Its second feature is due to the first. With the realization of this mechanism and the flow of social services and agricultural inputs into peasant social relations, production is boosted. Not on the basis of market dependence, but rather because of what are, in market terms, subsidies. Acquisition of these benefits does not depend on market behaviour but rather political equality. Yet this inserts itself directly into the reproductive logic of the peasant and production decisions are made on the basis of the boost they give to subsistence agriculture. Unsurprisingly, as Hydén recognised, food production grew on this basis.

But, to complete the point around the second aspect, this was meaningful in market terms. Surpluses had grown, to a great extent extensively but also through productivity gains, and these were capable of being marketed *after subsistence needs* were accounted for. Furthermore, due to the extension of infrastructure which was also a feature of demands made through the political market, getting that surplus to market (whether literally or figuratively) was significantly faster and cheaper than before.

With this two-pronged conception of the political market in place, its utility can be established by showing that in this form it is able to account for some of the most

salient criticisms of Hydén's work. Kasfir, for instance, suggests that Hydén 'overstates peasant self-sufficiency' and 'blocks understanding of complex relations, partly dependent and partly self-sufficient, that connect peasants to the larger political economy' (Kasfir 1986, p. 340). The seemingly odd combination of dependence and self-sufficiency is at the heart of the political market.

What advantage does the political market confer though? Peasants cannot be self-sufficient, says Kasfir (1986, pp. 345–6), because they enter the monetary economy for some consumer goods, school fees, to purchase land and hoes, ploughs and fertilizer and to pay taxes. But entry to the market of this sort does not establish *dependency* in the conventional sense. A crucial feature of the political market is, through its first arm, that entry to markets for social services and so on are often *not* monetary or commercial but rather political. Furthermore, even where those goods are purchased on the market in a more conventional sense, that still does not establish strict dependency. The point is that Kasfir's terms of reference also obscure the working of the political market but fudging the issue of *how* exactly the peasantry can be both 'partly dependent' and 'partly self-sufficient'; without the political market such a formulation looks more like a contradiction in terms than helpful.

The political market began to emerge on the basis of increasing capacity of the state to make provision to the peasant alongside careful clarification that villagisation did not entail collectivisation. Recall the point made earlier about the ecological limitations that obstructed villagisation. Because the state had severely limited capacity to offer inputs that would rectify those limitations, villagisation – to say nothing of collectivisation – had been unattractive on balance. Indeed, the distinction between villagisation and collectivisation was itself one that the peasantry needed to be convinced of. Even the early experiments with coercion (Operation Rufiji in particular) failed to firmly establish villages as the basic pattern of life because they feared it was all in aid of their dispossession (Kjekshus 1977, pp. 278–279, Nursey-Bray 1980, p. 67).¹⁸ And, given all the coercion, cajolment and repeated issuing of edicts, production targets and so on, these were hardly irrational fears.

¹⁸ It was what Kjekshus calls the 'lingering legal uncertainty' over ownership, the seeming fluidity in property relations, that was 'a major obstacle to early peasant compliance with the plans'. It 'exposed the *ujamaa* plans to much popular speculation and harmed its status in the masses. Rumours that villagisation was a means to collectivize family life as well as property, or that it was a first step in the reintroduction of local taxes has repeatedly been mentioned in the reports about the various "operations"' (Kjekshus 1977, pp. 278–9).

It was not until 1975 that comprehensive legislation was introduced dealing with the ownership situation in these villages, making it clear that collectivisation was off the table in every sense. That clarification, several years after collectivisation had in practice been put on the backburner, was coincident in time with the nation-wide coercive effort at villagisation. On this basis fears of a kind of capture, whether socialist or capitalist in nature, could be put to rest.

Another key point is around the issue of ecological constraint and state provision. So pressing were they that even after nationwide villagisation had been accomplished a key commentator issued a dire warning. This new settlement pattern could, he said, be 'destructive of the ecological balance maintained under the traditional settlement pattern...Without major inputs...the ghost of British concentration will haunt the *ujamaa* movements and the parallels between their outcome will become more obvious' (Kjekshus 1977, p. 282). Yet, which was not yet entirely clear at the time Kjekshus was writing, the basis for those major inputs *had* been established alongside villagisation. This is important because identifying how that had been established moves the analysis toward identifying where the political market had come from.

This achievement, then, required both very clear signalling that collectivisation ('capture') had been entirely abandoned *and* the means to provide social services and agricultural inputs on a nationwide level. Put another way, Nyerere's government needed to show both that it had no designs on the peasants' land *and* that they would sweeten the villagisation 'deal' with a range of inputs. The first condition underlines why the political market remained an essentially *peasant* logic of reproduction. Each household would maintain its land, constituted as their own property and apply their labour to it.

As for inputs, fertilisers and agricultural subsidies, village dispensaries and schools, roads and rail, the benefits were substantial. Adult literacy had increased from 10% in 1960 to 73% in 1978, primary school enrolment increased from 25% at independence to 95% in 1980 and life expectancy increased from 34 to 51 between independence and 1980. Health provision had improved, though less dramatically, 35% of villages having clinics in 1980 whereas such provision was virtually non-existent level at independence. 40% had clean running water, again from an essentially standing start in 1961 (Weaver and Kronemer 1981, p. 840). It is only by turning to express consideration of the process of substitution that the ability to realise these improvements can be properly ascertained. Indeed, the political market as a logic of reproduction will then be explicable as *combined development*.

TAZARA, and the transfer (fission) of an aspect of modernity which it stands for, is especially crucial to the ability to provide inputs in sufficient quantity. The imbalance in the political geography prior to TAZARA has been noted, broadly going to the distinction between cash-crop and subsistence regions: the ‘prevalence of a cash economy in the north contrasted with the largely peasant subsistence character of production in the south’ (Bryceson 1992, p. 83).¹⁹ In achieving this rebalancing TAZARA, and the other aid projects it provoked, the political market became viable as a logic of reproduction in the Southern Highlands. This infrastructure meant that villagisation in this particular region, as well as others, could be credibly backed with the promise of ‘inputs’. Furthermore, the region began to experience something of a ‘mini-green revolution’ on the back of these developments becoming the breadbasket of the nation (Rasmussen 1986).

Over the course of a few years ‘the Southern Highlands [were] on the “economic map” of the country after almost a century of neglect’ (Ponte 2002, p. 49). Road and rail made the provision of the services that were key to the political market deliverable. Additional innovations arose too. Amongst these were the National Maize Programme, pan-territorial pricing which further facilitated the marketability of surpluses beyond the physical ability to transport goods that were now available (Bryceson 1992). Together with the provision of subsidised inputs (particularly fertilizer) and social services all these factors were vital to that mini-green revolution.

The ability to market surpluses beyond the immediate confines of the locales of peasant-farmers in the Southern Highlands was no less significant than these programmes. Not only could crops be sold to Dar es Salaam, many other smaller (and nearer) conurbations were also in reach (Bryceson 1992, p. 96). That ability, along with ample fertiliser subsidies, encouraged the growth in food production that followed villagisation. Whilst it is true that much of this growth was *extensive* that risks missing the point. First it was only partially so, productivity was boosted by fertiliser subsidies and so on. Second, the ecological limitations Kjekshus pointed to likewise suggest that even extensive growth should not be taken for granted. Finally, that extensive growth was the extension of production that had elements of both subsistence and surplus. All this taken into account, the last major food crisis Tanzania experience, to date, was in

¹⁹ It is worth further noting, recalling the discussion of nation-state formation issues in the previous chapter, that Bryceson regards this ‘north-south divide’ as posing a real ‘danger of regional conflict’ (Bryceson 1992, p. 83).

1974-5. The boom in food production, centred on the Southern Highlands was both real and of deep political significance as a point of food security (Ponte 2002, pp. 42-3).

What is beginning to become apparent is that these developments in the Southern Highlands are the epicentre of the political market as a whole; indeed, it was also the most substantial region by population aside from cash-crop regions. Thus in opening up the Southern Highlands TAZARA did not only make service provision to a large region possible; it allowed the state to reach the one region with a favourable enough environment for production to be substantially boosted.

This all had significance beyond the immediate conditions of the Southern Highlands. With good reason 'most national policy-makers...especially those from the southern regions' believed that 'the integration' of the Southern Highlands 'into the national economy to be a major achievement of the post-independence government' (Bryceson 1992, pp. 86-8). Here was both the constituency that TANU and Nyerere needed, a centre of political gravity that was neither urban nor cash-crop dependent. 'Tanzania's future', wrote Deborah Bryceson, 'is very hard to predict. One thing however is fairly certain: Nyerere will go down in history as the initiator of Tanzanian peasants' agricultural transformation. He began bridging the chasm between the logic of the peasant household and that of the nation state' (Bryceson 1988, p. 47). By opening up the Southern Highlands, establishing villagisation there and throughout the rest of the nation by making the political market viable, that 'bridging' was fundamental to the nature and success of Tanzanian nationalism.

The sheer weight of the Southern Highlands, by population, food production and political significance goes a long way toward establishing that TAZARA was significant for Tanzania as a whole and not just that region. TAZARA also had nationwide significance in the sense that it had provoked other countries to be far more forthcoming with aid projects for Tanzania. The National Maize Programme is a typical example, and was very significant to establishing the political market as national logic of reproduction. Thus in both direct and indirect senses, TAZARA was crucial to the establishment of the political market. It made it possible to extend its operation into the Southern Highlands, a crucial region to its nationwide viability and it provoked a series of other projects which further entrenched its operation throughout the country.

The citizen-peasant, finally, is the social form which stands on this political market. It represents the hybrid social form of that logic of reproduction. On the one hand politically equal citizens enter into the political market in its first sense, making demands on the state. Second, those demands fundamentally reinforce their status as

peasants. That is because it sustains the unity of labour and property, but with the substantial insertion of the political market those peasants are now explicable only by simultaneous reference to their citizenship. Furthermore, the citizen-peasant is essence of Bryceson's 'bridge' between nation-state and the peasant; that bridge, as it turns out, is contained within that single social form.

Before proceeding, there is a tangential issue to address. There is a complex and technical debate over whether Tanzania exhibited 'urban bias' in this era, a term that gained much currency in the 1980s with intellectual trends influenced by (Bates 1983) and the Berg Report. Because of the operation of the political market and the citizen-peasant form the issue in Tanzania does not admit of simple application of Bates' thesis. Bryceson highlights that complexity, suggesting that once a distinction is made between food and cash-crops, policy appears relatively favourable to *food* producers (Bryceson 1992). Yet attributions of urban bias to socialist-era Tanzania are frequently premised on evidence that is specific to cash crop production. Ponte (2002, p. 52), for example, suggests that agriculture was neglected and that urban-bias was present citing in support (Johnston 1989, pp. 49–50). Yet Johnston's argument is wholly based on the ratio of receipts by producers of *export crops* - coffee, cotton, and tobacco - which suggests that perhaps a more promising distinction is bias between food and cash crop production. This is one issue which will be revisited in Chapter 6.

Conclusion

This Chapter has brought the argument, in one sense, to completion. Beginning with the Arusha Declaration, it was identified as being both a diagnosis and response to unevenness between peasant and modernity. Proceeding from there, Section II established the content of the most significant feature of Sino-Tanzania interaction, TAZARA. Reconciling the discussion of Arusha with TAZARA in Section III it finally became possible to both establish the nature of the political market and citizen-peasant *and* that its origins lay in the transfer of technologies that TAZARA achieved directly and indirectly.

Accordingly, the process was one of combined development, and substitution, *because* the (fissile) transfer was crucial to strengthening the peasant logic of reproduction but also differentiating it as a *political market logic*. In this sense, it is possible to say that the citizen-peasant is a hybrid social form of peasant and modernity which is, in empirical form, the resolution of the incommensurability

problem. But, equally, it can also be said that it is a theoretical contribution to that issue since that social form has been traced as an emergent property of a process of U&CD.

That said, further work is nonetheless called for. For widespread readings of the Arusha Declaration as a “failed” socialism imply that its social innovations as identified here were only temporary. Indeed, those views are only further strengthened by the perception that the subsequent era was defined by neoliberalism and structural adjustment. Chapter 6 proceeds to show how it was that the political market and citizen-peasant became entrenched features of Tanzanian modernity long after the formal abandonment of the Arusha programme, surviving throughout the so-called neoliberal era.

Chapter 6: ‘I thank God I have never been employed!’: the entrenchment of the citizen-peasant, 1975-2000

‘Nashukuru mungu sijaaajirwa!’ [‘I thank God I have never been employed!’]

A common phrase amongst Tanzanian villagers (Mueller 2011, p. 33).

Introduction

Whilst Chapter 5 was able to establish the citizen-peasant’s origins in the historical process initiated by the Arusha Declaration, understood via U&CD, this Chapter extends the argument in two ways by proceeding forward in time. First, by showing that it has become an entrenched and central feature of Tanzanian social relations rather than melting away in a “neoliberal” era. A second is that in doing so the Chapter is also able to take the opportunity to point to potential expansion in the nature of the political market as a logic of reproduction and the citizen-peasant as its representative social form. In tracing this form across the period 1975-2000 the unfolding development of the citizen-peasant further reveals its distinctive character and analytical utility. One particular feature of which gives the Chapter its title. For it had become common amongst Tanzanian villagers, that is citizen-peasants, to celebrate that they were not employees; this further affords the opportunity to highlight the citizen-peasant as a distinctive (non-wage labour) social formation rather than a pathological sign of underdevelopment.

Recognition and elaboration of this has important consequences, recasting and shedding light on the crisis-prone years associated with neoliberalism (Gibbon 1995a, Harrison 2010, Harvey 2005). This crisis had plenty to do with both the socialist heritage of the Arusha Declaration, thus giving rise to a raft of failure narratives,¹ and ‘neoliberalism’. However, the persistence, indeed entrenchment, of the citizen-peasant establishes that Tanzania had *not* ‘slowly returned to being a conventional

¹ A typical judgment of Tanzanian socialism is: ‘never was there a more noble social experiment; and never was there a more miserable failure’ (Weaver and Kronemer 1981, p. 839).

impoverished country' (Cooper 2002, p. 180) and in turn crisis was not a consequence of the things Tanzania is *not* – i.e. to commit Mamdani's 'history by analogy' – but of what it *is*. Thus the peculiar and contradictory qualities of the citizen-peasant are themselves major features of the crisis.

This is important because it allows explanation of the agency of the Tanzanian state in engaging with its donors (Brown 2013).² It is particularly notable that engagement with 'reforms' was selective, the agency of the state in this sense best exemplified by the Helleiner Report in the mid-1990s (Helleiner 1995, Brown 2013). This was not the only agency at play that might seem surprising. Within Tanzanian society, the reaction to 'market reforms' was quite different than was expected by its advocates. This consisted not just of 'resistance' and oppositional movements, these reactions were an aspect of the logic of the *political market* which generated a sense of *public ownership* of assets amongst citizen-peasants. In addition, neoliberal policies geared toward 'getting the prices right' did not result in a society of evincing a straightforward market rationality as was anticipated. Peasants, often dubbed 'smallholder farmers' by that literature, would not act as abstractly 'rational' actors in the world market by maximising production of cash-crops. Rather, in a continuation of the pattern observed in Chapter 5, food crops produced primarily for subsistence and local or national markets continued to grow instead.³

All of this is shown to be fundamentally related to the citizen-peasant having been entrenched in Tanzanian social relations, outliving the immediate context of its birth in the socialistic politics of the 1960s and 1970s. Neoliberalism did not result in a shift back toward 'conventional' modernity and in particular market *dependency* continued to be absent from these relations in any general sense. Instead the political market remains a fundamental explanatory feature. With the unity of labour and property not only still in place, but buttressed by political modernity in this way, wage labour continues to be a marginal activity in rural Tanzania.

In showing the utility of the twin explanatory concepts of political market and citizen-peasant, and underlining the difficulties of approaches to Tanzania that neglect this hybridity, the value of the thesis' overall argument is reinforced. Without it debates around Tanzania once again tend to fall prey to the incommensurability of peasant and modernity problem. This manifests in narratives of failure which have

² Recognition of *African* agency being a much wider issue of concern (Harman and Brown 2013).

³ For the data that shows the upward trend in food production beginning in earnest in the mid-1970s see (Ponte 2002, pp. 43, 48–50).

already been alluded to, and problematic terminology such as ‘smallholder farmer’ or ‘proletarianisation’ (Mueller 2011, p. 33).

Section I begins by sketching the broad contours of the period under consideration. It shows how existing approaches tend to be afflicted by the incommensurability of peasant and modernity; then, showing that the citizen-peasant was an entrenched feature by now, it proceeds to demonstrate how it can resolve the problems of those existing approaches. Section II further specifies how the citizen-peasant enhances analysis of the particular moments of agency identified above as the narrative moves toward the 1990s. Furthermore, this begins to point toward a significant extension in the logic of the political market toward a more strategic, nationwide notion of public (citizen-peasant) ownership of national assets. Sketching the contentious politics of the 1990s that arose on that basis, the Section concludes by pointing to how the analysis offered by this thesis sets the stage for further study of contemporary, 21st century Tanzania.

Finally, for completeness, Section III returns to ‘the international’. Whilst Chapter 5 showed the centrality of interactivity to the genesis of the citizen-peasant, it did so by reference to Sino-Tanzanian relations most especially. This Section specifies the nature of these relations during the neoliberal era. It explains both the reason that for much of the 1980s those relations were somewhat muted, before suggesting that their resurgence by the 1990s is actually of more interest. In this additional sense, then, it sets the stage for further study of Tanzania given the substantial attention now being given to ‘China in Africa’ in the 21st century.

I. Citizen-peasant and crisis: the peasant-modernity problem redux

Accounts of the crisis, and the putative neoliberal aftermath, of the 1970s and 1980s generate the peasant-modernity problem in their construction of ‘the market’ and its application to Tanzania. Following a sketch of the crisis to establish bearings, it is shown how the peasant-modernity problem arises and, likewise, how the citizen-peasant can be brought to bear on it in this particular historical context. Allowing explanation of the crisis, which explains the actual pattern of peasant engagement with the market rather than a false presumption of dependency, is the initial point. But this soon yields a further proposition that the political market first observed in Chapter 5 also emerged as a specific market of *opportunities*. There is, of course, an irony in this inasmuch as the market has long been thought of as a site of *opportunity* rather than

compulsion; in this case it is the politicisation of these relations that makes it possible, rather than its contrary, the doctrine of *laissez-faire*.

The crisis was, at its core, fiscal. A major element was the precipitous decline in the production of profitable, foreign-exchange generating, cash-crops; this was exacerbated by the unhelpful coincidence of a fall in the price of those commodities on the world market. Given the deep and wide increase in the fiscal liabilities of the Tanzanian state during the 1970s, central to the narrative of Chapter 5, it became increasingly difficult for the Tanzanian state to pay for its service provision to citizen-peasants, maintain itself and meet debt obligations arising from those development projects. Like the fall in commodity prices, once again this was deeply aggravated by the increase in interest rates at a global scale (Harvey 2005, chap. 1). Combined with the impact on exchange rates, consumables became both scarce and vastly more expensive to Tanzanian consumers of all types in the early years of the 1980s. All this rendered Tanzania's protestations of 'self-reliance' increasingly hollow, and the World Bank and IMF began to shift their attitude toward Tanzania between the 1970s and 1980s, becoming increasingly assertive in their insistence that Nyerere abandon the flagship policies of his African socialism.⁴

Nyerere retired from the Presidency in 1985,⁵ unwilling to personally concede to demands for 'reform' that were seen as the death-knell of the Arusha era. Thus crisis gave way to the era of structural adjustment policies. The new President, Ali Mwinyi, was more willing to make concessions to IFIs for the sake of securing sorely needed finance in the face of the crisis conditions described above. Those adjustments aimed at economic 'stabilisation', privatisation, and a reorientation of policy toward 'market-led' solutions all of which had very real consequences for state capacity (Mkandawire 2004, p. 311).⁶

The intellectual impetus, aside from anything else, for the push for structural adjustment was Bates' (1983) approach to urban bias noted toward the end of Chapter 5. Bias here is conceived as an obstacle to cash-crop producers accessing the world market, having the particular effect of distorting prices, the upshot being that rational

⁴ This much is a conventional enough sketch (Ponte 2002, pp. 47–51, Aminzade 2013a, pp. 245–256, Campbell and Stein 1992). The main elements of the crisis are not hotly contested; its upshots, historical and intellectual, are both more controversial and of more interest in this chapter.

⁵ Though he continued to play a leading role in public life as 'Founding Father', 'Mwalimu' [Teacher] and elder statesman until his death in 1999.

⁶ There is a formidable literature examining structural adjustment and subsequent liberalisation in Tanzania (Kiondo 1995, Raikes and Gibbon 1996).

small-holders reduced their production of cash-crops. As such the solution to crisis lay in ‘getting the prices right’ so as to enable farmers to produce efficiently for the market. Doing so meant in particular removing those obstacles, that is the parasitic effects of urban bias, and restoring a far greater share of surplus to the producers themselves. Straightforwardly enough, went the idea, upon those changes cash crop production would be restored to adequate levels and fiscal crisis would be resolved with the generation of sufficient foreign exchange (Wuyts 2004, pp. 368–9).

Because this view is deeply influential, in the academy and policy circles, it is worth pressing a basic problem with it. Aside from anything else, the difficulty is that even with the (admittedly partial) implementation of these reforms it is conspicuous that there was *no boom* in cash-crop production. On the contrary, the decline of cash crops continued whilst in an important sense *food* production continued to boom. (In another sense food production would be negatively impacted, an issue dealt with in due course.) Proceeding to drill down to the core of the matter, this is explained as an emanation from the logic of the political market.

Meanwhile, this engages the peasant-modernity incommensurability problem in the sense that, if the argument of Bates *et al.* is an example of insistence on the applicability of a generic institution of modernity, *the market*, to Tanzania then a further literature has arisen to emphasise Tanzanian *difference* in critique of the same. The most common gambit is to contradict the starkest of failure narratives and insist that the ‘socialist’ inheritance of Arusha is critical to Tanzania even into the neoliberal era (Osafo-Kwaako 2012, chap. 2, Gray 2012). To the extent that these are path dependency arguments (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 368–370), the argument in this Chapter differs somewhat inasmuch as the citizen-peasant, whilst having its genesis in the politics of Arusha (*siasa ni kilimo*), was itself a mutation of the socialist intentions of Arusha.

The political market as a site of opportunity

At this point in time rural society was essentially a peasant one – that is, whatever one makes of the specific citizen-peasant claim – and almost all rural households ‘still’ produced primarily through their own labour on their own land. Likewise, systematic employment of wage-labour was correspondingly rare (Collier *et al.* 1986, pp. 132–4). Those households ‘invariably’ chose to work on their own land (Collier *et al.* 1986, chap. 3) and significant *diseconomies* of scale applied to those farms beyond the size at which

a individual household's labour would be sufficient (Collier *et al.* 1986, chap. 4). On this basis it was difficult to see, even without the arguments of the previous Chapters, that any significant capitalist farmers could emerge.

Stefano Ponte's (2002) analysis of the historical reality of rural Tanzania's experience of neoliberalism is particularly useful here. Carefully scrutinising local patterns during liberalisation his work allows real insight, beyond the realm of policy prescriptions, into the realities on the ground. He describes his own work as an attempt to understand 'changing relations between farmers and markets during policy reforms in Africa' and the increasing substitution of 'contractual relations' for 'social relations' (Ponte 2002, chap. 1). A key element to this is the notion of 'commercialisation' which anticipates that the removal of obstacles (state-generated urban bias) should allow a resumption of natural market behaviour. What Ponte's data will reveal is that even with the removal of those obstacles commercialisation is an unreliable notion. Moreover, once the data is scrutinised, relations between 'farmers and markets' and shifts toward 'contractual relations' have a very different set of connotations than one might expect.

Pointing to a divergent pattern between food and cash-crop production already noted in Chapter 5, Ponte shows that whilst food production had increased since the mid-1970s the reaction to state 'withdrawal' in the 1980s was a shift between 'slow' and 'fast' food crops. Fast crops were attractive because, grown more easily and rapidly, they could be quickly marketed *locally* decreasing risk and reliance on programmes that had assisted national marketing but were now vulnerable to withdrawal.⁷ If, the policy intended and theory predicted, prices had been gotten 'right' and 'farmers' were now free to act rationally, then significant numbers 'ought' to have decisively shifted production toward cotton, coffee, tea and so on.

How is *modern* theory and policy to be squared with the divergent reality on the peasant/'smallholder' ground? Again, mirroring the wider problem with peasants vis-à-vis modernity, there were undoubtedly movements going on which 'commercialisation' has at least some purchase. Market relations were growing, exchange was increasing even before the move to 'fast' crops not least because food production had been increasing thus allowing the increased surplus to be marketed. Thus, Ponte dryly notes, advocates of liberalisation soon discovered that what had they had *meant* to say all

⁷ See the discussion of the National Maize Programme in Chapter 5.

along was that these policies aimed specifically at encouraging food production (Ponte 2002, pp. 42–3, 61).

It was the Southern Highlands, the originating centre of the citizen-peasant, which was at the core of this trend. And, in spite of the scrambling of liberalisation advocates, in the Southern Highlands ‘food markets had hardly been liberalised at all’ (Ponte 2002, p. 61) even as late as 1990. The implication that can be drawn from this is that the citizen-peasant is likewise at the heart of this trend, constitutive of the process rather than a victim of neoliberal policy-making. Doing so requires a return to the *political market* point, elaborating on it to show how it continued to imposition on the state the need to make ‘markets’ attractive *opportunities* to induce participation in markets amongst citizen-peasants.

The operation of this logic was identified in Chapter 5. The challenge here is to demonstrate how this worked during a period in which the state was having to withdraw from its socialist policies. As this issue is discussed a further radical variant of commercialisation stands to be discussed. That claim is that as a result of the withdrawal of the socialist state capitalist social relations began to grow once again; a key feature of that argument is that the countryside was becoming proletarianised (Mueller 2011).

Proceeding at a regional level, two locales are examined to these ends. The first is Songea, in Ruvuma that is one of the ‘Big Four’ regions of the Southern Highlands. Second is Morogoro, in central-eastern Tanzania, proximate to Dar es Salaam, the major urban centre of Tanzania. This data is drawn from Ponte (2002, chaps 6–8) and supported by key sources such as Collier (1986) the latter of which especially supports the claim that the (citizen-) peasant is an adequate starting point. Indeed, even the data that is deployed in aid of the proletarianisation thesis (Mueller 2011) is consistent with the claims that will be advanced.

The data is categorised by reference to *three* broad organisational modes. 1) ‘The household’ (peasant labour) 2) ‘hired labour’ (wage-labour, *potentially* indicative of proletarianisation) and 3) ‘exchange labour’ recruited ‘socially’ as opposed to commercially.⁸ In this period there is a shift in weighting across these categories but not a shift from household (peasant) labour to hired (wage) labour. Rather the principal trend, somewhat more modest than grand claims for proletarianisation

⁸ In which the owner-farmer of the land that was to be worked agreed to perform some other task deemed reciprocal, through such means large numbers can work, for example, to quickly harvest a time-sensitive crop that the immediate household would struggle to do alone.

suggest, is the commodification of category 3, 'exchange labour'. Whereas additional labour that (some) households had employed had been performed in the past on a social basis, such as reciprocal arrangements that included offering to perform the same task for their neighbour, this was increasingly being done by *hiring* that labour instead. By 1994/5 50% of households in Songea, and 75% of those in Morogoro, were hiring either labour or machinery (but in both regions it was overwhelmingly labour) for agricultural work. However, because this was the commodification of the third category, which was largely residual anyway, there is little reason to suppose that this amounts to fundamental proletarianisation (Ponte 2002, pp. 124–8).

Turning to the principal categories, household (peasant) labour barely changed as an overall proportion of the labour process in the 1980s and 1990s, remaining at between 80 and 83%. The vast majority of rural labour, itself some 80% of the overall population, was being done by peasants on their own land. Few relied primarily, that is for their reproduction, on wage-labour. And in any case, little hired labour was being used. In Songea only 25 workdays of wage-labour were utilised per hiring household each year.⁹ In Morogoro – nearer Dar es Salaam, not the Southern Highlands – it was more significant, but even then only amounted to 88 workdays. In Songea that labour was mostly drawn from *seasonal* migrants from nearby districts with differing agricultural seasons, that is, whose primary occupation would almost always be farming in their own household. In Morogoro, meanwhile, they were overwhelmingly drawn from the same village. Nevertheless in both cases the labourers were mostly poorer peasant-farmers supplementing their own household's income (Ponte 2002, pp. 124–5).

There were some shifts taking place in the labour process, especially commodification of 'exchange [social or customary] labour' and some increase in hired labour as an income supplement. These *can* be attributed to a great extent to the effects of liberalisation. These included the loss of, or decline in, input subsidies; increasing school fees; and other similar consequences of state 'withdrawal'. All of these, of course, indicate in the terms of this thesis some weakening in the provision of the political market; a response to which was an elevated need for day-to-day access to money and greater resort to private exchange relations to make that money. However, what cannot be said is that this provides reason enough to conclude this had the makings of a process of proletarianisation.

⁹ In fact this figure is inflated, since it includes some equivalent machinery workdays.

In neither region was a large section of society demonstrably *primarily* reliant on 'wage-labour'. Nor is there strong evidence that even a small group that was dependent on the labour market was growing in size. Amongst those that did sell their labour for agrarian production, it overwhelmingly remained the case that their primary occupation and the basis of their reproduction lay in farming their *households* – thus much of the scope for exploitation was and remains *within*, rather than between, households¹⁰ – whilst selling their labour for only small proportion of the year. A very small minority, meanwhile, referred to their *primary* occupation as a "daily farm labourer"; 0% in Songea throughout the period, whilst a figure of 1% in 1987 rose to 3.8% in 1995 in Morogoro, which is insufficient to found a trend. Nor does the proletarianisation thesis find succour in turning to 'non-farm employment'. Not only was it rare as a primary occupation, it was growing rarer, falling from 4% to 2.2% in Songea and 4% to 1.9% in Morogoro in the same period (Ponte 2002, p. 135).

Additionally, there is no strong evidence of widespread dispossession of citizen-peasants, whether by commercial or political means. In fact landownership became *more* equal between 1971 and 1996 in Tanzania (World Bank 2007, p. 87).¹¹ This is not to say that land was not a prominent concern; (perceived) threats to citizen-peasant tenure, both *de facto* and *de jure*, was one of the leading political issues around which agency is identified in section II. Even then such anxiety could, at most, only go toward a tentative and transitional claim of proletarianisation and, furthermore, even then it would have to engage with the point that such agency was being exercised not as proletarians but rather citizen-peasants striving to avoid that fate.

At a minimum, based on this data, there is no good reason for leaping toward a theoretical premise of market dependency. Neither proletarianisation, nor the simpler assumptions of a neo-classical commercialisation thesis, can constitute good reasons to move away from the citizen-peasant claim. That aside, the issue is now directly one of pointing to how the citizen-peasant argument can positively address the matter at hand.

¹⁰ As noted previously, modes of exploitation are more likely to run through households than between employer and employee. Gender is the most obvious instance of which, and Nyerere had long ago singled out *women* as more exploited than any other category, including non-gendered categories of 'worker' and 'peasant' (Nyerere 1968, p. 245). Meanwhile see (Shivji 1998, chap. 8) for consideration of the relationship of gender to land.

¹¹ It should be noted, however, that the average farm size did decrease from 1.3 hectares to 1.0 in the same period, again raising the question of involution which, for all its significance, is somewhat tangential to the matter at hand.

None of the foregoing entails that the citizen-peasant, as it stood at the end of Chapter 5, was undisturbed by 'neoliberalism'. Engagement in 'non-farm' activities increased in this period, known to the literature as 'diversification'. This amounts to an important response to the consequences of fiscal crisis for the political market; agrarian relations, supported by its provision, undoubtedly encountered difficulties upon the (relative) 'withdrawal' of the state. But such diversification, rather than being a reflection of market dependence and buttressed by questionable notions like 'semi-proletariats' (Mueller 2011),¹² actually reflects a diversion of the opportunistic impulse in the political market to non-agrarian ends.

This is because, damaged as it was in some respects, the political market continued to operate as a social mechanism. Indeed, without it, the (relative) absence of wage-labour relations would be more consistent with Hydén's 'uncaptured peasant' thesis than the citizen-peasant thesis here. On what basis might the political-market claim be maintained? The first point is to start with the fundamental shift, in two steps, between cash and food crops and then once again from slow to fast food crops. The former shift has already been addressed in part in Chapter 5. In its essence it arises from the conjunction of what can be described as a 'subsistence plus' logic. Production of food, supported by the political market in its first sense, allowed the citizen-peasant the protection of a firm foundation in non-market dependence because it could literally eat its own product, whilst any surpluses thereof could be marketed (the political market in its second sense).

More pressing, however, is the second shift from slow to fast food crops. First it should be noted that the shift, whilst significant, was and could not have been absolute. 'Slow' staple crops remained the principal crops. Significantly demands from IFIs for liberalisation of policies that were most important for those slow staples, like fertiliser subsidies, were also the arena in which the Tanzanian state exhibited most recalcitrance, greatly slowing liberalisation in that respect (Ponte 2002, chap. 3). This suggests both the durability, and necessity, of the political market. Without continued provision, on the basis of formal political equality, the state could not be confident of continued entry to the market by these citizen-peasants; were that to be seriously imperilled, the crisis would have both been worse and very possibly destabilising in a political sense.

¹² The close resemblance of this to terms like 'worker-peasants' discussed in Chapter 2 is especially noteworthy.

Indeed, when, as will be discussed in Section II, fertiliser subsidies were eventually withdrawn in the 1990s political contention quickly arose to demand its restoration. In an important sense this political agency, alongside the other instances given in that Section, is vital to completion the claim that the citizen-peasant was entrenched in this period. For now, however, it can be pointed out that very significant state provision continued across a range of direct inputs into the production process as well as other services even during liberalisation and state 'withdrawal'.

As this point emerges, 'diversification' as prompted by neoliberalism helpfully illustrates a further important point: the citizen-peasant concept is not strictly tied to agrarian activity. Said diversification consisted, as noted above, of non-farm labour to a much greater degree than farm labour. Whilst households remained rooted in the unity of labour and property in the agrarian sphere, some of their members extended their activities to non-agrarian work. Rarely, if at all, was this a sign of prosperity on their part; nevertheless, it does signal the flexibility of the citizen-peasant form. Consider that the typical form of diversification has been *artisanal* in nature: brewing, masonry, carpentry and tailoring, done primarily on a self-employed basis (Ponte 2002, pp. 136–7). So, as with farm-labour, 'new' labour was typically not done on a wage-labour basis either.¹³

A further important qualification is that this was not a straightforward consequence of liberalisation either. By the mid-1980s in *pre-liberalisation* Songea, for instance, 80% of households were already involved in off-farm activities. Whilst that figure did increase as liberalisation policies were instituted, rising to 86.7% by 1995, in the Southern Highlands region diversification appears to have been a pre-existing feature of the citizen-peasant prior to liberalisation. That said, nearer Dar es Salaam, Morogoro's 'diversified' households amounted to some 46.2% prior to liberalisation, increasing much more dramatically to 88.3% in 1995 (Ponte 2002, p. 136).

Whatever the extent of pre-liberalisation diversification, it is substantially important as a source of income. Off-farm income in Songea made up 58.1% of incomes in the mid-1980s declining slightly to 52.4% in 1995. Morogoro, once again, suggests a

¹³ That said, in Morogoro, proximate to Dar es Salaam, the proportion of households with members involved in non-farm *wage-labour* at all increased slightly from 12.5 in the mid-1980s to 17% in 1994/5, but fell slightly in Songea from an already low base in the same period. It seems reasonable to surmise that proximity to Dar es Salaam - Tanzania's great metropolis - significantly impinges on the political economy of Morogoro. Even so, it remains the case that in both regions, both as a *primary* occupation and as a proportion of income, non-farm wage labour was not only low, but falling (Ponte 2002, pp. 135–9).

more dramatic experience of liberalisation, where off-farm income increased as a proportion from 42.8% to 68.9% in the same period. Simultaneously farming income was falling in both regions. This is all rather suggestive of a social form under pressure. Nonetheless, aside from the simple fact that much diversification pre-dated liberalisation, there is still a good reason to suppose that the reproductive logic of the political market was a necessary pre-condition to these trends. To the extent that diversification was an advancement of the division of labour, it would not have been possible in the dispersed pattern of settlements that pre-existed Arusha nor without such state provision that was maintained in the face of liberalisation.

Proceeding to draw these threads together to restate the political market claim, Deborah Bryceson's (2010) work provides a further helpful data point. Examining a small town, Katoro-Buseresere, near Lake Victoria - far from both Songea and Morogoro - she notes that it emerged as a modestly sized urban area after the Arusha process. And it has done so with success, enjoying substantial prosperity in Tanzanian terms. Bryceson points to its developed division of labour and broad range of economic activity. Whilst it plainly does not exhibit the *egalitarian* socialist pattern Nyerere had wished for, she points out that 'this settlement owes its origin to Nyerere's villagisation campaign' (Bryceson 2010, p. 88).

This is so because, in a point that is deeply complementary to this thesis', it 'retains an agrarian foundation with a large proportion of its residents engaged in farming for household food provisioning in the nearby fields surrounding the settlement' (Bryceson 2010, p. 88).¹⁴ This case study underlines that the citizen-peasant formation pointed to here is not only an agrarian phenomenon. Rather, so long as effective possession of farming land is retained, there is no reason in the political market's logic why the citizen-peasant's activities cannot be diverse and flexible. Indeed, and as a consequence, it is a logic that impinges on processes of urbanisation, artisanal industries and perhaps beyond. This is the beginnings of a wider claim, to be developed below, that the core claims of this thesis also constitute an ongoing process. From the origins of the political market and villagisation of the 1970s, to diversification and urbanisation of the Katoro-Buseresere sort, it is a dynamic process.

Flexible as it has been, the citizen-peasant has nonetheless also been threatened by crisis and liberalisation. What might this reveal about the political market? First, and most basically, it did continue to operate, fertiliser subsidies, social services and

¹⁴ Thus, although in her terminology there is an overall trend toward 'de-peasantisation', her argument is supportive of the citizen-peasant claim advanced in this thesis.

infrastructure were all maintained to the end of ensuring that 'the market' was sufficiently attractive to the citizen-peasant not to 'withdraw' *à la* Hydén. In fact, increasingly desperate attempts to maintain these features, with the state fighting running battles to defend fertiliser subsidies from the demands of IFIs, suggests the importance of the political market more than anything else.

These rear-guard battles in defence of the political market raise a further point. This Section began with a rehearsal of fiscal crisis, but a fundamental cause of that crisis was the need to make provision via the political market. Yet the citizen-peasant, on which this is based, has not been capable of generating surpluses sufficient to reliably pay for that system. For this reason, such a system would inevitably be prone to crises of this sort. In order to break out of that tendency there would need to be a great deal more 'diversification' into more value added activities than 'subsistence plus' farming. And that, it must be said, had most certainly not come to pass by even the end of the 20th century. Unsurprisingly, therefore, 'development' remains a much sought after prize in Tanzania, and none of the claims made around the citizen-peasant should be taken to preclude such a point. This is an important issue for further reflection in the concluding Chapter.

Absenting such a breakthrough, the Tanzanian state has sought to resolve its fiscal crisis – and the abiding structural issue the political market engenders – by resort to other sources of revenue, tourism and (mostly gold) mining in particular. So much so that it has been, as much of the literature readily recognises, an outstanding feature of the liberalisation era in Tanzania (Chachage 1995, Gibbon 1995b, Kiondo 1995, Butler 2004). One consequence of this, especially in mining, has been a degree of dispossession – mainly of artisanal miners rather than farmers – and, for a minority, is a direct threat in that sense.

More fundamental, and widespread a threat, however, is not direct dispossession of the citizen-peasant but rather the possibility that the mechanism of compromise between state and peasant for which the political market stands becomes increasingly strained by the state's resort to alternative sources of finance. The threat, if not yet the reality, is that the citizen-peasant becomes isolated as the state turns to benefit itself through encouraging the formation of James Ferguson's 'islands of globalisation' (2006, pp. 34–8). Were that to happen the 'bridging' of peasant household and nation-state discussed in Chapter 5, and with it the core of the citizen-peasant claim, would have suffered terminal damage. Considerations such as these have driven the contentious politics in 1990s Tanzania to which Section II now turns.

II. Citizen-peasant and the politics of public ownership

These contentious politics are crucial to establishing the entrenchment of the citizen-peasant. The pattern they throw up, in particular a strong politics of public ownership, amount to both a defence of the political market and, possibly, to its extension beyond the more immediate confines of the agrarian sphere in which it emerged in the 1970s.

These contentious politics, firstly, underline the agency of the Tanzanian state, thereby suggesting it is not explicable as a 'governance state' (Harrison 2004). In a sense that agency is, perhaps, surprising given the raw measures of its power, but real nonetheless (Wangwe 2004, Brown 2013). Part of the explanation flows from the pressure imposed on it by the agency of the citizen-peasant. Citizenship, the bridging of peasant and nation-state, is fundamental to that ability to exert pressure on the state, especially so in a way that has not (yet) jeopardised Tanzania's (romanticised but nonetheless real) reputation for stability. And, as has been intimated, it is this agency on which the political market continues to rest. It explains, for example, the determination of the state to maintain fertiliser subsidies for as long as possible, and after their eventual removal, restoration against the protests of donor agencies.

The increasingly contentious politics that characterises Tanzania is analysed in Aminzade's historical sociology of Tanzanian nationalism (2013a, pt. III). He divides the neoliberal era chronologically as 'Structural Adjustment' (the 1980s) and tracks the political reaction to them in what he calls the 'Neoliberal populism' of the 1990s and then concludes, referring to a well-known literature, by pointing to a nascent 'Developmental state' in 21st century Tanzania.

Although this periodization has its uses, some criticisms of it will also emerge in this section. In particular, this work does not identify a sociological form for the bridging of nation and rural society, instead Aminzade resorts to a vague notion of 'nationalism' that, at each analytical stage, is contrasted with the external influence of a global capitalism. On one hand it amounts to a useful typology, and plenty of useful material too, but on the other this treatment of nationalism and its 'dialectical' relation to a 'global capitalism' raises questions that the citizen-peasant claim can answer.

The analysis can be resumed where Section I left off, with the potential for discontent aroused by the turn to mining as a source of finance, threatening to isolate the citizen-peasant in favour of 'islands of globalisation' constituted around such industries. As this analysis builds the reaction that Aminzade tracks as 'neoliberal

populism' can be recast as a contradictory attempt to sustain the political market. Yet in turning to mining and other such sources of finance, the state increasingly seemed to its citizens to be willing to resile from the agrarian-developmentalism that the 'political market' amounted to.

In constructing this argument, two central areas of contention are taken into account: *land* and *corruption*. President Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005), the third president of Tanzania, took over from Ali Mwinyi (Nyerere's immediate successor) seeking to tackle corruption whilst land had already forced its way firmly onto the national agenda during the Mwinyi era (United Republic of Tanzania 1994, Shivji 1998). Allied to this was a return, at least rhetorical if not real, to Nyerere-era 'people-centred development' (United Republic of Tanzania 1999). On that basis, went the claim, progress would be made in 'poverty reduction' with significant (renewed) investment in education and health services. These moves will be interpreted as an expression of enduring commitment to the political market. At the same time this was not a rejection of liberalisation *per se*, indeed the ambition was very much to be open and capital-friendly (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 256-8). Rather, what Aminzade calls 'neoliberal populism' and the 'developmental state' were at the heart of the attempt to find a site of compromise between such openness and the political market.

What this meant, in particular, was that confrontation with capital could be avoided by fostering 'a sense of ownership in neoliberal economic policies'. This could be populist nonetheless *because* its fruits were supposed 'to stem the erosion of the social rights of citizenship by investing more in the provision of social services' (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 261-2). In the terms of the thesis, its fruits were supposed to sustain the provision *of the political market*.

This gesture at compromise would turn out to be mostly wishful thinking on the state's part. Nonetheless the attempt to compromise is revealing. Whilst there is plenty of scope for critiquing 'neoliberal populism' as more rhetorical than real (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 264-7) the gesture at compromise between these goals is a recurrent feature of these contentious politics. This same point emerges out of consideration of both the politics around land and, subsequently, the issue of corruption. And in both cases the attempt at compromise provoked further claims of public ownership.

Land and citizen-peasant agency

Land, clearly foundational to the citizen-peasant, was subject to two central anxieties in this period. One was the looming threat of a breakdown in the political market, more plainly the services that had been provided systematically from the 1970s onward. Since, as Section I observed, farming incomes were declining and such vital things as fertiliser subsidy were in doubt, this concern is readily understandable. The reason it goes toward the issue of land is that without the assistance of the political market matters could well return to subsistence farming and/or an “involutionary” pattern of continued subdivision of plots might take hold. Second was the perception that ‘openness’ to capital also entailed their vulnerability to “land grabbing”.

Not only was the period of the active extension and encouragement of peasant-led farming – which TAZARA was so central to – seemingly over, openness to capital amounted to an attitude on the part of (many) within the state that still ‘unused’¹⁵ areas could be offered for outside investment (Aminzade 2013a, p. 291). The prospect of openness to large-scale capital-intensive farming and, somewhat more often, non-agrarian but land hungry enterprises such as mining (Chachage 1995, Butler 2004) and ‘wildlife’ tourism/conservation (Neumann 2001) seemed to encapsulate both issues. First, it brooked the prospect of the isolation of the citizen-peasant from the efforts of the state, in which case how durable would promises of service provision prove? Second, it actively threatened land grabbing (Hall 2013, McMichael 2014b, Shivji 2000).

These tensions run through ‘neoliberal populism’, whose allusions to ‘participatory development’ (United Republic of Tanzania 1999) in particular seemed to be honoured only in their breach (Aminzade 2013a, p. 267). This is best evidenced in the state’s rejection of many of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Matters (United Republic of Tanzania 1994, Rwegasira 2012, pp. 88–91) chaired by Issa Shivji.¹⁶ Indeed his book, reflecting on that process in the aftermath, illustrates the deeply political constitution of that issue: *Not Yet Democracy: reforming land tenure in Tanzania* (1998).¹⁷

The Land Commission was appointed due to an increasingly widespread and deeply-felt concern for increasing land disputes (Rwegasira 2012, p. 89), reflecting the concerns of the citizen-peasant as outlined here. Taking its work very seriously indeed,

¹⁵ This is, of course, an often-questionable categorisation, not least in the sense that land might not be used for arable farming but less ‘visibly’ for pastoral ends.

¹⁶ Who was last seen critiquing Tanzanian socialism from a strong Marxist position in Chapter 5 (Shivji 1976).

¹⁷ Shivji further reflects there on an earlier era in which much of the Tanzanian left denied that there was a ‘land question’ (1998, p. vii).

the Commission gathered an enormous range of evidence, visiting all but two districts of Tanzania and interviewing a wide range of villagers. Out of that process they developed a set of proposals that came very close to formal codification of the social relations that have been described as the citizen-peasant by this thesis.

There were two wings to these proposals. The first concerned 'uncultivated' spaces. Whilst all land was already vested in the state, held by the President as Trustee, uncultivated space would be categorised as 'national lands' and placed under the control of a National Lands Commission specifically accountable to Parliament. This would more closely subject the disposal of land to investors to democratic control, an innovation that went directly toward assuaging anxiety about the connection between government land policy and citizen-peasant interests. Secondly 'cultivated' land, that which was clearly occupied and used by farmers (citizen-peasants), would be categorised as 'village land'. In turn that would vest the ultimate political power of the President over that land in local democratic institutions, village assemblies in particular (United Republic of Tanzania 1994, pt. II, Shivji 1998, pt. II).

Aside from the significance of these proposals to codify the property relations of the citizen-peasant in law, the Commission's report also constitutes an immense wealth of evidence in support of the suggestion that Tanzania was witnessing a wave of anxiety over land. Over two volumes, only one of which is widely available in the interests of confidentiality, the Commission brings a weight of evidence to bear that supports this view.

The government's response, however, is equally instructive. It responded hastily with a National Land Policy in 1995, followed by a second (United Republic of Tanzania 1997) which appeared to reject key aspects of these proposals, hence Issa Shivji's evident dissatisfaction (Shivji 1998). Two new statutes followed those policy statements, the Land Act 1999 and Village Land Act 1999 (Rwegasira 2012, pp. 90–92). Whilst strongly reasserting the principle that all land was fundamentally public in ownership and that land rights flowed from *use* and *occupancy*, it eschewed the more democratic aspects of the Commission's recommendations. Political control over village land, in particular, would not be devolved to village assemblies but would remain a matter reserved for the President. That said, it did evince a protective stance as regards villages, in this sense conceiving the land issue as fundamentally one of *conservation*.

The government was much more robust as regards National Land, outright rejecting proposals for democratic control over National Land and its disposal. The reason for this can only be that this proposal would, as the Commission intended,

directly curtail the ability of the state to make land 'open' to investors. Instead the Land Act 1999 allowed the President to allocate land to large-scale investors in amounts over 250 hectares. Moreover, even village land was defined to the exclusion of underground mineral rights, which could likewise be disposed of. Indeed, in 2002 the government would go on to establish a Land Bank specifically for the purpose of marketing 100,000 plots, amounting to 3.1 million hectares of land (Aminzade 2013a, p. 267).

Whilst this underlines land's centrality to contentious politics, by the end of the century there was little reason for citizen-peasants to feel more optimistic than before the Land Commission. Although the state continued to evince a commitment to the political market and support for land rights that were currently in use, that seemed to extend no further than a doctrine of preservation. An inference that could be drawn from state policy was that the future of development in Tanzania lay in capital-intensive, investor driven agriculture, mining, tourism and anything else the dictates of the world market might suggest.

Corruption as a threat to the political market

If land policy gave reason to fear isolation and encroaching land grabbing, growing corruption, which had become a major problem, seemed to threaten privatisation – in both legal and illegal senses – of the political market. Given the already severe limitation of resources available to the political market, even a small degree of corruption might have been troubling. Yet it was actually very substantial, increasingly recognised as a salient issue in Tanzania (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 264–267, 281–282, 281–282, 337–349, Lofchie 2014, chap. 7, Coulson 2013, Edwards 2014). The overwhelmingly weight of evidence points, with differing emphases, to widespread discontent amongst both the Tanzanian public and aid donors.

At root though it is the political market that conditions citizens' objection to 'corruption', perceiving it as a loss of resources that would otherwise be theirs. Threatened thus, an active sense of public ownership began to emerge in response. Corruption was objectionable as a particularly pernicious instance of privatisation (Ghanadan 2008, Aminzade 2013a, pp. 278–84). The movement against corruption, therefore, is part of a wider reassertion of 'citizen ownership of public assets' (Aminzade 2013a, p. 319) and anti-privatisation sentiment. *Why*, though, should Tanzania not evidence attitudes that evince a more straightforwardly 'neo-patrimonial'

approach in which corruption is more functional than dysfunctional, evidence *par excellence* of the politics of the belly (Bayart 2009, Bayart *et al.* 1999)?

The answer lies in the specificities of the social form identified as the political market and citizen-peasant. The *political* nature of that market, and its allocation on the basis of formal equality (citizenship), militated against a patrimonial norm taking precedence. Clearly this cannot mean that corruption has been rare in Tanzania, but it does explain why it is so widely derided and very much a central feature of Tanzanian politics. And, if nothing else, it was continued corruption that suggests that Mkapa's 'neoliberal populism' was somewhat disingenuous. By the end of his tenure corruption had become an even greater concern than before, and discontent grew to so high a level that anti-corruption became the central pledge of the election campaign of his successor, Jakaya Kikwete in 2005 (Nyang'oro 2006).

The mechanisms of contentious politics and public ownership

Proceeding now to examine how these contentious politics manifested, the norm of public ownership becomes progressively clearer. This was primarily electoral in form, the citizen-peasant expressing its interests through the ballot box. In this sense the *political constitution* of Tanzanian modernity does conform to a key precept of liberal political theory but in a less recognised peasant context. Even so, there have also been important social movements that express related sentiments; but for the time being they have fed into, rather than contradicted, the formal electoral politics of the nation. Up until this point in the Chapter reference has been made to the Tanzanian state in general, but the primary means through which citizen-peasant discontent has manifested has been through the sensitivity of the ruling party, CCM (formerly TANU) to electoral politics (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 276–7).

Since the socialist era's single party democracy had given way, by the early 1990s, to multi-party democracy (Cranenburgh 1996) CCM as an institution became increasingly concerned at the prospect of losing power. In the face of dwindling support throughout the 1980s and 90s in the Mwinyi-era, CCM politicians looked to become more responsive to the electorate. Although under President Mwinyi CCM became increasingly associated with corruption, the party would subsequently try to reassert its close historical association with Nyerere, whose credentials on this point were impeccable. That said, CCM had reached such a low ebb in this regard that many, including senior members of CCM, saw multiparty politics as an opportunity for auto-

critique and redemption. Foremost amongst this group was Nyerere himself, believing CCM would restore its reputation as popular movement for development in response to competitive pressure (Aminzade 2013a, p. 248).

CCM's difficulties, however, ought not to be exaggerated. Particularly in electoral terms, the danger was more prospective than current. At the time that multi-party democracy was adopted a survey showed 77% support for one-party democracy, many respondents voicing concerns that multiparty democracy might promote racial, religious and regional divisions (Cranenburgh 1996, Hydén 1999). And, in due course, support for CCM at the ballot box would continue to be robust (O'Gorman 2012, Morse 2014). But it was Parliament, rather than Presidential elections, that was the epicentre of contentious politics; individual MPs were far more vulnerable to electoral losses than nationwide Presidential elections, though CCM did retain at all relevant times a healthy majority in Parliament too. Indeed, such has been the electoral strength of CCM that it has puzzled several writers (O'Gorman 2012, Morse 2014).

Contentious politics' impact at the ballot box emerged in stages. At first primarily expressed by a limited amount of protest at state's refusal to budge from its basic 'compromise' position of conserving the citizen-peasant whilst maintaining 'openness' to capital for the future. This reluctance, meanwhile, is understandable as the state was, at the time, enjoying real success as Tanzania became one of the top destinations for Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, which had been under \$2m between 1986-91 rising to \$1bn 1995-2000 (Aminzade 2013a, p. 257).

What had begun to develop were factions within CCM, divided on the issue of corruption in particular. One was seen as 'dirty' and for corruption, the other anti-corruption and driven by deep concern for CCM's electoral prospects in the longer term if corruption continued unabated (Aminzade 2013a, p. 347). Since the emergence of these factions a great deal of the contentious politics found expression within CCM and between these sorts of groupings. Nyerere had been right up to a point though, multiparty politics had renewed CCM to that extent, electoral competition driving the emergence of the anti-corruption faction.

Close attention to voting patterns illustrates the way this worked. Deploying quantitative methods, O'Gorman (2012) articulates this as a basic challenge for democratisation literature. CCM has, she notes, remained persistently dominant even with the establishment of multiparty politics. Whilst criticisms have been made of the quality of Tanzania's democratic processes, they are not so great as to explain away CCM's dominance which is built on a genuine and substantial rural support base.

Whereas other parties have made real progress in attracting support in Tanzania's large cities, the countryside has essentially remained a single party state (Aminzade 2013a, p. 277, O'Gorman 2012, n. 3, Morse 2014, p. 663).

This is deeply 'puzzling' O'Gorman (2012, p. 318, Lofchie 2014, p. 215), suggests because liberalisation has harmed those rural areas and CCM is, she suggests, the party of liberalisation. That premise in place, she casts around for an explanation for the attachment of 'subsistence farmers' to CCM. Yet the equation of CCM with liberalisation is flawed, neglecting the internal divisions within the party and the significance of its earlier history under Nyerere. Voters tend to cast their vote for CCM on the basis of that longer historical memory, and on that basis CCM's reputation as 'pro-rural' is both more durable and reasonable than O'Gorman allows (Morse 2014). More significantly still, policy was more responsive to rural interests – the imperative to maintain the political market – even at the height of liberalisation, as has been noted at various points above. Foremost amongst these is the long rear-guard battle to retain fertiliser subsidies and, latterly, the restoration of fertiliser subsidies (Kjær and Therkildsen 2013, pp. 600–1).

Regional voting patterns further encourage the impression that not only is CCM the party of the countryside; it is the party most closely associated with the heartland of the citizen-peasant. Whilst rural areas in general strongly support CCM, its greatest strongholds are in southern and central Tanzania, and the Southern Highlands most especially of all. Meanwhile its weakest rural areas are the Lake regions, in the North-West of Tanzania, where export crops remain paramount (Morse 2014, pp. 663–4). This is surely no coincidence, given the great significance of CCM/TANU's historical activities in these regions. And that history, alongside a degree of continued responsiveness to citizen-peasant demands, has maintained its electability for the time being. But this has not been a foregone conclusion; rather it is a position that has been reinforced by making some concessions and engaging in robust intra-party debate on the issues that are most sorely contested.

All of which had generated pressure on the Tanzanian state to try and respond to concerns over land and corruption. Indeed 'neoliberal populism', as noted at the outset, at the least tried to pay lip service to them. Meanwhile the appointment of the Land Commission and partial acceptance of its recommendations do show effective agency, via electoral politics, of the citizen-peasant. That agency was, in turn, a major driving force behind the Tanzanian state's search for a greater scope of action in its dealings with IFIs and the 'donor community' in general as the 1990s wore on. Far from being

simply a responsive conduit to 'Western demands for...liberalisation' (Pinkney 2001, p. 139) it was, at minimum trying to strike a balance between them and the political market.

Given this, the citizen-peasant is an irreducible sociological basis for the agency the Tanzanian state increasingly exercised in its international relations. In this sense it is supplemental to recent work looking to revise readings such as the 'governance state' (Harrison 2004), distinguishing between 'autonomy', which *has* been hampered and 'sovereignty' which is far from extinguished in the case of Tanzania (Wangwe 2004, Brown 2013, pp. 276–7). This argument runs even amidst the consequences of fiscal crisis and stark inequality between the Tanzanian state and the donors with which it was negotiating. Whilst the late 1980s and early 1990s might have been a 'period of defeat', a quite different reading of the following years seems to emerge which is seen as a period of reclamation or recovery from those defeats (Wangwe 2004, p. 387). This period of recovery can be dated to the mid-1990s, beginning with the Helleiner Report (Helleiner 1995) which was commissioned by the Tanzanian government and seminal to a shift to 'partnership' in aid and development rhetoric (Brown 2013, pp. 276–7).¹⁸

All of this raises the question of international relations. Whilst interactivity, derived from the international dimension of social life, was central to the previous Chapter's argument, it has so far received little direct attention, an issue which is addressed in section III. Before doing so, the politics of public ownership that arises from these contentious politics must be fully specified.

In 1999, protesters against a South African company's plans to restructure TANESCO, the state owned electricity company, did so whilst clutching pictures of Nyerere and slogans stating 'TANESCO, its dams, and electricity are the hard efforts of Nyerere and Tanzanian citizens!' (Aminzade 2013a, p. 242). No mere 'nostalgia' for the socialist past, or mere 'rhetoric', this was part of a growing sense of public – that is, *citizens'* – ownership of Tanzania's infrastructure and resources. First, whilst this was primarily a *workers'* protest these were not expressed as particularly workers' interests, but those of the nation as a whole.

This highlights an intriguing possibility that the political market as it pertains to specifically rural concerns might grow into a much broader claim. That is it might grow from specific concerns for the agrarian sphere but a conception of all land and resources of the nation as the patrimony of the entire nation, and subject to the

¹⁸ See (Brown 2009) for a wider argument around the role of aid in African International relations, itself deploying a U&CD method.

political market in that sense. It must be conceded that the point is speculative, but it is not baseless; moreover, it serves to highlight the possibilities involved in the citizen-peasant social form.

Related to this is the strong anti-privatisation movement in Tanzania. Sometime later, after the defeat of those 1999 protests, the Tanzanian government backtracked, reversing the South African company's contract in 2006 (Aminzade 2013a, p. 282, Ghanadan 2008). This was not an isolated case, but one of many that, Aminzade (2013a, chaps 8–10) deploys over the course of several chapters. He explains discontent with privatisations by reference to nationalism. By deploying the citizen-peasant as a sociological basis for nationalism and a specific norm of public ownership, can be given a stronger foundation.

Further speculation on this point can be reserved for the concluding Chapter. Notwithstanding these points, a more modest claim can be advanced. The politics of public ownership, in the form of the established claim around the political market, do hold sway in rural Tanzania. Furthermore, as the majority of the population and empowered through electoral politics, Tanzanian politics can be expected to remain deeply under their influence. Having pressed for vindication of their rights through the Land Commission of the 1990s, the citizen-peasant was very much an entrenched and pervasive feature of Tanzanian society at the end of the 20th century. Finally, it might also be added that the attempt to entrench democratic political control of land, for which the Report of the Commission so strongly came out, would have a claim to be a leading edge of progressive politics in virtually any nation in the world. In this sense, Tanzania is very much a participant in modern world history.

III. Wither Third Worldism? Tanzania, China and the international in the late 20th century

If the citizen-peasant was an entrenched feature in Tanzania long after Arusha what of the significance, empirical and theoretical, for interactivity and international relations? China has been a clear feature of the argument through Chapters 4 and 5, so some comments on Sino-Tanzanian relations since the era of TAZARA are necessary.

Prima facie it is tempting to conclude that, in fact, there is little to say. 'It is hard', wrote Gerald Segal 'to make a case that Africa matters very much to China' (1992, p. 116). In saying so he typifies a then common view borne of the contrast between China's relations with African countries during the Maoist era, of which TAZARA is the most renowned, and the 1980s when relations became more muted. There were no new

large scale projects like TAZARA (Yu 1988, pp. 857–8). Indeed, some Chinese officials began to regard TAZARA as a white elephant that typified the excesses of an overly romantic Maoist internationalism.

Coincident in time with the turn to ‘the market’ in China, as well as Tanzania’s crisis and later liberalisation, the bare facts seem to encourage the conclusion that the ‘heroic age’ of relations between ‘unequal equals’ is little more than a footnote to the wider failure of Third Worldism and the dominance of liberalism since the end of the Cold War (Rosenberg 1994, pp. 132–3). Failure in Third Worldism is, like failure as an analysis of Arusha, not so much wrong as unnecessarily limited. Restricting this to the unequal equals issue for now, the first point to make is that to a great extent those interactive relations became more muted because their work had been completed. This was especially so in China’s case, its immediate aims having been accomplished with entry to the UN and rapprochement with the US, the geopolitical imperatives propelling Third Worldism were far less urgent.

Tanzania, for its part, remained eager for further projects in the vein of TAZARA that were not to materialise; nonetheless those earlier relations, TAZARA in particular, had been deeply consequential in the manner described. Not only had the citizen-peasant become an entrenched form; Tanzania had gone from being a particularly vulnerable and insignificant (from the donor states’ perspective) nation in the 1960s to, a donor darling in the 1970s; more significant still is the establishment of sovereignty as the last redoubt for a Tanzanian state faced with both fiscal crisis and financially powerful donors by the 1980s and 1990s (Brown 2013). The contrast with the 1960s (when upon disagreement donors simply left Nyerere to his own devices) and the 1990s is too strong to ignore. Even for all its difficulties, the Tanzanian state was able to bring to bear sufficient diplomatic weight to exercise real agency and command (a significant degree of) respect for its sovereignty through the Helleiner Report. The supportive role that Third Worldism, and Sino-Tanzanian relations particularly, had played in establishing these principles were considerable.

The principal focus of this thesis has been on the citizen-peasant as an emergent property of an interactive process, and in this regard that claim has been made out. Taking the point on sovereignty too far would soon find itself in difficult waters which are not central to this thesis which has been primarily concerned with the incommensurability problem. That said, it does seem reasonable to conclude that those relations play some significant part in the extension and entrenchment of sovereignty as a principle that holds for nations such as Tanzania that lack the

‘traditional variables of power’.¹⁹ It is at least arguable that Sino-Tanzanian relations, and Third Worldism in general, had not just provoked those donor countries into proactive aid policies; they were likewise provoked to closer adherence to sovereignty as a principle for all, “even” Tanzania and other weak nations in Great Power terms.²⁰

In this light, a few clarifications of Segal’s views can be registered. First, though the decline between the 1970s and 1980s was precipitous it was not abandonment. The Chinese were instead content to simply *maintain* their relations with Tanzania, having secured their immediate key goals (Yu 1988, p. 855), but were not willing to give up on the diplomatic advantages residual Third Worldism conferred. To this end aid relations with Tanzania actually continued at a relatively substantial level (Ai 1999). Indeed, TAZARA is something of a bellwether: by the 1980s the Chinese were restricting themselves to maintaining the railway during the years of fiscal crisis. Nonetheless, the calculation was that the continued symbolic value of the project outweighed the continued cost. Thus Segal was perhaps a little too negative in his conclusion.

A further point, and writing from the vantage point of 2015 it is almost banal to say so, the more notable thing about the decline in Chinese interest in Africa is its brevity. Beginning with the end of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square protests, Chinese interest in Africa began to pick up pace and soon became a headlong rush after the mid-1990s (Taylor 1998). Since that point trade and aid have both risen at exponential rates, a phenomenon that to a great extent had a political impetus with Jiang Zemin’s ‘going out’ policy (Alden and Large 2011). The significance of such a move is not only vast and much contested, it is both ongoing and fast-paced; even so, the term ‘unequal equals’ has been taken up by many working on the topic (Alden and Large 2011, pp. 22, 30, Large 2008) indicating its continued suggestiveness nearly 50 years after Nyerere used the phrase.²¹

¹⁹ An issue that IR theory too is not necessarily alive to, which is often focussed on Great Power politics to the exclusion of others (Mearsheimer 2014).

²⁰ Sovereignty as a principle remained at the core of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric too. At the 12th National Congress of the CCP in 1982 the strong articulation of sovereignty for all was advanced, making it clear that it must take within its ambit not just the Great Powers but also Tanzania or, one might add, Costa Rica or Malaysia (Waltz 1979, p. 73). China, it was declared, would hold fast to the ‘Five principles of peaceful coexistence’, reiterating that ‘imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism’ remained ‘the main source of instability and turmoil in the world’ and therefore ‘national independence and state sovereignty’ remained indispensable (Yu 1988, p. 856).

²¹ For a lengthier claim that ‘unequal equals’ could be a useful *problématique* for contemporary studies of ‘China in Africa’ see (A’Zami 2015). It might be the case that ‘unequal equals’ stands for little more than the principle of sovereignty between “Great Powers” and minor ones; but if so, it is part of (causal

Conclusion

Over the course of Chapters 4 to 6, the methodology proffered in Chapter 3 has been fleshed out to offer the citizen-peasant as a historically realised form of U&CD. This Chapter completes the argument by pointing the entrenchment of this form beyond the Arusha Declaration era up to the cusp of the 21st century. Long since socialism had been abandoned, in practice and rhetoric, the citizen-peasant has remained a central feature of Tanzanian society.

This has been an important to establish because, in the face of a literature that posits Arusha as a failure and then proceeds to reproduce (aspects of) the peasant-modernity problem once again, the citizen-peasant continues to provide an analytical basis for supplanting that problem. These problems manifest in the insistence on applying an abstract theory of the market and rationality (Bates) and/or in repeated predictions of incipient proletarianisation. In other words, a return to the exaggeration that attend erasure of the (citizen-)peasant witnessed in Chapter 2. Instead this realised form of combined development, fissile modernity and protean peasant, better explains features those exaggerations struggle with.

Furthermore, the pattern of political contention detected in Tanzania in this period is elemental too. These patterns have been related, in substantial part, to the citizen-peasant form. Protests against privatisation and corruption revolve around defence of the political market and the opportunities it generates; meanwhile, through the Land Commission episode, land continues to be the centre of national life and an object of sometimes innovative policy debate. In both ways, this Chapter suggests that the processes examined throughout this thesis are still ongoing and might yet yield continued social innovation.

Whilst these features complete the argument, offering a reconciliation of Marx and Arusha through a reading post-colonial Tanzania in the 20th century, these speculations obviously also pertain to what the prospects of this social form might be in the 21st century. Beyond the question of public ownership this also includes possible implications the citizen-peasant might have beyond 'the village', in particular whether and how the citizen-peasant could impinge on urbanisation and perhaps even industrialisation, the latter of which is still *far* more an aspiration than reality in

or not) a clear extension of sovereignty as opposed to the 19th and early 20th centuries. In other words, the USA and UK might also be 'unequal equals', but from the vantage point of that earlier time China and Tanzania being instances of the same surely has the ring of significance.

contemporary Tanzania. Finally, in discussion of the international dimension, the resurgence in relations between China and Tanzania (actually, Africa in general) in recent years was noted. In all these senses, there is a great of deal of unfinished and ongoing business in the 21st century. Thus in the final Chapter, by way of conclusion, some reflections are offered as to whether and how the citizen-peasant might continue in its career as a protean subject of modernity; and, if so, what preliminary observations that might yield for the wider historical conjuncture.

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Citizen-peasants in the 21st century?

‘At the World Bank the first question they asked me was ‘how did you fail?’ I responded that we took over a country with 85 per cent of its adult population illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were 2 trained engineers and 12 doctors...When I stepped down there was 91-per-cent literacy and nearly every child was in school. We trained thousands of engineers and doctors and teachers.

In 1988 Tanzania’s per-capita income was \$280. Now, in 1998, it is \$140. So I asked the World Bank people what went wrong...Enrolment in school has plummeted to 63 per cent and conditions in health and other social services have deteriorated. I asked them again: ‘what went wrong?’ These people just sat there looking at me. Then they asked what could they do? I told them have some humility. Humility – they are so arrogant!’

Julius K. Nyerere (Bunting 1999).

Introduction

What are the prospects for the citizen-peasant in the 21st century? In drawing out the implications of the theoretical and methodological (Chapters 2 and 3) and empirical (Chapter 4-6) propositions of the thesis, three sets of comments are offered here. Each illustrates the implications and limitations of those arguments, using them to, in effect, point out how further research might proceed.

The first considers the world historical ‘liberal’ moment since the end of the Cold War. ‘Liberal internationalism stands triumphant’ John Ikenberry concludes, ‘but also more alone and vulnerable’ (2010, p. 556). Prompted by that intriguing combination of self-confidence and vulnerability, the proffered comments lift the bonnet on the liberal moment – treating ‘liberal’ in the broadest sense possible - of markets and civil society to show how stubborn *difference*, as exemplified but hardly exhausted by Tanzania and the citizen-peasant, is as a contributory factor to that liberal anxiety.

It is a particular irony of this conjuncture that difference has become *more* rather than less intellectually troubling in the era of liberal triumph. Even if it ever was defensible to restrict analysis to a liberal core, and the premises of U&CD perhaps cast doubt on this, justifying such a move in the present would be particularly difficult. Amongst other things, what must be explained is the participation in this liberal order of societies that do not conform to liberalism's sociological premises and prescriptions. Yet difference has long been a problem for liberal approaches. Just as often as liberalism, and those drawn into its intellectual orbit such as the early Marx, begins to regard itself as triumphant, its corresponding failure to create a world in its own image, thereby eradicating difference, soon rises to the surface.¹

This is the significance of the epigraph, again drawn from Nyerere, reflecting on the idea of failure in an interview toward the end of his life. Whilst his own political programme had failed there is, he points out, plenty of failure to go around. In particular, that spearhead of liberalisation, the World Bank, ought to recognise its own. For the most part this is expressed as self-vindication suggesting that for all his problems Nyerere's leadership had seen Tanzania advance by reference to various developmental metrics, whereas those same metrics had plummeted when liberalisation had taken hold. Beneath this is a more important point still: starting with British colonialism, and then pivoting to the World Bank, his point serves to highlight the failure of both to procure anything resembling convergence on liberal modernity.

Those 'World Bank people', taken aback – at root, by difference or non-convergence in spite of their efforts – asked Nyerere what their response should be. 'Humility', went his reply; his prescription is, Section I argues, no less apposite for liberalism in general. Pointing to difference, and the citizen-peasant in particular, it might be helpful to approach the liberal moment as a set of interactions across difference rather than waiting for a moment of convergence which never quite arrives.

¹ In the current conjuncture witness, for example, all the energetic discussion of supposedly convergent BRICs (Mahbubani 2013). Whilst in any case 'convergence' is more a prediction based on forward projections, they evince a tendency to neglect, say, the profound sociological differences between present-day China and India and the US and UK. This is no small difficulty, witness just one example. Is the rise of China explicable in liberal terms? And, in any case, what is its trajectory? Its emergence, Perry Anderson points out (2007, p. 6), 'as the new workshop of the world' is 'not just the rapid expansion of one outsize national economy, but a structural alteration of the world market, with a global impact closer to Victorian England than the more parochial settings of Gilded Age—perhaps even Post-War—America'. Yet, and the failing is not his but a reflection of the topic's great difficulty, Anderson is reluctant to commit himself to a clear analysis, instead issuing a 'suspended judgement' (Wang 2015, p. 37). Thus, Anderson concludes '[t]owards what horizon the mega-junk of the PRC is moving resists calculation, at least of any current astrolabe' (Anderson 2010, p. 96).

Turning from that point, Section II proceeds to revisit some of those threads that arose in discussing the citizen-peasant in Chapter 6. Revisiting questions of rural development and political market, the potential implications for urbanisation and industrialisation, the wider possibility of public ownership and finally the dramatic acceleration of ‘China in Africa’ in recent years, the terrain is sketched. Upon doing so, this reveals significant limitations, not just empirical but at a methodological level. Whilst this points toward an agenda for further research, it also leads to Section III, which concludes by reflecting on what this research has, and has not, been able to say about difference, modernity and international relations.

I. Difference as interaction in the liberal conjuncture?

Liberalism advances a formidable set of claims in the contemporary conjuncture. Pointing to both a tremendous extension of ‘markets’ and a powerful political *zeitgeist* of civil society, democracy and universal rights (the ‘liberal state’). Especially when compared to the obvious ideological cleavages and deep unevenness of the ‘short 20th century’ (Hobsbawm 1995) that preceded this liberal moment, its claim to predominance is powerful indeed, ‘the empire of civil society had struck back’ (Rosenberg 2005, p. 57).

Furthermore, and despite the claims for its difference up to now, contemporary Tanzania seems to be no exception at first glance. Having already observed its ‘abandonment’ of socialism and the onset of liberalisation, as well as the emergence of multi-party politics in Chapter 6, the urge to cast Tanzania in liberal terms has some purchase. And this only becomes more pressing upon proceeding to the 21st century. Tanzania has become an ever more quiescent participant in the world market, remains deeply engaged with the Bretton Woods institutions and no less susceptible to the liberal *zeitgeist* of democratisation. Finally, as if to refute the humility point Nyerere makes, as Tanzania is seen as shifting from ‘state-’ to ‘market-led’ development it has come to be narrated as an economic ‘success story’, exhibiting one of the highest GDP growth rates in the world at around 7% (Nord 2009, Robinson *et al.* 2011).²

As such, much of the literature on Tanzania proceeds along the parallel lines of liberal ontology: state, civil society and market, divided between politics and economics. In the political dimension emphasis rests on stability, democracy and ‘civil

² The pitfalls of boosterism await the unwary. Not only due to the limitations of GDP growth as an analytical tool, but also concerns regarding data quality (Jerven 2013) and the low base from which these growth figures start in Tanzania.

peace' by which is meant the absence of sectarian politics of racial, ethnic or religious stripe (Lofchie 2014, pp. 1–18, 199–201, Green 2011, Fukuyama 2014a, pp. 329–333, 2014b, pp. 10–11). For the most part this is represented as continuity with the past – 'Nyerere's legacy' – sometimes verging on a degree of romantic 'Tanzaphilia' (Mazrui 1997).

The economic dimension is also represented as successful, contrasted with the record of socialist 'failure' and crisis (Nord 2009, Robinson *et al.* 2011), emphasising a break with that past. Although some of these accounts are celebratory in tone, most deploy critical nuance, introduced by pointing to the limited (at best) correlation between growth and living standards, widening inequality and corruption (Aminzade 2013a, pt. III, Coulson 2013, pp. 1–20, Edwards 2014, chap. 11, Lofchie 2014, chap. 7). Nonetheless the paradigm shift, from state to market, is a well-established proposition.

The concern that will nonetheless be expressed around this outline of the liberal moment aligns, again, with the peasant-modernity problem. For all the importance of this body of scholarship, and at root its indubitable proposition that Tanzania (along with so many other nations) is now an active participant in the 'liberal order', its premises are mistaken. Difference, in the form of the sociological figure that is the citizen-peasant, remains in place. As such, the *presumption* that 'state' and 'market' are separable categories is problematic.

As has been shown this does not entail the absence of markets, but it does entail the absence of *dependence* in an economic sense; therefore, as both a theoretical proposition and a concrete one in Tanzania, these markets are *political markets*. Due to this basic non-convergence, sweeping away the foundational premise for 'states and markets' analysis, the call for liberal *analysis* is something of a siren-call; in its pursuit the attempt to square it with sociological difference flounders. And this is so both for accounts of political stability and economic success, each contributing to a mystification of their objects of explanation: 'stability' and 'success'.

The political stability theme can be briefly addressed. Largely playing up continuity with the socialist era (Green 2011, Fukuyama 2014a, pp. 329–333), it can only be incorporated alongside a broader attachment to liberal premises via a sociologically thin reading of nationalism in which Tanzanian citizens are posited without reference to any foundational social form they might have (Aminzade 2013a).³

This matters because it is this very thinness that serves to erase significant difference. If one inquires into those foundations, the core elements of the citizen-

³ This is not to suggest that this work evinces no sociological analysis, only that it does not provide a foundation for the otherwise insightful and careful account of Tanzanian nationalism.

peasant claim would emerge. In particular, the unity of labour and property combined with the formal equality of citizenship that, in turn, is founded in the political market. These, it has been argued, are central to the bridging of nation-state and peasant household. Without it explanations of ‘civil peace’ and so on are thin, but with it the difficulty around the separation of states and markets would have to be addressed. In this sense this claim is similar to Chatterjee’s analysis of post-colonial Indian politics (2004, 2011) encountered in Chapter 2, except that the peasant is placed at the centre of the account of Tanzanian politics rather than marginal thereto. A particular difficulty that can arise without this point is overemphasis on stability to the exclusion or diminution of the contentious politics discovered in Chapter 6.⁴

Greater difficulties still occur in respect of the economic theme. Presuming the market as a standing category, there is no less sociological thinness here. Accounts for the shift, to say nothing of their definition, from state-led to market-led economics are limited to a policy shift. In turn that shift is often seen as an external imposition of the Bretton Woods institutions, thereafter *presuming* convergence on market *dependency* and sharply delineated from the political theme.⁵ The success story that is Tanzania’s ‘economy’ is then seen as explicable in terms of self-sustaining growth, with politics intervening either to foster or impede it rather than constitute it (Lofchie 2014, chap. 7). When Lofchie then comes to actually develop a ‘political economy’ of Tanzania in this period, it conceives politics in precisely this vein; an intrusion into an otherwise autonomous economy. That intervention, in his view, is mostly in the nature of a corrupt elite parasitically attaching itself to a market-economy.

This, he says, is ‘crony capitalism...in which political power and economic wealth are inextricably intertwined’. Nevertheless, it is ‘unimportant to consider the direction of causality since...wealth is a source of political power’ *and* ‘power is the gateway to wealth’. Thus reuniting politics and economics at a later conceptual point, his political economy is limited to distributional questions; corruption is seen as a sort of skimming the top off from the products of a set of market relations that themselves remain

⁴ Aminzade does not do this, but does attribute significance to nationalism as being founded in opposition to outsiders, racial and national. Whilst this is so, I think it is somewhat overplayed; more importantly though, it does not explain why difference along ethnic lines should not arise once again alongside those constructed ‘others’?

⁵ Tanzania may be exceptional as an African nation that has eschewed ethnic politics, says Michael Lofchie (2014, p. 18) underlining the presumption of separation: whilst Tanzania may have ‘little in common’ with the rest of Africa in political terms, he continues, its ‘economic trajectory...has almost everything in common’.

mysterious. His interest is not in 'how the system operates from day to day' but rather its long term prospects (Lofchie 2014, p. 201). Neglecting 'day to day' operation highlights the elision since, if the current argument holds, 'day to day' operations require at least some reference to the citizen-peasant and political market.

Of course this does not suggest that corruption is not a central category for inquiry, already looked at in Chapter 6. But it does suggest that this approach does not reveal anything about 'the mechanisms through which grand corruption influences economic development' (Gray 2015, p. 3). That would require working out the day-to-day operation of the system. Corruption in Tanzania, instead, should be seen as one (leading) aspect of the deeply political constitution of productive activity to which the citizen-peasant pertains to (at least in rural areas) and perhaps further, a point considered in Section II.

Returning directly to the question of participation in the liberal order this issue is often addressed by reference to an 'islands of globalisation' approach (Ferguson 2006, pp. 34-38). The suggestion is that the only sites of importance in Tanzania (to the globalised world) are particular islands whilst 'capital' skips the rest. One point made in Chapter 6 was the possibility, and fear, that the Tanzanian state was moving toward precisely such an orientation. 'The economy was already growing [in 2005]' writes Coulson, which was 'led by mining and tourism, and manufacturing exports to other African countries' (2013, p. 7). Emphasis on these industries, which is a common feature, is instructive.

Recognition of the potential for movement in that direction on one hand, and presuming its realisation on the other, are two quite different propositions though. Moreover, these industries, or 'islands' do not 'lead' to the extent suggested. The contribution to the overall growth rate of each of these sectors, mining especially, is modest relative to the attention they receive. Between 2000-5 mining contributed only 0.4% of average growth, whilst manufacturing amounted to 0.6% of an approximate total of 7%. Meanwhile, services contributed 2.1% and the agricultural sector 2.3% (Utz 2008, p. 21). Simply put 'success' even in the relatively narrow terms of GDP growth is not reducible to the export of raw materials and tourism, therefore in neither respect is an 'islands of globalisation' method sufficient.

It is the states and markets approach, or rather its presumption, which threatens to mislead here. Mining, for example, gets so much attention due to its visibility to that approach. It is an industry that is increasingly dominated by large-scale, capital-

intensive enterprises,⁶ dependent on FDI and outward oriented, contributing 32% of Tanzania's exports (Ferguson 2006). Requiring little wage-labour *in situ* in any case, the sparseness of anything like a proletariat is obscured from view, whilst the domination of the sector by foreign corporations seems to vindicate a premise of market *dependency* by supposing that it applies to those corporations and their immersion in wider global capitalism.

None of this means that analyses of these particular sites are wrong within the particular purview of outward-oriented mining. What it does mean is that when those terms of reference are taken as given for Tanzania as a whole, problems emerge. If those islands of globalisation were an established reality, that would not be so objectionable since it would substantially justify the approach to Tanzania's participation in the world market. Yet even the bare facts of the success story suggest something more broadly based is required. Moreover, increasing political agitation around the politics of ownership amounts to a direct challenge to the emergence of said 'islands'.

To appreciate the significance of this a backward step is helpful. Even when these problems are recognised, they do not dissolve away. Just as both the general problems – modernity-difference and peasant-modernity – do not melt away upon recognition of difference, neither does the impulse to liberal analysis in this conjuncture dissolve upon simple specification of the citizen-peasant. The reason is its seductive power, pointing to the powerful upsurge in 'globalisation' following the Cold War, of which Tanzania seems just one small part, whilst offering a powerful set of interpretive claims. Thus, quite rightly impressed by the world historical significance of the liberal moment, many proceed to take refuge in a liberal analysis, for all its problems.

Again, this threatens to reproduce the modernity end of the problem that was addressed in Chapter 2. The world market is, usually, the mechanism that is seen as generating a convergent effect, and supplies a particularly powerful worldview alone. Indeed this was the view of both Adam Smith and early, *Manifesto* Marx (Brenner 1977, pp. 25–26, 90) and similar notions can be found in (many) ideas of globalisation as well as many neo-Marxist accounts of imperialism, perhaps even David Harvey's (2003, chap.

⁶ But see (Bryceson 2013) for an argument that even in mining this is, at best, a simplification. To the extent that 'artisanal miners' continue to be a major factor, this is actually supportive of the wider point about citizen-peasants since the former can fit in this category *mutatis mutandis*.

4, 2009).⁷ Yet, which is the ‘irony’ point made earlier, if nothing else the expansion of the liberal system cannot be construed in terms of the economic logic of the market alone *because of difference*. As such, the expansion of capitalist-/liberal-modernity itself must be a political, and therefore a *geopolitical/international* process (Teschke 2003, pp. 264–265).

The way out of this difficulty has been seen to lie in reference to unevenness (difference) and international relations/geopolitics in particular (Rosenberg 1994, chap. 6, 2005, Teschke 2003, pp. 263–268). U&CD has elaborated on those ideas, starting with unevenness but with key adaptations to generate *combined development*. This thesis has likewise followed that pathway, seeking to take *both* modernity *and* the stubborn reality of peasant difference and unevenness seriously.

Yet the power of the post-1989 conjuncture is such that the balance between liberal-modernity and the challenges unevenness/difference is supposed to impose can appear to have decisively shifted in favour of the former. Indeed, the very common resort to ‘globalisation’ underlines this. The institution(s) of globalisation/ liberal modernity are so powerful that a powerful is that now, at long last, the work of history is complete and difference immersed within globalisation. Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’(1992) is only the most famous example of the broad intellectual trend. Even Benno Teschke (2003, p. 268), otherwise engaged in a historical critique of many of these ideas, seems unable to resist speculating that the contemporary conjuncture might amount to a shift from *international* order to one of ‘globalisation and global governance’. And, alongside this shift, references to the explanatory power of ‘global capitalism’ (Shivji 2009, Aminzade 2013a, p. 11) have become correspondingly popular in the Tanzania literature.

In an earlier work, focussing on modernity and before engaging with U&CD, Justin Rosenberg carefully discusses the division of politics and economics/ the states and market approach. In doing so he remarks that *starting* with a presumption of that

⁷ Harvey’s attempt to identify ‘territorial’ as well ‘capital’ logics of accumulation, in some senses aspires to go beyond this. But see Brenner’s (2006) careful suggestion that Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ privileges capital’s logic(2006, p. 86) – in spite of himself – and (2006, pp. 96–102) further pointing to the possibility that Harvey’s concept is closer to Smith than *late* Marx. Indeed, Brenner argues, if ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is supposed to show that ‘capital accumulation is strictly limited in the extent to which it can create the sociopolitical conditions for its own expansion and to call attention to the political conflicts and social struggles’ then ‘they need to be grasped not just in the global context of the long downturn and core governments’ efforts to restore the profitability of core capitals, but also in their own terms, by reference to domestic economic developments and internal political conflicts’ (2006, p. 100).

separation 'is not a theoretically innocent assumption'. Continuing, he notes that to a large extent the social relations that justify the view do not obtain across the world; but more importantly still 'because even where they do obtain, they are continually being contested' (Rosenberg 1994, p. 132). Amongst other things, a consequence of the current thesis' claims around the citizen-peasant, along with political market, is not just to emphasise how consequential that contestation is, but also that it disturbs a wide range of assumptions including many around the liberal moment.

The significance of this is underlined by considering Philip McMichael's (1999, 2000, pp. 682–686) suggestion that the current conjuncture is witnessing a crisis, or 'decomposition of wage labour'. This does not mean that the liberal moment (howsoever labelled) is an illusion. Rather it is to highlight how much participation in the world market is not premised on wage-labour in the sense that classical ideas of modernity did so much with. In the current case the political market, the institution attendant on the citizen-peasant, is a central mechanism of peasant difference in this process. But either way, difference holds as a disruptive feature vis-à-vis liberal analysis of the current conjuncture.

On this basis it can be suggested that the liberal moment cannot be understood through presumptions of convergence. Difference, and peasant difference in particular, are not just abiding features of the liberal moment: they are proliferating. This is so even with reference to the very core of modernity, wage-labour, as McMichael points out. It is further suggested that this is in line with the broad vision of *fissile modernity* proposed in Chapter 3. If this is so then this thesis points to an avenue that might be fruitful.

This is, based on the theoretical stance adopted in Chapters 2 and 3, the suggestion that the world historical liberal moment of our times should itself be understood as involving *interaction across difference*. Beginning with a pattern of unevenness, and thereafter proceeding to identify how that generates 'liberal' interactions of these sorts. In the absence of such a move, the alternative appears to be persistent difficulties with difference, and the exaggerations and erasures that risks. Down that path, it seems, lies yet more 'humility' of the kind Nyerere taxed those 'World Bank people' with. It is also worth noting, however, that such an interpretation would also involve re-connecting the notion of fissile modernity offered in this thesis with a notion of modernity as *fusion as well*. This would plainly be a very valuable innovation which, whilst it can be anticipated here, requires more work than is within the scope of this thesis.

II. Tanzania in the 21st century

Revisiting some of the empirical queries raised in Chapter 6 in this second Section, questions of rural development and the political market can be considered with reference to a recent policy initiative. Thereafter, it looks at the wider possibility of public ownership that the political market might yield. Along the way this touches upon the potential implications of the thesis' arguments for urbanisation and industrialisation in Tanzania. Finally, it considers the dramatic acceleration of 'China in Africa' in recent years. Sketching the terrain in this way some future research possibilities arise; in doing so, however, several limitations to the research presented in the thesis also arise, the methodological implications of which lead toward Section III and a final conclusion.

Kilimo Kwanza and the Politics of Land

If the narrative of economic success has been limited to 'islands of globalisation', the recent *kilimo kwanza* [agriculture first] policy initiative appears to be a promising starting point for getting at the 'day to day' life of the citizen-peasant and, therefore, the majority of Tanzanians. Rural poverty in Tanzania remains substantial, with 38.8% below the poverty line in 2000, falling to around 33% by 2012. Whilst this is significantly lower than comparators, including those with higher GDP per capita, such as Kenya (49.1% in 2005) or Malawi (55.9% in 2004,) this is a considerable source of political pressure (Poulton 2012, p. 8). Whilst the lower rate of poverty offers some support to the propositions advanced in this thesis, the focus here shall be on the political pressure that poverty generates. In fact, this supports the broad claim around the political market, part of a set of structural imperatives pushing the state to generate and sustain market *opportunities*, on pain of what Hydén called 'withdrawal'. Thus, as Chapter 6 saw, the withdrawal of fertiliser subsidies not only curtailed production (Skarstein 2010, pp. 116–120) but became a feature of electoral politics.

Attempting to find a way out of this difficulty, the Tanzanian state continues to search for the means to sustain and boost agriculture through the political market mechanism. The immediate impulse toward this is electoral politics, in particular CCM's fear of loss of power, but undergirded by the state's legitimacy resting to a great extent on its developmental function. In the early years of the 21st century that pressure

has resulted in the restoration of both fertiliser subsidies⁸ and significant social services that had been scaled back at the peak of liberalisation.

Since then the government has sought to more comprehensively restore and build upon the ‘mini-green revolution’ that had been sustained by the political market (Chapter 5). The current five year plan, for 2011-2016, *Unleashing Tanzania’s Latent Growth Potential* sets the ambitious target for increasing agricultural growth from 4.1% to 6% per annum (United Republic of Tanzania 2012, p. 7). That, alongside a large infrastructure programme in both rural and urban areas, is supposed to yield a shift to ‘an industry-based economy’ and ‘middle income’ status by 2025 built upon a strong, relatively prosperous agrarian base (United Republic of Tanzania 2012, p. i). As the basis, agriculture had to come *first* in chronological terms and as a policy priority (*kilimo kwanza*). These ambitions are to be achieved through the implementation of ‘Ten Pillars’,⁹ that will transform ‘peasant and small farmers to commercial farmers’ as well as promote ‘medium and large scale farmers’. Grist to the mill, so it would seem, of the state-to-market-led interpretation of the era of ‘success’.

The most salient Pillars reinforce that impression. Pillar 2’s (finance) overall thrust, whilst also providing for a minimum 10% of budget expenditure for agriculture, is unmistakably directed toward ‘financialising’ agrarian society. Its goals are to establish a Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank, encourage ‘private sector’ investment and rural savings through ‘community banks’ and an agriculture-specific social security fund. Land, Pillar 5, meanwhile is supposed to reinforce land rights, but also make land readily alienable – that is, a commodity – in various ways. Similarly, more (‘unused’) land is to be allocated to a Land Bank to facilitate investment, an aspiration first observed in Chapter 6. Pillar 6, concerned with ‘incentives’, seems to strongly confirm its fundamentally market nature. Its focus is on ‘fiscal and other incentives’, enhancing ‘competitiveness’ and the removal of ‘market barriers from agricultural commodities’.

⁸ Under the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme and very much against the will of the ‘donor community’ (Cooksey 2012, p. 15) a further reminder of the limitations of seeing Tanzania as a “governance state” (Harrison 2004) and the significance of sovereignty (Wangwe 2004, Brown 2013).

⁹ In full these pillars are, in mostly bland, technocratic register: 1. “A national vision”; 2. “Financing”; 3. “Institutional reorganization”; 4. “Paradigm shift to strategic framework”; 5. “Land”; 6. “Incentives”; 7. “Industrialization”; 8. “Science, technology and human resource”; 9 “Infrastructure development” and 10. “Mobilization of Tanzanians.”(United Republic of Tanzania 2009)

Two other Pillars, meanwhile, evince a clearer role for the state. These are industrialisation and infrastructure development, Pillars 7 and 9. The former, echoing Nyerere-era ambitions, aspires to increased backward and forward ‘linkages’ between agriculture and industry. In particular, the state intends to stimulate fertiliser production, and provide further subsidises for the benefit of ‘small farmers’. Indeed, similar provisions are intended for other agricultural inputs. Meanwhile agricultural produce, it is hoped, will increasingly feed into forward linkages in the form of agro-processing. Finally, infrastructural improvements are also fundamental, both as a general feature of the Five Year Plan and in *kilimo kwanza* in particular. This involves an irrigation scheme, increasing the provision of storage facilities, improvements in roads and railways and, finally, the promotion of rural electrification.

What does this rehearsal of the policy demonstrate? Rhetorically all this is conceived in approximately ‘liberal’ terms, and certainly there is little on the face of it that contradicts the states to market-led narrative. ‘The market’ is the central mechanism to the policy, whilst the aspiration to shift from ‘peasant’ to ‘commercial’ farming is hardly encouraging of the prospects of the citizen-peasant in the 21st century. The suggestion that *kilimo kwanza* ‘roots agricultural development firmly in the private sector’ (Jenkins 2012, p. 13) is both typical and, *prima facie*, reasonable.

Beneath the rhetorical veneers, however, is a deeper vindication of the political market reading. The principal thrust of *kilimo kwanza* is to emphasise the importance of state provision to agriculture. In particular, its core rationale is broadly in accord with the political market, aimed at encouraging engagement with ‘the market’ by *creating market opportunities* in the sense encountered in Chapter 6. Thus the ‘private sector’ in an agricultural context is not, without the political market, otherwise a (reliable) market participant; the phrase ‘private sector’ can be harmless or harmful, depending on whether this distinction is observed.

Whilst it is true that *kilimo kwanza* is aimed at appealing to ‘capital’ and encouraging large-scale farming (Coulson 2013, p. 18, Edwards 2014, p. 225), the overwhelming majority of land (95%) is held and farmed by smallholders, whilst 90% of Tanzania’s food is ‘smallholder’ grown (Aminzade 2013a, p. 378). Thus, whilst *kilimo kwanza* understandably raises concerns (Aminzade 2013a, p. 273) around the wider issue of land grabbing (Hall 2013, McMichael 2014b), this remains a prospect not a realised phenomenon. Furthermore, attempts to introduce large-scale farming have a long and almost entirely unsuccessful history in Tanzania. This is not just due to geographical constraints, but also social ones. Above all, due to the absence of

dependence on the market, wage-labour is both scarce and expensive (Coulson 2013, p. 18). Thus, even to the extent that *kilimo kwanza* favours large-scale enterprises, the result is anything but a foregone conclusion of accelerating dispossession.

Ultimately though, *kilimo kwanza* is at least as much about rejuvenating the political market – that is, encouraging citizen-peasant participation in the market – as it is about encouraging large-scale farming. First, continued political and especially electoral pressures (in line with Chapter 6’s argument) suggest that the citizen-peasant is a major influence on policy (Booth *et al.* 2014, p. 40, Chaligha *et al.* 2002). Second, the strategy of encouraging large-scale farming is focussed on pursuit of a fiscally sustainable means of sustaining the political market. The idea is simple: large-scale farming will pay for infrastructure and other service provision to their own farms, which smallholders/ citizen-peasants will also be entitled to benefit from.

This feature is illustrated by a core project that has arisen under the auspices of *kilimo kwanza*, the Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT 2010, 2011, Jenkins 2012). This corridor, running from Dar es Salaam on the coast through to the Southern Highlands, is a conscious attempt to build upon the earlier ‘mini-green revolution’. In technocratic language, it is described as ‘an innovative private partnership that can be used to encourage investments in agricultural development to the benefit of smallholder farmers’ (Booth *et al.* 2014, p. 51). Elsewhere its objective is expressed in terms that are directly evocative of the political market, aspiring ‘to provide opportunities [my emphasis] for smallholder producers to engage in profitable agriculture’ (SAGCOT 2011, p. 7).

Intentions aside, the prospects for rejuvenation of the political market are not great. First, investment prospects are not as strong as the glossy marketing prospectuses suggest, for obvious reasons. Moreover, land grabbing will remain a concern, and given the politically empowered status of the landholders, the proverbial ‘investor’ of ‘globalisation’ is sure to be anxious. Finally, wage-labour for large farms is, as Coulson suggests, likely to remain a substantial problem; whether capitalist-enterprise can be compatible with the citizen-peasant and political market is a fundamental question, and given the argument advanced there are reasons to doubt it.

Overall, then, the political market seems likely to remain unstable and liable to crisis. Whilst the ambition that *kilimo kwanza* evinces does provide a measure of support for the claims advanced in the thesis, it is much more difficult to say much with confidence about its current trajectory. Whilst those elements of modernity that have been subject to fission in Tanzania (infrastructural technologies such as TAZARA)

have been deeply consequential, industry has not been one of them. And, to the profound frustration of hopes for ‘development’ in the programmatic sense, the material capacities of production premised on the citizen-peasant have proven rather limited. This is a curious consequence to arrive at through U&CD, given its original conception as a theory of industrialisation in conditions of backwardness (Trotsky 2008, Gerschenkron 1962). This at least suggests that ‘privileges of backwardness’ do not necessarily extend to industrialisation in every case.

Citizens and the Politics of Ownership

Might the possibility of a wider politics of ownership yield more results for contemporary Tanzania? This can be addressed by resuming with the politics of corruption, concern for which has become ever more widespread and deeply felt in Tanzania (REPOA 2006, Aminzade 2013a, pt. III, Lofchie 2014, chap. 7, Gray 2015). Corruption was one of three major themes advanced by Jakaya Kikwete when first standing for president in 2005 (one other theme being agriculture) (Edwards 2014, p. 225). Yet, by the 2010 election, the situation was markedly different (Lofchie 2014, p. 217). Increasingly associated with corruption scandals, the Kikwete government had lost a great deal of credibility that resulted in both a fall in turnout and reduced vote share for CCM.

What, other than a sense of the intractability of the issue, does this reveal? First it highlights the centrality of the issue in electoral politics. If, as suggested in Chapter 6, the strength and depth of feeling against corruption is not just a reflection of moral sentiment but also closely tied to the political market this is hardly surprising. Political sentiment against corruption has come to be conjoined with campaigns against privatisation (Aminzade 2013a, pp. 278–284). So successful has it been that by May 2009 the privatisation process was essentially over, and a substantial amount of Tanzanian infrastructure remains in the state’s hands. Thus, whilst few leading personalities associated with corruption have been prosecuted, Aminzade suggests that corruption attached itself to a great extent to privatisation schemes.

This amounts to some evidence of a widening in public ownership. A tangential issue is also due consideration here. For the fundamental basis of the political market lies in its close connection to the lack of market dependence amongst rural, agrarian peasant labour. If the politics of ownership was being extended, one could reasonably expect to see an extension of that logic to more urban concerns. In Chapter 6 some

urban oriented diversification was noted, and Bryceson's (2010) urban case study was deployed to demonstrate not only the logical possibility but its actual realisation too.¹⁰ To advance consideration of this issue further, a great deal more data drawn from the present era would be required, looking at patterns of migration and 'day to day' reproduction. Important work (Tripp 1997) has been done to show the great flexibility of urban Tanzania, but it relies upon the particular context of liberalisation.¹¹ Aside from there being some limitations to the data available, there is a methodological limitation that is of more concern.

To build toward that, then, another field can be scrutinised that might evidence an extension in public or citizen ownership. This is the recent discovery of large natural gas deposits and some oil (Coulson 2013, p. 9). Resource nationalism has, as in so many other places, arisen around gas (Green 2013), which is not in itself particularly remarkable. More interesting is the form it has taken. This has involved protests in Mtwara, nearest to the gas finds, over concerns that the benefits will be monopolised by Dar es Salaam (BBC 2013). In response, the government has been forced to guarantee that the proceeds, financial and infrastructural, would be for the benefit of Tanzania as a nation, including Mtwara, not solely Dar es Salaam. Indeed it has gone so far as to clarify that the entire project will be oriented toward domestic infrastructure and energy generation (including rural electrification) even at the cost of reduced profits (Manson 2013, Ng'wanakilala 2015).

There are real perils in engaging with this issue, very much still in flux and possibly subject to further conflict, which has involved some violence. Nevertheless, some tentative observations are helpful. Whilst these outbursts of violence in its contentious politics might yet damage Tanzania's reputation for stability, and the possibility that government guarantees will not be honoured, at least one possibility is that this is suggestive of a widening norm of public ownership as advanced, contentiously, by citizens themselves. The government's quick moves to assuage concerns along these lines is suggestive in this respect, even more so is the significance of those claims being construed in expressly national terms.¹² In spite of its perils, the minimum that can be

¹⁰ See also (Bah et al. 2003) for an attempt to complicate understandings of rural-urban linkages in Tanzania.

¹¹ Tripp mostly argues that this is done to maintain labourers' independence from the state, which if generalized beyond the context of liberalization and Dar es Salaam would cast some doubt on the extension of the political market.

¹² Another possibility, of course, is that discourses of nationalism are deployed to delegitimize local protest.

said of the speculative suggestion being offered is that it remains within the realm of possibilities.

The final, very visible, aspect of contemporary Tanzania that can be pointed to is the dramatic re-entry of China to the stage. Relations between China and Tanzania, to say nothing of Africa in general, have been booming since 2000, if not before (Baregu 2008, Lofchie 2014, pp. 222–227). Trade is a great feature of this, but at least as significant is China's role as a major source of infrastructure development. It is one of several major participants in features of the gas project noted above, but there are two other projects that are worth noting in addition.

The first is a deep-water port at Bagamoyo, which will have capacity that will dwarf every existing port in East Africa. Aside from its vast capacity, attached thereto will be both export and import processing zones, road and rail links connecting the port to Tanzania, extending into Zambia (through TAZARA) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Anthony 2013, p. 136, Lofchie 2014, p. 225). Originally conceived as a private project, but unlikely to proceed on that basis (Aminzade 2013a, p. 268) Chinese funding of \$10 billion at concessional rates seems to have made the project possible.

A second project revisits the industrial ambitions that Nyerere had once hoped would follow TAZARA. A \$3 billion agreement is now in place for the construction of a coal mine, thermal power station and iron ore mine in the Southern Highlands (Anthony 2013, p. 135). This project, also taking advantage of TAZARA,¹³ is hugely ambitious in scale and on some projections will generate as much of 25% of Tanzanian GDP once complete.

Whilst the completion of these projects, let alone the wider claims made for them, should not be taken for granted, this does have real bearing on many of the issues facing contemporary Tanzania. The abiding problem, since the citizen-peasant emerged in Tanzania, has been fiscal; that is, the difficulty in securing resources to make the political market 'work' in view of the real but all too modest surplus the citizen-peasant has been able to generate. This has meant persistent resort to external finance, and since the 1970s this has become increasingly problematic as external finance became both less available and much more expensive under 'neoliberalism' (Harvey 2005, chap. 1). These difficulties have pushed the state in the direction of embracing mining, or 'public-private' schemes like *kilimo kwanza* with dubious prospects, in an attempt to resolve the problem.

¹³ At a more modest financial scale, aid packages have also been agreed to recuperate the TAZARA railway and thereafter establish it in a commercial footing (Mumero 2012).

China's interest in infrastructure, and relative financial largesse toward Tanzania, suggest this ground *might* be shifting. Unsurprisingly, the Tanzanian state has, like many others, responded to Chinese interest with great enthusiasm. Likewise, this does seem prone to once again provoke greater responsiveness to Tanzania amongst other powers once too (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 263). However, the content of Chinese interaction is not easy to comprehend. Whilst these relations are commercially oriented, they are normally attached to deeply concessional loans and premised on a range of political and geopolitical calculations (Wang and Zou 2014).

Without leaping to the conclusion that 'unequal equals' might still have analytical purchase – which would be a very difficult position to sustain based on the current evidence available – it does suggest that a more thoroughgoing analysis of the content and potential of the pattern of interaction in the 21st century is worthwhile. Furthermore, the potential significance that 'China in Africa' holds out for the political market as it is currently constituted in Tanzania is simple at one basic level, offering to buttress the political market through both finance and infrastructural projects.

This leads, finally, to an issue of concern for Section III. This is what might be a methodological limitation to U&CD, and the claims that have been advanced on the basis of it in this thesis. U&CD, beginning with a plane of unevenness, before identifying interaction and combination to specify a form of development, is not a methodology that is particularly well attuned to very short timescales, least of all in the case of ongoing phenomena. It would have been very difficult, for example, to forecast the possibilities attached to the TAZARA project in the ways that have been identified in this thesis in, say, 1970. Allying U&CD with ancillary theories might alleviate this limitation, but that risks subverting the potential of U&CD that lies in the great intellectual flexibility derived from its core premises. Alas, it seems, U&CD gives no greater mandate than other methodologies to avoid the usual disclaimers: it is simply too soon to tell with confidence what the nature and prospects of the contemporary citizen-peasant are.

III. Difference, Modernity and International Relations

Setting out to tackle the problem of difference encapsulated as Marx and Arusha in this work, the focus has been on the need to reconcile modernity and the peasant. The first step toward addressing this was theoretical, deploying U&CD in an effort to re-theorise modernity as a *fissile process* in Chapter 3. Out of that framework the

empirical Chapters identified the citizen-peasant as a concrete social form that expressed the possibility of the peasant as a protean subject of fissile modernity. Having reflected on the implications and prospects of that research in the contemporary conjuncture, Section III concludes with some reflections on the concepts which have been deployed and developed here and the methodological choices which have been made.

The integration of difference with modernity can be achieved, in this argument, by articulating modernity as a process, theorised through reference to U&CD. With this methodology in hand it becomes possible to both recognise the logical possibility of difference and track across time elements of modernity breaking off from its original foundations and recombining with different elements. As such the peasant can more than just 'survive' as a marginal feature. Rather, through transmutating and combining with elements of modernity, it can be more thoroughly integrated into a theorisation of modernity. In these instances, the peasant, in combined form, would have revealed itself as a *protean subject* of modernity.

In pursuing this argument to its empirical conclusion, the focus has been on Tanzania. This was methodologically necessary since the data required to fully flesh out the general argument does not easily admit of a 'world history' of peasants under modernity. That said the standing of this argument would benefit from extension in some important directions. Aside from extension to other and wider regions of Africa (Boone 2014), the possibilities for extending and testing these notions by reference to the peasant are vast.

Perhaps the most obvious place to turn to though is China.¹⁴ Here the peasant has plainly been central to its revolutionary history but continues to emerge at the heart of debates, most especially in China itself, over the trajectory of its development right up to the present day (Wen 2007, Wang 2009, Day 2013). Although it is true that processes that could well be thought of as depeasantisation are ongoing there, support for the broad positions established in this thesis would not depend on denying that. Instead it would "only" (scare quotes intended!) need to establish that such depeasantisation could, in fact, be understood as hybridisation in the sense of *combined develop* discussed in Chapter 3. Since the immense world historical significance of the rise of China could hardly be doubted, the core claims around peasant and modernity would

¹⁴ India is another potential site, not least since the post-colonial method has been extensively developed there. Accordingly, it also affords an opportunity to further consider the complementary and/or competitive intellectual potential of post-colonialism and U&CD.

be very substantially advanced if it were possible to link them to this phenomenon, showing the Chinese peasant to be a protean subject of its rise.

Similarly, this thesis has also pursued a temporally limited strategy, developing its claims in relation to the post-colonial era alone. There are similar possibilities for historical extension as there are for geographic. But without reproducing the same thoughts advanced above, another methodological point arises to be made. Having relied upon U&CD in developing this argument, political multiplicity has been taken for granted both theoretically and empirically by virtue of starting at the point of independence.¹⁵ Given the significance of ‘peasantisation’ in the passage to independence (Iliffe 1979) the possibility of historical extension of this research might also be able to shed light on how political multiplicity is generated. Thus, whilst the thesis has focussed on asking what IR (or at least U&CD) can do for the historical sociology of peasant and modernity, a temporal extension might offer fruitful possibilities in the reverse. Such a move might also guard against the danger of reification of political multiplicity (Rosenberg 2009, 2010). Doing so, however, would require a great deal further theoretical and empirical excavation beyond that offered here.

Finally, what of the problem of difference in general? It has been suggested that attention to international relations, especially through U&CD, offers great potential. Indeed difference is, or at least ought to be, a central preoccupation of disciplinary IR (Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, Rosenberg 2016). Rather than starting with political multiplicity though, the thesis began with a fundamentally social difference, modernity and the peasant or Marx and Arusha, then sought to reconcile them by making use of ‘the international’ as a field of interactivity across a plane of social difference.¹⁶ In doing so the ambition has been to show that the Tanzanian peasant has been a protean subject – a part of history, not outside it *à la* Sarkozy – of the modern world. Nyerere, like Du Bois, thought the moral implications of this sort of possibility are paramount, writing:

‘To the extent that we in Tanzania succeed in the struggle to which we have committed ourselves, so we shall be taking our place in the march of humanity

¹⁵ Work on U&CD itself endeavours to not take this for granted (Rosenberg 2010); the point being made here is directed at this thesis insofar as it has not taken a position on this aspect of the theoretical framework.

¹⁶ Whilst this does not entail that the argument as relied upon reification of the international, it must be accepted that it does nothing in itself to address the issue.

towards peace and human dignity...Now we are beginning to wake up and to join with our fellow human beings in deciding the destiny of the human race. By thinking out our own problems on the basis of those principles which have universal validity, Tanzania will make its contribution to the development of mankind. That is our opportunity and responsibility' (Nyerere 1968, p. 32).

The ultimate limitation of this thesis, then, is as follows. If the premises of U&CD are valid then difference is a fundamental feature of human society; and this might be especially true of a modernity that, in this argument, is subject to a process of fission. Such premises have allowed this thesis to address a real problem of difference: peasant and modernity. However, if historical sociology can ultimately only tell us that difference, as far as we can tell and theorise, always has been and will be a feature of human societies then one key dimension of the problem of difference must remain beyond its ken. For the upshot is this: the challenge that difference poses to humanity has an irreducibly moral dimension; upon this thought, though, I can offer no more than humility.

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